Transforming Global Governance:
Contesting Images of the Future from People on the Edge of
the Periphery.

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Keywords.

Bioregionalism, critical futures studies, decision-making, feminism, future, global governance, globalisation, globalism, Global Digital Democracies, image, international relations, metaphor, multilateralism, myth, partnerships, planetary civilisation, United Nations, United Nations reform, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, transformation, vision, world order, worldviews.
Abstract.

This thesis aims to bring unconventional perspectives to the global governance debates by developing multiple images of futures from contesting worldviews. Informed by futures research and the perspectives and stories of nations and peoples currently unrepresented in global decision-making forums such as the United Nations General Assembly, the thesis maps global governance philosophies, systems and structures, agencies, and their underlying worldviews and myths to produce possible futures for each of six actor groups contesting the current global governance system. The criteria used to construct these possible futures are then used to construct a model and story for the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (U.N.P.O.) using their materials, collected at their 2010 General Assembly, as content. The model and story represent the preferred global governance future for U.N.P.O. evoking an image of ‘One World’. The thesis in its entirety provides U.N.P.O. with the means to develop a positioning statement on global governance futures and to join the growing international conversation on this topic.
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Acronyms and Key Terms.

C.L.A. Causal Layered Analysis
G.A.T.T. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
G.D.P. Gross Domestic Product
G.N.I. Gross National Income
I.C.T. Information and communications technologies
I.M.F. International Monetary Fund
I.P.C.C. International Panel on Climate Change
N.G.O. Non-government organisation
O.E.C.D. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
R2P Responsibility to protect
S.A.R.S. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
T.F.N. Transnational Feminist Network
U.K. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
U.N. United Nations
U.N.D.P. United Nations Development Program
U.N. ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council
U.N.P.O. Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation
U.S. United States (of America)
W.E.F. World Economic Forum
W.O.M.P. World Order Models Project
W.S.F. World Social Forum
W.T.O. World Trade Organisation

State, Nation and Nation-State.
A State (capital ‘S’) is a self-governing political entity. A nation is a group of people that shares a common culture. A nation-state is a nation that has the same borders as a State.
Statement of Original Authorship.

The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

Signature: A Kelleher

Date: May 18, 2012
Acknowledgements.

There have been times during this doctoral research project when I have felt a close affinity with Frodo Baggins, the Hobbit in Ray Holyoak’s Doing a PhD: a Lord of the Rings Analogy. Setting out alone on an exciting yet arduous journey into unknown (doctoral research) territory entrusted with the ring (the idea of this project) believing that the future could be influenced in some way if I succeeded in reaching Mordor (thesis submission) yet not really knowing what perils and pitfalls I might encounter along the way. Fortunately, like Frodo, I had guidance and support along the way from Galadriel, Gandalf, Elrond, Sam, Arwen, Aragorn, Eowyn, Faramir, and the Hobbits.

The Characters in my PhD story:

Galadriel  Professor Joanne Scott (supervisor), University of the Sunshine Coast
Elrond  Professor Pam Dyer (supervisor, retired), University of the Sunshine Coast
Gandalf  Adjunct Professor Sohail Inayatullah (supervisor), University of the Sunshine Coast
Arwen  Professor Alma Whitely, Curtin University of Technology
Aragorn  Dr Jose Ramos
Faramir  Dr Peter Hayward
Eowyn  Kelisha Lyndon, Office of Research, University of the Sunshine Coast
Frodo Baggins  me
Sam  my husband, Andy Sykes
The Hobbits  family and friends

Gandalf the Wizard of Futures, got me started on the road to Mordor and sent me on small quests along the way to learn new ways of thinking. There were times when I had no idea if I was on the right track and Mordor seemed an eternity away; a distant vision from the mountain top, an impossible destination from a dark vale. Yet just as I became disheartened with the search there were three who gave me aid: Arwen used her wisdom and telepathic skills to read my mind and help me understand the importance of the
ring; Faramir showed me where to look for the writing signposts to Mordor; and Aragorn, a former student of Gandalf, shared his experiences of an equally perilous journey and talked me through some of the doubts that beset me at the mid-way point.

Like Frodo I felt the weight of the ring. I tired of carrying it for so long and was occasionally tempted to wander off with Legolas and the elves into the forests of Middle Earth for music and meditation. Eowyn the Brave went into battle with the Orks for me on a few occasions when I missed my scheduled reports and gave me the information and administrative support I needed to complete my journey. There were times when the spectre of Gollum (failure) haunted me. Galadriel entered here, taking over from wise Elrond who retired to Rivendell. Galadriel shared her knowledge of many other heroic quests, imparted energy when I needed it, and restored my faith in my ability to reach Mordor.

Sam gave me love and support throughout the journey. He could not carry the ring but understood how important it was for me to complete the quest. He made sure I ate, drank, rested and occasionally made merry so I did not lose touch with reality. He promised a great party and feasting with The Hobbits once the ring was cast into the flames. And finally I acknowledge The Hobbits who encouraged me, even though they didn’t understand what it was all for.

Husband, family, friends, colleagues - thank you all for sharing my journey.
A Special Acknowledgment of the Nations and Peoples of the U.N.P.O.

Whilst the reading for this thesis opened my mind to new and hopeful possibilities for world futures, the U.N.P.O. opened my eyes to the seemingly intractable problems that beset millions of people today. These insights into the lives of the victims and the marginalised kept me grounded when my imagination took flight to explore some of the futures that might be. I would especially like to thank the U.N.P.O. secretariat and membership for their support, encouragement and participation in this research and acknowledge representatives from the following nations and peoples who contributed during the U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly:

- Abkhazia
- Afrikaner
- Assyria
- Balochistan
- Cabinda
- Chittagong Hills Tract
- Circassia
- East Turkistan
- Gilgit Baltistan
- Hmong
- Hungarians in Romania
- Inner Mongolia
- Iranian Kurdistan
- Khmer Krom
- Mapuche
- Montagnard
- Ogaden
- Ogoni
- Sindh
- Southern Azerbaijan
- Southern Cameroon
- Taiwan
- Tibet
- West Balochistan
- Zanzibar
Personal Preface.

The twenty-first century is the one we have direct responsibility for - we, our children and possibly our grandchildren will live, grow old and die in it. What can we do for our part in planetary evolution? What can we bequeath to our great, great grandchildren? (Cocks 2003:np).

As a grandmother, the quotation above eloquently reflects my concerns for the world that my children and grandchildren are living in, and the world that my yet unborn great grandchildren and their children will inherit. When I started this work in 2008, a number of seemingly intractable problems faced the human family: climate change, terrorism, fundamentalism, water and energy shortages, world population growth, ecological degradation, desertification, and an international economic crisis which was expected to last several years. Popular media coverage of world events showed little but doom and gloom and this negativity continues today in 2012. Yet there are also signs of new peoples’ movements rallying to protest against political and economic extremism, to collaborate on social and ecological issues, and to create a better world for future generations. There are shifts in politics including a softening of national borders in some areas towards regional approaches to economic, political and environmental issues. In these movements and shifts I see signs of hope for the world ahead. Many of these signals of change are emerging from the majority of the world’s inhabitants whose voices appear to come from the periphery of human civilisation because their views are suppressed by the minority elite nations, the media, economically powerful corporations, and the international organisations that only recognise States in their debates and decision-making forums.

For me the challenges facing the human family in the twenty-first century are significant and will require collaboration and cooperation across politically imposed State borders, across cultural schisms, across ideological and spiritual divides, between sectors and domain silos, across echelons of consciousness, between rich and poor. Most importantly, in my view, it is time to listen to the wisdoms of the world, understanding that many have developed through the aeons as a means of ensuring a
good life, however defined in context, for the people and their natural environment. I believe dialogues between ancient and modern wisdoms are needed to develop a deeper awareness of how we can improve the dignity and quality of life for all people and co-create the world we want to leave to our descendants. Laszlo eloquently expresses this emerging planetary consciousness as ‘the knowing as well as the feeling of the vital interdependence and essential oneness of humankind, and the conscious adoption of the ethics and the ethos that this entails’ (Laszlo 1997:143). I can see the glimmer of an emerging planetary civilisation just over the horizon, oscillating between an ephemeral illusion and an inevitable emergence. As an activist, and some would say idealist, I am drawn to shaping its form. What I hope will emerge during the twenty-first century is an inclusive, socially just, environmental-healing planetary civilisation striving to ensure a life in dignity for all of the human family and providing the means for all the people of the world to have a voice in global decisions that affect their futures.

Influenced by life in multi-cultural Ealing, London in the 1960s - anti-nuclear demonstrations, protest marches, hippy rock concerts, racial hatred, the Beatles - I have a personal history of activism, idealism, and wanting to create the best possible of all worlds. The Lennon song Imagine remains, for me, a beacon of hope for the future: ‘imagine all the people…living life in peace….you may say I’m a dreamer, but I’m not the only one….I hope some day you will join us and the world will live as one’. For me idealism is optimism and in the face of seemingly intractable global problems I believe positive images and collective action will counter the sense of despondency and hopelessness experienced by many people when faced with images of dystopian futures they feel powerless to change. These influences and beliefs informed my approach to this research. At the heart of this study are my desires to creatively explore human potential for societal transformation at the planetary level and to assist the members of the Unrepresented Nations and People Organisation (U.N.P.O.) to empower themselves within this interconnected and interactive reality. The words of Needleman (2005:np) express this eloquently:

There is an action, an allowing, a surrender within that has always been the birthright of every man or woman. The ego experiences it as a kind of stoppage. It is a special quality of silence. In that moment, you know why you are on earth and you know that as you are you cannot serve. You know you must change
your life and that this can only happen by searching for companions and conditions that will support the appearance of this moment of opening. In that moment, a new intention enters into one’s life, a new morality. It is the morality of the search.

My search has led me to participation in groups, movements and projects locally, nationally and internationally, paid and voluntary, with similar aims: creating a better world. My personal motivation is to leave a living legacy to my children and grandchildren: a better world for them and their descendants in the twenty-first century and beyond. The work undertaken for this thesis is one contribution and is dedicated to my children and grandchildren and their children and grandchildren.
The U.N.P.O. General Assembly 2010, Rome, Italy.

Your stories are our stories: without you we are utopians. Do not act in a scared way or we increase the power of our aggressors. We are finding strength in ourselves, strength in truth. We have a duty to live in order to make others live. New weapons are needed: instruments of non-violence such as reasoning and contradiction. Encourage solidarity: if I succeed, all can succeed. The strength of poetry is using ancient words to give birth to a new way.

Marco Pannella, President of the Nonviolent Radical Party.

The world is a changing in such a speedy way. We need new methods, unusual alliances: we need fresh thinking.

Emma Bonino, Member, Italian Senate.

My hope for the future is a General Assembly in Africa. We need to give positive messages of the direction we wish to go.

Ledum Mitee, President of U.N.P.O. 2008-2010, Leader of the Ogoni delegation.

As an unrepresented nation, people feel their opinions are being ignored in spite of their large populations. To be unable to decide your fate and run the affairs or have a say in your own country’s affairs, this is the unfortunate reality of millions of people. Many have been subject to political, cultural, linguistic, social and physical genocide. Many nations have been deprived of their basic rights even in the 21st century; at a time when technology is changing the way people live and making life easier. Unfortunately, despite all the development and progress in the world, many people are still deprived of clean water, shelter, electricity, health, and education. It is ironic. Technology has greatly contributed to the plight of many people and has strengthened the oppressor. Civilisation crumbles when it is most needed.

Baloch delegation.
Chapter One

The Core, the Periphery and the Need to Find Middle Ground
1.1 Fellow Passengers on Planet Earth.

Whilst giving a voice to all the millions of people who currently have none is, for me, a very attractive and desirable proposition, it is outside of the realms of feasibility for this thesis. However, as alluded to in my personal preface, there are international citizen groups forming around social, environmental and political agendas in many parts of the world and some are becoming increasingly interested and engaged in an international conversation on the topic of global governance. One such organisation, with membership comprising nations and peoples currently ineligible to participate in the global governance system, is the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (U.N.P.O.). The U.N.P.O. has agreed to participate in this research and provide their views on the major issues facing the world today and how the common affairs of the human family might be managed differently in the future. Hence this study will investigate a range of alternative global governance futures based on the ideologies of six non-State actor groups and then develop a U.N.P.O. preferred global governance future that engages the people of the world in debating and deciding on humanity’s common affairs. The articulation of this preferred future also assists the U.N.P.O. to join the growing international conversation on global governance futures.

As the world awakens to the interconnectedness of all things on planet Earth (Carpenter 1996; Coates 2007; Tucker 1991; Vaughan 2010), there is a growing call by scholars, activists, futurists and social scientists for the recognition of the human family as a planetary civilisation and for Earth’s human inhabitants to take on the additional layers of identity and responsibility of planetary citizens. Citizenship confers upon the citizen multiple rights and responsibilities according to the laws and customs of the city, State or ruler to which allegiance is given or compelled. Hence the views as to what constitutes a planetary civilisation and what Earth citizenship might entail could be as diverse as the communities that inhabit the planet.

Writers such as Baker and Chandler (2005), Bauwens (2005), Chase-Dunn (2005), Laszlo (2006) and Raskin et al (2002), for example, view this through the lens of societal evolution and group decision-making, albeit from the differing perspectives of the creation of a global civil society, a planetary society facilitated by technological
advancements, a cultural path to planetary civilisation and the inevitability of a planetary phase based on historical civilisational transitions. Others, notably Berry (1999), Cocks (2003), Falk (1975), Falkenmark (2007), Galtung (2002), Lovelock (2006), Mason (2006), Mendlovitz and Weiss (1975), Stern (2007) and the U.N. endorsed Commission on Global Governance (1995), take the stance that the human family needs to collectively manage their common affairs, particularly the challenges of this century that threaten the ways of life, even survival, of many people, and that present problems beyond the capability of individual States to address. Challenges such as climate change and water and energy shortages, for example, point to the need for cohesive worldwide resolutions and significant changes in thinking and human behaviour. Many researchers share the view that there could be insufficient drinking water for human needs, aside from the needs of other life forms, within the next two to three decades (Falkenmark 2007; Gleick 2009; Hunt 2004; Pearce 2010; Ramesh 2007; Rosegrant et al. 2002; SIWI 2009; World Water Assessment Program 2009). Other writers, including Bello (2001), Giddens (2002), Huntington (2002), Korten (2001), Mies (2005), de Sousa Santos (2004) and Werlhof (2008) see neoliberal globalisation as becoming increasingly contentious as a result of inter-cultural differences, perceived pressures for cultural homogeneity, the exclusion of many of the world’s peoples, and the failure of systems such as the international monetary system to achieve their intended aims. The severity of the recent international financial crisis has prompted an unprecedented call from the Vatican for a world political authority to manage the global economy, including commentary from the Pope criticising unrestrained capitalism and market forces for their destructive effects in society (Pope Benedict XVI 2009). In response to these concerns some scholars are exploring alternatives to neoliberal globalisation including Applebaum and Robinson (2005), Bello (2001), Cavanagh and Mander (2004), Inayatullah (2001), Lipschultz (1999), Ramos (2010) and de Sousa Santos (2006).

In the past, humans could adapt their thinking over several generations before a crucial change in behaviour was completed (Laszlo 2008; Rose 2005). In the present day, scientists tell us we must achieve a fundamental civilisational shift within less than a decade if we are to avert the worst effects of climate change on humans (Berry 1999; Laszlo 2006; Stern 2007). Yet at this juncture, there is no universally agreed means by
which humanity’s common affairs can be debated and decided at the planetary level, or
the means for the people of Earth to exercise the as yet imaginary rights and
responsibilities of planetary citizenship. Whilst people in many countries are becoming
aware of the global nature of the problems facing humanity, the responses from their
States and the actions of the U.N. to date lack the imaginative, transformative capacity
that scientists and scholars envisage will be necessary for human survival and thrival
(Florini 2006). New thinking and new perspectives are therefore required from outside
of the States-based U.N. system to rapidly transform global governance for relevancy
and effectiveness in the twenty-first century.

One potential source of new thinking on global governance is civil society. As the U.N.
endorsed Commission on Global Governance wrote in its 1995 publication, Our Global
Neighbourhood, ‘the people of the world have more power to shape the future than
ever before and never has there been a greater need to exercise that power’ (1995:3).
The current global governance system, however, only recognises the power of States to
shape the global future; opportunities for individuals and non-state actors to be heard in
key global decision-making forums such as the U.N. General Assembly are almost non-
existent. As well, North American and European writers dominate research in the field
of global governance, effectively marginalising perspectives from non-Western authors.
In this context there is an increasing need for the study of alternative forms of global
governance to establish a means by which the people of the world might contribute their
collective intelligence and wisdom to the debates and decisions on planetary issues.
This study seeks to contribute to meeting that need by investigating alternative global
governance futures for their potential to engage the people of the world as envisaged by
the Commission on Global Governance. For as Laszlo writes:

To work for the smoothest and most efficient transition to an order capable of
sustaining the world population, in conditions satisfying at least its minimum
non-negotiable demands, is not only a matter of long-term rationality but also of
basic morality. Ultimately the study of global futures moves from the area of
physical-technological constraints, to socio-economic processes, to the heart of
the matter: the investigation of perceptions of human interest and the advocacy
of genuine morality among fellow passengers on a small, crowded and fragile
planet earth (Laszlo 1978:743).
The preliminary literature review conducted for this research confirms that many other writers now share Laszlo’s sentiments. The topics of an emerging planetary civilisation and its common affairs, global problems that require coordinated worldwide responses, and neoliberal globalisation are collectively stimulating a growing international conversation on the futures of global governance, as will be discussed in greater detail in chapters two and three.

In the absence of agreed definitions in this emerging area of scholarship, I offer my own view of global governance futures studies: it is the study and production of alternative futures of the means to collectively address those issues common to the human family and which consider the planet as a whole as the unit of analysis. The use of Futures Studies methods in this research, as discussed in chapter four, will assist in the exploration of contemporary views of global governance futures that consider the changing social, environmental, economic, technological and political landscapes of the twenty-first century. These contemporary views provide significant contrast with the perspectives underpinning the establishment of the U.N.-centric global governance system that was designed in the twentieth century to achieve political and economic imperatives after World War II.

In the context of the above, I have developed the following research question:

By what means might international non-State actors transform global governance in alternative futures and what is the preferred global governance future of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation?

This introductory chapter provides background to the research, introduces the U.N.P.O. and outlines the remainder of the thesis.

1.2 The United Nations: at the Core of Global Governance.

The U.N., with a General Assembly now comprising 193 of the world’s 194 nations, is at the core of the current global governance system. Some might consider the U.N. to be the legitimate forum for the people of the world to debate and agree the management of their common affairs, as envisioned by the Commission on Global Governance, or to seek global resolutions to challenges and intractable problems. However there are
weaknesses in the structure and operation of the U.N. that limit its ability to act. The balance of power within the U.N. is skewed by the power of veto held by a small number of politically and economically dominant countries. The views on globalisation and global governance held by these countries are influenced by a commitment to Neoliberalism reminiscent of the Thatcher-Reagan ethos of the 1980s. Representatives of less influential nations attending U.N. and World Trade Organisation forums are not always in a position to stand up to the powerful States that can wield the veto to attain their own ends (Crowl 2001). Some weaker nations have been coerced or induced by more powerful actors to sign agreements and to vote on issues contrary to their people’s best interests (Crowl 2001; Kelleher 2005). In such a highly contested arena dominated by a few elite nations it is difficult for the majority of the world’s people to be heard. Individual citizens have no legitimate means of contributing to global decisions in these forums. Only States that have recognised each other through international treaty are represented at the U.N. and only heads of these States participate in decision-making. As one distinguished macrohistorian writes ‘there are 2000 nations in 200 countries’ (Galtung 2007:153) which suggests that not only are the views of some 1800 nations potentially not being heard at the U.N. General Assembly but of the ‘200’ States eligible to participate in this high-level decision-making forum, just a small minority are actually shaping the agendas on issues that affect the whole planet. The U.N.P.O. members contributing to the aims of this research project are but a few of the many nations and peoples that are potentially not being heard.

1.3 Engaging With The Periphery: The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation.

Founded in 1991 by fifteen nations at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the U.N.P.O. is an international democratic membership-based organisation created for and by its members to address the impacts of exclusion from major international forums such as the U.N. General Assembly. U.N.P.O. members include indigenous nations and peoples, minorities, unrecognised nations and occupied territories. Their exclusion from such forums significantly limits their ability to participate in international debates, or to access the support of international institutions mandated to defend their rights, protect their environments and alleviate the effects of conflict. They have been forced to the
edge of the periphery of the international relations system. The U.N.P.O. Presidency and Secretariat work to address these consequences of marginalisation, promoting members’ democratic causes, providing information, articulating creative and nonviolent strategies for progress, and ensuring members’ voices are heard. Through its website and media networks, U.N.P.O. raises the profile of members’ suffering which includes attempted genocide, destruction of sacred sites, torture, forced disappearances, execution of peaceful demonstrators, environmental destruction by corporations, and communications embargoes (see www.U.N.P.O.org). The U.N.P.O. Presidency and Secretariat also organise regular diplomatic missions, deliver training programs to assist members to empower themselves, and lobby European Union institutions and U.N. councils on human rights and indigenous issues.

The U.N.P.O. has five foundational principles of non-violence, human rights, democracy and self-determination, environmental protection and tolerance that guide its policies and activities. Upon joining, each member commits to respecting these principles, which form part of the U.N.P.O. Covenant. This study will also respect these principles throughout the research to produce a normative global governance future for the U.N.P.O.

Members interact through thematic programs of mutual interest and through forums such as the U.N.P.O. General Assembly held every two years, the Assembly of the Nonviolent Radical Party, international conferences and capacity building programs, and some participate in the U.N. Permanent Forum for Indigenous Peoples. At the U.N.P.O. General Assembly, delegates report on the situation and plight of their nations, highlighting current issues such as breaches of human and cultural rights, executions, sanctions and communications embargoes against their people, and exchange stories of successes and failures in their ongoing struggles for self-determination and peaceful co-existence with the recognised States.

In the twenty years since its launch, U.N.P.O. has grown into a respected international forum through which its members can become effective participants in and contributors to the international community. U.N.P.O. now represents approximately sixty member nations and peoples that are located on the following map (U.N.P.O. 2010).
The focus of this research is the views and images of unrepresented nations and peoples of possible futures for global governance. In searching for suitable participants that are accessible to me for the purposes of this study, I selected the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (U.N.P.O.) for its broad membership, commitment to non-violence and its organisational capabilities. The challenges confronting U.N.P.O. add different perspectives to the growing international conversation on global governance futures. It is a conversation in which the U.N.P.O. can participate on an equal basis. Situated on the periphery of the current global governance system by virtue of their status as nations and peoples that are not recognised as States by international treaty, U.N.P.O. members are ineligible to participate in many international forums where decisions affecting their futures are taken. However, as a collective, U.N.P.O. can formulate a position on alternative global governance futures and participate in the international conversation in other forums, including Internet based forums, meetings of activist movements such as the World Social Forum, the peace movement or the international feminist movement, present their case at conferences, and promote their position on the U.N.P.O. website. The formulation of an U.N.P.O. position on global

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1 Source: www.U.N.P.O.org
governance futures is one of the products of this research and is presented in chapter five. Its development requires an understanding of the current global governance system, with the U.N. organisations at its core, and some of the alternative futures that are emerging through the international conversation. This understanding is developed through the literature review discussed in chapters two and three.

At the outset of this research, the U.N.P.O. had 70 member nations and peoples. Their dire situations present considerable challenges for the conduct of this global research. Direct contact with some nations is impossible due to embargoes and to the threat such contact might generate for the individual concerned. Others might be challenged linguistically and technologically. The contributions to this study will be limited to those members available and willing to participate at the U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly. Contact after the General Assembly will be limited to communications with the Secretariat. Achieving the research objectives is therefore highly dependent on effective working relationships between the appointed Secretariat contact and me. I make one key assumption at the outset of this research. That people with limited or no access to existing global governance forums wish to have a voice in matters that affect the future of the world.

1.4 Extending the Conversation.

Previous research in the field of global governance has been dominated by Western civilisational images, thinking, institutions, and perceptions of the priority issues facing the world including, for example, the reports of the Commission on Global Governance (1995), the edited works of Beres and Targ (1975), scholarly articles and books by Evans et al. (2005), Falk (1975, 1995, 2000; Falk and Strauss 2000), Held (1995, 2004; 2005; Held et al. 1999), Huntington’s *Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* (2002), Korten’s *When Corporations Rule the World* (2001), and reports from The Millennium Project (1996-2011). Much of the work available in English also has a relatively short-term perspective. To date, researchers do not appear to have considered the diversity of views envisaged by the Commission on Global Governance or provided the means by which the people of the world might exercise their power to shape the longer-term future. Consequently what is missing from the global governance futures
scholarship are opportunities to hear what the voiceless, the marginalised, the excluded and the victims have to say. My stance here is that drawing on the different ways of knowing of a wide range of people is not simply about being politically correct and inclusive but rather is an opportunity to explore possibilities of new thinking for global governance transformation. Deep in the unheard stories, the veiled myths and metaphors of the human family could lie the means of human survival in the twenty-first century. For Inayatullah:

New time and future metaphors and images have the potential to free us from deterministic and mechanistic thinking and allow us to reintegrate a sense of wonder and stewardship towards the future. How we think about the future determines the way we act in the present and new metaphors and a new narrative could allow us to engage more creatively and perhaps more responsibly with our futures (cited in Green 2007 n.p.).

Resourceful humans across the planet have developed their own survival strategies for local conditions and collectively have the knowledge to use the common affairs of the human family at the dawn of the twenty-first century as catalysts to take humanity to its next societal evolutionary stage. Emerging schools of thought from Indian and Islamic writers, for example, are adding depth to the global governance debate in the form of more spiritual paths to world order (Chandhoke 2002; Kapoor 2007; Sardar 1993; Sarkar 2006; Sen 2006; Shiva 2002). Eastern philosophies have provided catalysts for numerous Western studies into consciousness and explorations of the inner-self as evidenced in the works of Boldt (1999), Dreher (1996), Heider (1985), Wilber (1995, 2000, 2002, 2007) and others who use Taoist and Buddhist thought and practice to open readers’ minds to old wisdoms for the twenty-first century. Doubtless there are perspectives in other cultures and civilisations that would further enrich the discourse.

The consideration of these perspectives has the potential to prevent future global governance arrangements from becoming merely a larger Western democracy, or a continued extension of 1980s Neoliberalism with its narrow focus on politics and money. Considered from the standpoint of societal evolution, alternative views from the periphery might also yield the spark of creativity needed to ignite the fundamental civilisational shift called for by some writers earlier in this chapter.
As previously discussed, U.N.P.O. members have no means of directly contributing to global decision-making, only States recognised within the relevant international relations treaties do, and only leaders of States do in the U.N. The peripheral position of U.N.P.O. members places them in a unique position to contribute to debates on alternative globalisations and modes of global governance. This research needs to be completed to give a voice to those on the periphery of global governance and to enrich the discourses on globalisation and global governance with alternative stories and images of futures.

1.5 Methodological Overview.

This research aims to produce images of global governance futures from the perspectives of unrepresented nations and peoples as expressed in their stories and interviews related at the U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly. The nature of this interest requires a qualitative approach to the research (Burns 2000; Denzin and Lincoln 2005b; Denzin and Lincoln 2000). According to Denzin and Lincoln, authors of an authoritative series of Handbooks of Qualitative Research, a research design describes a flexible set of guidelines that link theoretical paradigms to strategies of enquiry and then to methods (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). Within the ambit of qualitative research, this particular project draws upon Critical Theory and Social Constructionism for its theoretical paradigm. The theoretical base will then be linked to Participatory Action Research as the methodological strategy of enquiry and segue to the proposed methods for collecting, analysing and interpreting empirical materials, at the core of which is Causal Layered Analysis. The final global governance futures produced for the study are created from data and other materials provided by participating U.N.P.O. members and extracts from the literature search. The following diagram illustrates the research design:
Theoretical Paradigm: Critical Social Constructionism.

The principles of critical theory are emancipatory in nature, seeking to empower subjugated people by giving a voice to those often suppressed due to class, race, age, gender, sexual orientation, economic status, physical and mental ability and the like (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). For Sardar (1999a), this is not merely a politically correct exercise in emancipation. He believes that real change comes from the periphery from wise and unconventional people historically known as prophets, and that today’s prophets are the communities whose voices have been silenced. For this particular thesis, the voices that have been, and continue to be, silenced are members of the U.N.P.O. by virtue of their exclusion from international forums such as the U.N. General Assembly where matters affecting world futures are discussed and decided upon.

The preliminary literature review conducted for this study indicated that a Western civilisational worldview dominates the discourses on planetary civilisations, globalisations, global governance and futures. In his seminal edited book, *Rescuing All Our Futures*, Sardar (1999b) writes that the future has been colonised by Western corporate interests, that Americanisation has transitioned to globalisation and that a ‘list
of the one hundred most influential futurists contained only one person from the non-West’ (Sardar 1999b:13). Wildman (1996) also finds that the majority of the world’s people live in oral cultures and that the West is textualising them out of existence. As most U.N.P.O. members are from the non-West, from oral cultures, and are not native English speakers, they are marginalised in the world futures debates linguistically and culturally as well as politically. This project takes a critical theory approach by seeking a broader view to that available in the scholarly literature and by including perspectives from U.N.P.O. members that are not usually considered by researchers or policy-makers. The inclusion of such perspectives seeks to challenge the current limited view by creating different worlds based on a more globally representative set of worldviews and synthesising these perspectives within scenarios. It is hoped that critiquing and questioning both dominating and potentially liberating social constructs will encourage actors in global society to adopt a paradigm that liberates the people of the world as envisioned by the Commission on Global Governance (1995). Critical theory is, however, historically oriented. Its basic belief systems give no indication as to how the future might be shaped. For Futures Studies, with its one unifying characteristic of viewing a topic through a future time lens, a future orientation is an important aspect of this study. To address this shortfall in critical theory I incorporate the more recent theory of Social Constructionism.

Social Constructionism is a body of social theory concerned with the way that meaning is produced and assimilated by society; specifically, the social construction of knowledge. It argues that meaning and understandings emerge from the interactions between people inter-subjectively (Fuller and Loogma, 2008). In the context of futures research, the social constructionist position is that knowledge of what is desirable or undesirable for the future is inter-subjectively socially constructed, a process often referred to as ‘co-creation’. These constructions are symbolic texts of future knowledge ‘often in the form of scenarios and stories, with illustrations’ (Fuller and Loogma 2007:9). I therefore blend Social Constructionism with Critical Theory, which for the purposes of this thesis will be referred to as Critical Social Constructionism, to achieve the emancipatory and normative aims of this study.

According to Inayatullah, (2005a) critical futures researchers:

assert that the present is fragile, merely the victory of one particular discourse, way of knowing, over another. The goal of critical research is to disturb present power relations through making problematic our categories and evoking other places, other scenarios of the future.

Drawing on the works of Foucault, Shapiro and Ashley, Inayatullah presents a post-structural view of critical futures studies that acknowledges reality as socially constructed. Truth is not, therefore, absolute; rather there are multiple patterns of truths that shape the way we perceive and create our worlds (Inayatullah 2004). In this thesis some of these multiple patterns, or worldviews, are explored with the aim of challenging the dominant perspectives of globalisation and global governance with alternative views. Under the umbrella of Critical Social Constructionism the methodological strategy of enquiry used to achieve the inter-subjectively generated knowledge in this study is Participatory Action Research. Whilst a detailed discussion of the collection, analysis and interpretation methods used in the study is provided in chapter three, I introduce Causal Layered Analysis (C.L.A.) here as it is used to structure and map the literature reviewed in chapters two and three.

Derived from poststructuralism, C.L.A. is both method and theory (Inayatullah 2004c). As method, C.L.A. comprises four vertical layers, The Litany, Systemic and Social Analysis, Worldviews and Discourses, and Metaphors and Myths within which horizontal discourses may be entered into (Inayatullah 2004a). As one of the aims of this study is to produce images of the future, images have been assigned to each layer of C.L.A. as visual representations of the vertical layers. These are presented in greater detail in chapter four. The Litany level of C.L.A. gives the official description of a particular topic accompanied by the means that are used to measure the subject under investigation. The Systems and Social Causes level seeks to understand what lies beneath the measurements, their systemic origins and the social causes that led to the current system becoming more prominent than other past-future systems. At the third level political or civilisational worldviews are explored along with the various discourses that constitute reality for the multiple stakeholders. The final level, metaphors and myths, seeks to uncover the almost subconscious mythic stories that are
driving the issue and the metaphors used to make sense of them. In this thesis C.L.A. is used as an analytical method to structure the literature review in chapters two and three and forms the foundation of the framework used in chapter five to analyse the research findings and develop alternative global governance futures.

1.6 Outline of the Thesis.

This thesis is structured in six chapters with a personal preface. Chapter one introduces the research topic, provides background material, emphasises the significance of the research, presents a synopsis of the methodological approach, and then provides an outline of the thesis. The literature reviewed in chapters two and three explores the key research theme of global governance futures with four aims: to increase my own understanding of the domain; to provide context by way of a précis of the literature on societal evolution, humanity’s common affairs and alternative globalisations from which new forms of global governance could emerge; to discover the elements necessary for the analytical framework that will subsequently inform the development of a matrix of alternative global governance futures; and to identify gaps in the current literature that enable this thesis to make a contribution to the body of knowledge.

Chapter four describes in greater detail the methodology used to investigate the research question in theory, and in practice at the U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly. It builds upon the methodological overview provided in this introductory chapter, discusses the necessary improvisations made when the theoretical approach was put into practice at the General Assembly, and demonstrates that appropriate and ethical research procedures were followed. In chapter five the results of applying the methods are discussed and then analysed using a framework developed for this project that synthesises the layers of C.L.A. with the elements of a global governance system identified in the literature review. The purpose here is to create distinctive images of preferred global governance futures for different actor groups engaging in the international conversation on this topic. Chapter six summarises the thesis, provides conclusions for the research question and discusses the implications for the U.N.P.O., and for theory, policy research and practice. The limitations of this project and possibilities for further research are outlined in this final chapter.
1.7 Chapter Summary.

In chapter one I introduced the purpose of this thesis: to investigate possible future modes of global governance from the perspectives of members of the U.N.P.O. and to co-create their preferred future, thereby assisting U.N.P.O.’s participation in the international conversation concerning global governance futures. I have provided background material as context for the study, demonstrated the need for alternative views of global governance to be considered, and developed a focal question to guide the research. The answers to this question will be discussed in chapters two to six. A methodological overview describes the qualitative approach to this research and summarises the research design that will guide the investigation. C.L.A., the central method for this enquiry, is introduced in this chapter. A thesis outline shows the structure of the document and summarises the contents of each section, assisting in orienting the reader. To support the research question:

By what means might international non-State actors transform global governance in alternative futures and what is the preferred global governance future of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation?

I have formulated the following four research objectives:

1. To explore the views of U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly delegates as to the major issues facing the human family;
2. To discover how delegates view the prospect of social organisation at the planetary level;
3. To understand the positions of other non-State actors that are engaging in the international conversation on global governance futures;
4. To develop a preferred global governance future for U.N.P.O. to enable them to join the international conversation.

In chapters two and three I begin to address these objectives by reviewing the literature on globalisation, societal evolution to a planetary civilisation, the common affairs of the human family, and global governance futures, and identify gaps that present opportunities for this thesis to make a useful contribution to knowledge.
Chapter Two

Globalisation, Planetary Civilisation and the Common Affairs of the Human Family
2.1 Introduction.

In the previous chapter I introduced the research question and objectives, the participants, and justified the need for this study of alternative global governance futures. In this chapter I will review the literature that supports the need for global governance and then segue to global governance itself in chapter three.


Globalisation continues to undermine the States’ authority in world affairs yet there is currently nothing to replace it (Suter 2003). The aim of this thesis is not to challenge these perspectives, but rather to explore the literature and discourses that provide the most divergent views in order to provide the foundations for the development of distinctly different global governance futures alongside which a preferred U.N.P.O. future can be constructed. To that end I provide some initial contextual discussion of the literature on societal evolution to the planetary phase and a synthesis of humanity’s common affairs identified by several writers. I then review literature from the fields of alternative globalisation studies, global governance studies and futures research in greater depth to situate future global governance models within the context of alternative globalisations, the area of the literature that contained the most strongly contested views. This approach to the literature review meets research objective three ‘to understand the positions of other non-State actors that are engaging in the international conversation on global governance futures’.

For some of the writers cited above, the form globalisation might assume in the future is likely to be a key determinant in the mode of global governance adopted. Contemporary literature reveals a number of contesting discourses of globalisation that are not limited to ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ globalisation discourses, which relate almost entirely to neoliberal
globalisation. For example, there are views from feminists who ask what the world might look like if we adopted a partnership rather than a dominator approach to globalisation and global governance (Eisler 2011; Steans 2003). Perspectives from the ‘Global South’ and movements like the World Social Forum challenge the political and economic neoliberal form of globalisation from a strong social platform. Environmentalists and indigenous groups, concerned about climate change and ecological degradation, call for environmental global governance. This then prompts me to consider what global governance might look like if globalisation was an environmental rather than economic phenomenon and founded on Neohumanism (Vedaprajinananda 2006) rather than Neoliberalism. Globalisation is therefore explored in this chapter as a historic and contestable phenomenon, building the argument that the dominant neoliberal form of globalisation is a product of a particular time that need not be carried forward into the future. This creates space for the consideration of a range of globalisations, summarised in the matrix on page 72, that could produce the uniquely different global governance futures discussed in chapter three. C.L.A. is used to map alternative globalisations vertically through the four levels and horizontally by giving consideration to how, at the worldview and discourses level, proponents might view progress and the utility of globalisation. Metaphors have been created for the purpose of sense-making in each alternative.

2.2. Societal Evolution to a Planetary Civilisation.

(2008a, b, 2010) and Bollier (2011) are leading the call for the global commons to be debated and agreed, whilst the means to achieve the transformation deemed necessary for a collective capable of addressing global issues are elucidated by Laszlo (2006) and Sharma (2007). For Laszlo (2006:14) ‘the safest and most effective path toward planetary civilisation is a cultural path: the path of adopting adapted values and behaviours. These need to emerge in a critical mass within civil society’ to enable political and business leaders to make the necessary changes. In this section of the literature review the four layers of C.L.A., namely The Litany, The Systems, Worldview and Discourse, and Metaphor and Myth, are used to structure an overview of the literature on societal evolution to the planetary phase and the common affairs of an emerging planetary civilisation. There is a wealth of literature on the prevailing view of societal evolution that developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries but literature concerning the twenty-first century perspectives is still emerging. My interpretation of an emerging paradigm is based primarily on the scholarship of Laszlo and Eisler as both present well-developed theories that challenge the dominant paradigm.

**Societal Evolution to the Planetary Phase: the Prevailing Twentieth Century Paradigm.**

*Table 1: Deconstructing the Twentieth Century View of Societal Evolution.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Prevailing Twentieth Century View</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Litany</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal progress as economic growth measured by G.N.I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Systems</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western science.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A complicated system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worldview and Discourse</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear, expansionist evolution. Man is separate from nature. Man controls and exploits nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metaphor and Myth</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man is a predator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival of the fittest.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Litany.*

The three disciplines of economics, political science and sociology were developed during the modern era to support the needs of political leaders for studies of the present (Wallerstein 2004:6). Within these disciplines, two themes are particularly prominent in
the prevailing ‘official public description’ (Gidley 2004) of societal evolution to the planetary phase. The first is Darwin’s nineteenth-century writings on biological diversity and the second is the introduction of widely accepted economic measures of societal progress. The first theme, Darwin’s theories published in 1859 in *On the Origins of Species By Means of Natural Selection*, challenged the accepted scientific and religious views of evolution shifting the discourse from creationism and linear, predictable genetics to a discourse of unpredictable systems where diversity of and within species provided the basis for evolution in, and adaptation to, a changing environment (Bowler 1990). Darwin’s studies have recently informed further scientific enquiry which found that diversity emerges from changes to DNA and can lead to new biological species or new human cultures (Kingsley 2009) thereby illustrating diversity’s role in societal evolution from both biological and sociological perspectives. As Gidley (2007:17) writes ‘clearly biology as a discipline has been transformed by such twentieth-century developments as chaos and complexity theories….Darwinism more recently making way for emergence theories’.

The second theme originated in the economic doctrine of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that equated societal evolution with progress in the form of economic growth, evidence of which was wealth measured by Gross National Product per capita (Harbison 1971). Organisations such as the O.E.C.D., established in 1961, reported on progress as economic growth providing member governments with statistical analysis and country comparisons on productivity, flows of trade and investment and national accounts with an increasing number of variables. Diversity also featured strongly in the economic discourse appearing in more than 100 articles on the O.E.C.D. website where it continues to be promoted as the key to long-term growth (OECD 2010). The concept of growth for the O.E.C.D. has expanded to focus on ‘innovation, green growth strategies and the development of emerging economies’. Economic retraction, where it is discussed, is presented as a problem for the countries concerned. Gross National Product, as the measure of societal progress, has recently been replaced by Gross National Income per capita using Purchasing Power Parity to provide comparisons between developing and wealthier countries based on the U.S$. Countries are ranked highest to lowest according to per capita income.
The Systems and Social Causes.

At this level of analysis I sought to understand the system that produced the litany information and the social causes that might be influencing that system or systems. In this instance the prevailing twentieth century litany of biological diversity and economic growth has been underpinned by the established Western scientific system, largely a product of Greek philosophy and Arabian methods of experiment, observation and measurement, according to one author (Briffault 1919). This system has occupied a privileged place in the body of knowledge and twentieth century educational curriculum as the only legitimate means of identifying truth in what was understood to be an objective world (Barlosky 1996). The nature of the traditional scientific system is complicated as understood through the ‘Cynefin’ framework (Snowden 2005), meaning that the system can only be known by experts, in this case scientists with extensive domain and disciplinary knowledge. However since the 1980s postmodern scholars have criticised the traditional sciences ‘in the hope that the loss of epistemic certainty will yield a productive openness to alternative interpretations of the world and to new possibilities for understanding,’ pointing out that science itself is ‘an interpretation rather than definitive explanation’ (Barlosky 1996:54).

Worldview and Discourse.

At this level of C.L.A. I considered the multiple worldviews of societal evolution. The discussion so far has emphasised the dominant Western scientific worldview. From that perspective, evolution is linear and expansionist. Man, my deliberate use of gendered language, was separate from and superior to nature, which he was free to control and exploit. These linear theories, promoted in the works of Marx and Smith, suggest that societies develop from ‘primitive’ to ‘advanced’ in an expansionist manner (Inayatullah 2004b). Marx’s views were founded in communism and the belief that the capitalist society would ultimately transform to socialism through a grand revolution whereas Smith’s theory centred on a market-driven society of the future (Inayatullah 1998a; Kapoor 2007). Both theoretical perspectives evoke for me an image of eternal growth where advancement is largely equated with the technological, economic and political prowess often associated with European civilisation and its progeny; nations such as the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Implicit in these theories is the suggestion that one nation’s past stage of development is destined to be another nation’s future, that
is that the industrialisation that has advanced Western economies whilst regressing its social systems and natural environments is an inevitable rite of passage for developing nations. Also assumed in the linear theory of evolution is the continuous convergence of societies, stability and order (Bauman 1998). The traditional European values of growth, property and land ownership, environmental mastery and the like are now being questioned as growth in populations and demands for goods and services, the ‘consumer society,’ are understood as having contributed to or created some of the global problems discussed earlier.

Metaphor and Myth.

At the heart of the twentieth century Western scientific perspective of societal evolution one metaphor and one myth appear to be prominent. The metaphor is ‘Man is a Predator’ and the myth, associated with Darwin’s theory of evolution, is ‘survival of the fittest’. The metaphor ‘Man is a Predator’ is evident in the language entailments that are in common usage in the English language today. We have commonplace expressions such as man being ‘top of the food chain’, we ‘chase targets’, when promoted in our organisations we say we’re ‘swimming with the big fish’, and to illustrate the competitive nature of our lives, we say it’s a ‘dog eat dog world’. These linguistic clues point to the underlying myth of survival of the fittest.

There are, however, emerging perspectives on societal evolution and human progress that suggest shifts in multiple levels of consciousness are underway. Table 2 overleaf summarises these perspectives using C.L.A. and is reproduced for comparative analysis at the end of the discussion.
Societal Evolution to the Planetary Phase: The Emerging Paradigm.

Table 2: Societal Evolution to the Planetary Phase: The Emerging Paradigm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C.L.A.</th>
<th>Societal Evolution and Progress: Emerging Twenty-first Century View</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Litany</td>
<td>Balanced development. Societal progress as social and spiritual growth measured by ECO-(ecological) nomics and footprints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Systems</td>
<td>Sciences of complexity, quantum physics and foresight. A complex adaptive system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldview and Discourse</td>
<td>Non-linear adaptive and generative evolution, images of futures. Humans as integral part of, and living in harmony with, nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphor and Myth</td>
<td>Life is a dance. The Great Transition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Litany.

In the early twenty-first century a more balanced approach to measuring societal evolution and progress is increasingly advocated. In February 2011 the O.E.C.D. report ‘National Accounts at a Glance 2010’ begins to encourage governments to look beyond G.D.P. when measuring the material wellbeing of citizens (OECD 2011). Studies into broader measures of wellbeing are progressing within the O.E.C.D. and, more recently, in countries like Australia, Canada and the U.K. (OECD 2011) and in businesses like the Deutsche Bank (2006). The government of Bhutan has established a Gross National Happiness Index, reporting progress on the Internet and increasingly concerning themselves with both the material and non-material aspects of citizen wellbeing, including participation in spiritual activities (Centre for Butan Studies 2010). Concerns about climate change and detrimental anthropogenic effects on the natural environment have generated increasing interest in measuring ecological footprints, indicators of the extent of human impact on natural systems (Rees 1992; Rees and Wackernagel 2008).

The Systems and Social Causes.

The ‘new’ sciences of complexity, quantum physics and foresight: In the past decade there has been increasing interest in the new sciences, in particular complexity, quantum physics and foresight, the latter founded in neuroscience (Capra 2002; Chia 2002; Dodgson et al. 2009; Greenfield 2010; Hilborn 2004; Hollick 2006; Laszlo 2008; Rose
Some of the theories presented by these sciences describe the world as uncertain (Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle) which inherently means that more than one world, or one future, is available to us. They explain the interconnectedness of life systems and how a small catalyst for change in one part of a system can create ripple effects throughout the system leading to substantial impacts, positive and negative, described in the ancient Chinese text ‘Tao Te Ching’ as the ripple effect and in chaos theory as the butterfly effect. The nature of the system, as understood in the Cynefin framework, is Complex, meaning that there is currently no knowledge of it and that it might be unknowable (Snowden 2005). In addition to the official histories and Western science, travellers’ tales, indigenous oral histories, myths and artistic representations are other ways of knowing about the origins and evolution of the human family (Smith 2006). The new scientific epistemology appears congruent with that of many indigenous epistemologies.

**Societal evolution as a complex adaptive system:** Laszlo (2008) offers a new theory of evolution, describing it as ‘a new scientific reality’. The theory explains the co-evolution of humans, nature, social organising, science and consciousness throughout human history and speculates as to how we may evolve into the future. One assumption made by Laszlo (2008) of this evolutionary process is its progress toward greater levels of complexity. Koestler, in his 1967 book *Ghost in the Machine*, endeavoured to explain the developmental process using the term ‘holon’ from the Greek Holos (meaning whole) and ‘on’ (meaning part). Holons are both systems in their own right and parts of larger open hierarchical systems or ‘holarchies’ (Koestler 1967). In the natural systems domain, this is demonstrated by the example of the evolution of cells that mutated to form organisms comprising cells, and then mutated again to form a human body comprising cells and organs and so forth. The individual cells or holons are not destroyed by the mutation, according to U.S. philosopher and psychologist Wilber who writes that they are ‘transcended and included’ in the larger system (Wilber 1995). Once biological evolution expanded to encompass socio-cultural and technological change it was the dominant civilisation, rather than genetic matter, that mutated or collapsed (Laszlo 2008). Civilisational mutations, throughout history, have driven towards the continuing amalgamation of different peoples, enterprises, economies, societies and cultures in systems of larger and larger dimensions, according to Laszlo (2008) and.
Raskin et al. (2002). These writers barely mention the rise and fall of civilisations, nor do they consider the effects of wars and plagues that have considerably reduced population sizes at various points in history; the Black Death in Europe is one such example. Some scientists also believe that at one point in human history the number of people on Earth was reduced to less than 20,000 by a series of catastrophic volcanic eruptions (Ambrose 1998; Gibbons 1993). Biologists have recently questioned the assumption of evolution toward greater complexity and now believe the possibilities of loss in biological evolution may have been underestimated, and that in some circumstances evolution moves towards greater simplicity (Spinney 2007). Spinney (2007) comments that evolution ‘loves to prune’ and provides examples of human loss of body hair and animal loss of limbs over time. Whilst these findings relate specifically to biological evolution the concept applied to societal transformation could produce some interesting insights and potential scenarios in a future research project. As with the previous example of holons as cells that are transcended and included in the larger system of the human body, civilisations and cultures need not be destroyed by the acceptance of a planetary identity. Ideally nations, peoples, civilisations, cultures and individuals would be transcended yet included as cells and organs in a planetary civilisational body. Human societies are both expanding and contracting: expanding to form regional and international groupings towards a planetary communion and contracting to identify with the local community, the tribe or the clan.

Some writers agree that human consciousness has evolved to the extent that we are aware of the possibility of our own extinction brought about largely by our own actions (Eisler 1991; IPCC 2007; Laszlo 2008; Lovelock 2006). Yet human ingenuity has also produced the means by which individuals may collectively influence the necessary decisions previously the sole province of dominant political and economic actors: the internet and spending power (Eisler 1991; Laszlo 2008; Mason 2006). As Laszlo emphasises:

> the doomsday arguments miss a basic point: they do not recognise that humanity is also a dynamic system capable of rapid transformation. As the natural system approaches collapse it is sensitive and responds to small catalysts of change (2008:15).
These small catalysts of change were described in the 6000-year-old Chinese text, the Tao Te Ching, as the ripple effect. One small pebble can be dropped into a pond to create multiple waves. Today the phenomena are explained in literature on Chaos Theory as the Butterfly Effect whereby a butterfly flaps its wings in one part of the world and creates a tsunami in another part. The dropping of a pebble or the flapping wing represents a small change in the initial condition of the system, which causes a chain of events leading to large-scale alterations. Lorenz coined the term ‘butterfly effect’ in his work in Chaos Theory and sensitive dependence on initial conditions (Hilborn 2004). For Laszlo, the ‘butterflies’ needed for transformation, to avert collapse in the natural systems, are the ‘thinking, values, ethics and consciousness of a critical mass in society’ (2008:15). Diamond reached similar conclusions in his study of societal collapse (2006:429-440).

Emerging Worldviews and Discourses.

A planetist worldview: non-linear, adaptive, and generative evolution: In contrast with the Western scientific worldview of linear and expansionist evolution, the emerging worldview is one of non-linear, adaptive and generative evolution. The uncertainty of our future presents humans with greater flexibility and choice. Not only are we capable of selecting from different realities but also of generating alternative visions of futures and creating the ones we prefer. This ability to envisage and create new realities using social and human-made technologies makes us co-creators in both biological and sociological evolutionary processes (Eisler, 1991, Laszlo, 2008). From the biological perspective, environmental scientist James Lovelock (2006) builds on this argument, believing that humans have interfered in the natural selection process to such an extent that it can no longer function effectively. Giddens (2002) refers to this interference as ‘the socialisation of nature’ by which he means that previously natural phenomena have become dependent on our social decisions (Giddens, 2002:256). These authors share the view that humanity now literally has its future in its own hands. For them, an inclusive process of conscious evolution in harmony with the natural environment may therefore be necessary for the survival of human life on planet Earth in the twenty-first century. Societal evolution is equally purposively undertaken under the guises of development, negotiated regional groupings such as the European Union (E.U.), African Union (A.U.), and A.S.E.A.N., and defined geographic national borders.
recognised through treaties. It is reasonable to assume that societal evolution to the planetary phase will be similarly purposive, yet how it will be brought about and by whom is yet to be determined. What is apparent from the literature is that the emerging worldview is planetist in nature.

**Images of futures:** Whereas macro-historians study the histories of social systems in search of patterns of social change (Galtung and Inayatullah 1997), futures researchers interpret these patterns, consider possible trajectories, and complete the theories of future social change by incorporating the idea of the image of the future (Bell 2002). The importance of images of the future in influencing human action to create the future has been the subject of many scholarly works, seminal of which are Boulding’s 1956 book *The Image* and Polak’s 1973 book *The Image of the Future*. Boulding wrote about the unique reflective character of the human image and the human capacity to respond to images of the future that are ‘filtered through an elaborate value system’ (Boulding, 1956). He emphasised our ability to envisage what exists and what might be in the future. Polak’s study linked images of the future with the dynamics of culture, concluding that the images a society holds of its future determine the rise or descent of that society’s culture. A positive, quality image leads to a vibrant, healthy culture and society whereas a negative image will lead to its demise (Polak 1973). His studies showed that new images of human potential precede and accompany significant periods of social transformation. As Boulding wrote in Polak’s foreword:

> The human condition can almost be summed up in the observation that, whereas all experiences are of the past, all decisions are about the future. The image of the future, therefore, is the key to all choice oriented behaviour (Polak 1973:xii).

Further research on imaging revealed that community attitudes to images of the future represent that community’s knowledge and determine the image’s usefulness in futures research generally. For Denton (1986:60) ‘an image is plausible when it stimulates dialogue within the community, forces us to lay aside old and attempt new languages, and opens us to seeing new and different possibilities for the future’. Beach and Mitchell (1987) take the proposition further when they discuss Image Theory as a ‘descriptive decision-making theory in which decision makers represent information as images or schema’. The ‘projected image’ consists of a range of anticipated future states
that could result from the exploration of alternative futures using methods such as scenarios. The ‘trajectory image’ consists of flexible and resilient strategies needed to create the state envisaged in a preferred projected image using, for example, the backcasting method. The ‘action-image’ consists of actions to be taken to create the environment for the future state to emerge and to present the preferred future. The ‘self-image’ comprises those principles and values that are used to choose between various alternatives (Beach and Mitchell 1987:209). Endeavouring to introduce a systems perspective to the debate on imaging, Ames describes imaging a world as ‘tracing effective correlations among interdependent details and producing harmony’ (Ames 1991:231). For Ames, imaging permits ‘direct access to concrete detail and nuance unmediated by abstract and intellectualised discourse’ (Ames, 1991:231). Eisler emphasises the power of image in communications when she states ‘language is limited to those who understand the form, structure, content and nuances of a particular language. Humans use image to convey more complex issues’ (Eisler, 1995:88). For Berger (1989) visual communication is a central aspect of our lives, and much of this communication is performed through symbolic means, by words and signs and symbols. If we consider the uptake of communications technologies such as radio, television, mobile phones, and the internet, and the proliferation of cultural artefacts such as films and documentaries, the arts, and business advertising campaigns from television and radio advertisements to billboards and letterbox flyers, we begin to appreciate just how far images have come since humans made their marks on cave walls.

The human brain continues to evolve biologically and whilst neuroscience has many questions still to answer to explain the emergent mind properties of the brain, it is now understood that areas of the brain on the periphery of the eye-brain connections are linked to our ability to envision, conceptually, our future (Greenfield 2010; Wilkes 2010). Whilst the eye sees what is perceived to be real in the world around us, these other faculties allow our minds to picture what is imaginary (Wilkes 2010). The mind seeks meaning in the patterns of our environment and to do that it must first have an image to relate to (Hollick 2006), whether that image is real or conceptual. In the context of this study, therefore, ‘our most urgent need is to provide the human mind with the wherewithal to image and thereby create a better world’ (Eisler, 1995:187).
A Metaphor and A Myth for the Planetist Worldview.

In support of a planetist worldview I offer a myth and a metaphor that could be used to direct societal evolution in the twenty-first century. The metaphor, life is a dance, is inspired by the poetry of Eliot in the *Four Quartets*. In the first quartet, *Burnt Norton*, Eliot writes ‘at the still point of the turning world….there the dance is…and there is only the dance’ (Eliot 1974:191). This evokes for me images of partnership, of give and take, lead and follow, interconnectedness and interaction. For Eliot many formal patterns exist yet the dance itself, through choices made by the dancers, fuses first into one pattern before dissolving into another. Through Eliot’s poetry ‘life is a dance’ is a complex, self-organising system within which the dancers move through space and time without treading on toes.

The new metaphor for societal evolution to the planetary phase represents a considerable shift from nineteenth and twentieth century thinking and language where man is a predator and life is predicated on the Darwinian evolutionary principle of survival of the fittest. It is suggestive of a myth of a great societal transition.

For Raskin et al (2002) there have been two such great transitions in the past; the first shift as Stone Age culture made way for ‘Early Civilisation’ approximately 10,000 years ago and the second transition from ‘Early Civilisation’ to the ‘Modern Era’ over the last 1,000 years (Raskin et al 2002:2). They argue that a third societal macro-transformation is underway which they refer to as a Great Transition to the Planetary Phase as shown in Figure 2.1. Their analysis suggests that each significant transition occurred more rapidly than previous societal evolutions. In their view, if this pattern were to continue, the transition to the planetary phase of human civilisation might be completed by the end of the twenty-first century. Raskin et al (2002) emphasise that these historical transitions were not neat orderly processes. Whilst their visual representation of these transitions is linear, their view of history as an ‘intricate and irregular process conditioned by specific local factors, serendipity and volition’ suggests a more non-linear approach than is presented in their diagram, Figure 2.1 overleaf (Raskin et al 2002:2):
Figure 2.1 The Rate of Change and Increase in Complexity of Previous Societal Transitions. Source: Raskin et al (2002:2), Great Transitions.

Table 3 below summarises this discussion on societal evolution to the planetary phase, which for some authors, as discussed earlier, is a primary driver for global governance. Here I use the C.L.A. matrices developed earlier to structure a comparison between the perspectives that dominated the twentieth century and those emerging strongly in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The comparative analysis reveals that the linear, Western scientific, expert-based, and highly competitive view of societal evolution and progress is transforming to a non-linear, new sciences, collaborative and cooperative view that enables people from many different backgrounds to participate in the dance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C.L.A.</th>
<th>Prevailing twentieth century view</th>
<th>Emerging twenty-first century view</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Litany</td>
<td>Diversity. Societal progress as economic growth measured by G.N.I.</td>
<td>Balanced development. Societal progress as social and spiritual growth measured by ECO-nomics² and footprints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldviews and discourses</td>
<td>Linear, expansionist evolution. Man is separate from nature. Man controls and exploits nature.</td>
<td>Non-linear adaptive and generative evolution, images of futures. Humans as integral part of, and living in harmony with, nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphor and myth</td>
<td>Man is a predator. Survival of the fittest.</td>
<td>Life is a dance. The Great Transition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² ECO-nomics is a play on the word ‘economics’ and is used by environmental movements to emphasise the need for a ‘green’ economy.
2.3 Humanity’s Common Affairs.

_The world’s seemingly intractable problems._

Catalysed by terrorist bombings in New York, London, Madrid and Bali, the growing concerns expressed by scientists regarding climate change, the media coverage of water wars and future energy problems, public debate in the early twenty-first century has turned its attention to the world’s seemingly intractable problems and how they could be managed in the future. Wallerstein (2004) describes these issues as:

> phenomena defined in limited time and scope – we don’t understand their meaning, their origins and trajectory and where they fit in the scheme of things. We tend to ignore their history, are unable to put the pieces together and are constantly surprised that our short-term expectations are not met (Wallerstein 2004:6).

Nonetheless there are a number of initiatives underway that aim to rectify this lack of understanding. For example, the World Economic Forum’s 2010 Summit on the Global Agenda brought 700 domain experts together to set priorities to improve the state of the world and to present these to the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in 2011. The O.E.C.D. is looking at the issues through economic, statistical and risk management lenses. Their International Futures Programme is undertaking topical studies of the future and recent examples include the Bio Economy, Space Economy, Infrastructure, Migration, and Risk Management. The World Bank has six strategic themes for its global development programs through which it aims to meet the global challenges of poverty, post-conflict and fragile states, middle-income countries, global public goods, the Arab world, and knowledge and learning. World Bank programs aim to improve financial and trade development. These international organisations appear to be focused on the political and economic challenges within the scope of their remit. Following this logic, one might deduce that the international social movement, the World Social Forum (W.S.F.), would be the entity to represent the peoples’ voice in the discussion on global issues. However, those involved in the W.S.F. activities maintain the stance that ‘it does not intend to be a body representing world civil society’ rather it aims to act as an ‘attractor of social groups and movements in many countries who oppose neoliberal globalisation’ (World Social Forum 2009). Issues currently being debated by W.S.F.
groups include migration, education and peace. These initiatives and forums provide potential opportunities for U.N.P.O. to participate in the international conversation concerning global governance futures.

A review of the works of several scholars and projects identifies the following key global intractable problems: globalisation in its current neoliberal form; terrorism; wars; climate change; anticipated energy, food and water shortages; growing world population; poverty; the standards of living in third world countries; the status of women; science and technology; transnational organised crime; health issues (in particular pandemics); and rogue States (Mason, 2006, Cocks, 2003, Wallerstein, 2004, The Millennium Project 1996-2011). Of these, Mason identifies six key converging influences that he believes have the potential to generate catastrophic consequences for humanity by the year 2030 if left unchecked: climate change, wars, energy shortages, food and water shortages, globalisation as a lack of political control, and population growth and poverty (Mason 2006:82). These six influences, as issues to be resolved, require a coordinated global response. Other lists, rankings and statistical measures include those that assess development and progress, such as the U.N.D.P. Human Development Index and the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, those emphasising economic growth, such as Gross Domestic Product and Global Competitiveness, available from the O.E.C.D. and World Economic Forum, and those focusing on security and wellbeing, including corruption, human rights and national happiness indices (Costanza et al. 2009; OECD 2009, 2010a, 2012; Stutz 2011; United Nations 2012a; World Economic Forum 2011).

Contrary to the dystopian futures often presented in the news headlines, Cocks’ view of the future suggested by the litany of global intractable problems is comparable to that of Hobsbawm’s ‘unknown and problematic but not necessarily apocalyptic future’ in which Cocks envisages a future of ‘destructuring and simplification’ rather than destruction (Cocks 2003:6). For Werlhof (2007) we will need to:

establish a new economy and a new technology; a new relationship with nature;
a new relationship between men and women that will finally be defined by mutual respect; a new relationship between the generations that reaches even
further than the seventh\(^3\); and a new political understanding based on egalitarianism and the acknowledgment of the dignity of each individual. But even once we have achieved all this, we will still need to establish an appropriate spirituality with regard to the earth (Werlhof 2007:385).

The global commons.

In addition to the literature on global problems and challenges, there is renewed and growing interest in the global commons. One study found that the literature on this topic had increased five-fold from 1985 to 2005, and that the range of commons domains has extended beyond the traditional ‘fisheries, forestry, irrigation, water management and animal husbandry’ to include ‘biodiversity, climate change, intellectual property and copyrights, especially commons related to computers, software and the Internet’, or the digital commons (Laerhoven and Ostrom 2007:8). The nature of the emerging global commons discourses has two distinctive voices at present: the first voice is constructive and is about sharing the world’s natural resources and spaces (Quilligan 2008b, 2010), including Internet spaces (Bauwens 2004, 2005); the second and more recent voice expresses concerns regarding the commons that include threats to national security (Murphy 2010) and the possibility of the commons extending into outer space and cyber space (Scheinmann and Cohen 2012), both seen as undesirable from U.S. perspectives.

For the purpose of this thesis, and its interest in global governance futures, governance and the commons is an emerging research area, yet few writers have approached the topic at a global institutional level to date. Most focus on one of the commons domains listed above (Laerhoven and Ostrom 2007). Within this undeveloped area of scholarship there is some promising work in adaptive multi-level governance, based on experience in natural resource management programs, that has implications for a future global governance system (Armitage 2008; Dowsley 2008). Armitage (2008:7) draws upon common property theory, resilience thinking and political ecology to produce principles of ‘participation, accountability, leadership, knowledge pluralism, learning and trust’ and concludes that the roles of ‘power, scale and levels of organisation, knowledge valuation, the positioning of social actors and social constructions of nature’ are

\(^3\) here Werlhof is referring to the Native American Indian traditional practice of making decisions for seven generations into the future.
influential in the resistance and resilience to change in top-down governance systems. He emphasises the importance of ‘flexible and distributed organisational forms,’ when considering governance of the commons as complex adaptive systems, and deliberative processes that foster self-organisation and build relationships amongst actors (Armitage 2008:25). For Dowsley, (2008), failures in top-down and bottom-up management of natural resources have revealed the need for multi-level, local to global, approaches. In her exploration of the interaction of biophysical, economic and social/cultural with the international polar bear management regime, she concludes that it is possible, and in some instances desirable, to transform top-down management systems rather than create new ones. Dowsley (2008) considers that the history of the existing organisation, and its ability to effect change and evaluate its impacts on the whole system, could outweigh past institutional failings. Whether it would outweigh the current resistance to change within the U.N. is debatable. These authors’ perspectives on multi-level governance of the global commons provide new thinking that could be used to explore U.N. transformation in the future and will be incorporated into the analysis in chapter five.

For Laszlo (2008) it is clear that our current reality is unsustainable. In his view ‘this decade offers humanity a choice: this could be the last decade of a fading obsolete world or the first decade of a new viable one’ (Laszlo 2008:1). Though the final form of the planetary phase of human social organisation remains undetermined, a new worldview is clearly emerging that integrates ideas from the sciences and from different cultures and religions into a new story about what it means to be human in the twenty-first century. There is a growing awareness of the interconnectedness of the dynamic systems of macro-reality that collide and spark new forms of creativity and new ways of living, being and thinking. There is a renewed appreciation of systems thinking that aims to understand this interconnectedness and the larger context in which challenges and possibilities emerge. Views of evolution continue to influence views of societal evolution and globalisation, and thus perceptions and images of a planetary civilisation and global governance. If the view of evolution is ‘man as predator’ and ‘survival of the fittest’ then it follows that the view of globalisation might be one where man owns the world and everything on it that he can conquer, where men compete to exploit global resources, and where men are superior to all other life forms.
2.4. Globalisation Discourses.

Having discussed the common affairs of the human family and societal evolution to the planetary phase in the previous section, I will now explore the topic of globalisation in order to complete the literature review of the three primary influences on the future of global governance: humanity’s common affairs, the emergence of a planetary civilisation, and challenges to the prevailing neoliberal form of globalisation.

2.4.1. Globalisation: a Contested Phenomenon.

Globalisation is one of the most contested phenomena of our time, yet it is not a new phenomenon. When viewed from the societal evolutionary perspective, globalisation is part of a long historical process that began with human biological evolution that enabled our ancestors to leave Africa and explore the world (Applebaum and Robinson 2005; Connor 2008; Gidley 2007; Kohn 2006; London School of Economics 2008; Mithen 1990; Steffen et al. 2011; Stix 2008). Over many millennia, globalisation has contributed to the development of human societies ‘through travel, trade, migration, the spread of cultural influences and the dissemination of knowledge and understanding’ (Sen 2006:126). Globalisation, experienced as travel, also enabled military conquests and empire building initially by land travel throughout the High Civilisations: Western civilisation, the Levant, the Middle East and the Far East; and later by sea as European explorers sought new lands to exploit. What has changed since our ancestors’ time is the nature of globalisation which has transformed from travel to the highly contested neoliberal form that has become hegemonic over the past four decades, and which has created a widening ideological chasm between pro and anti-globalisation groups (Applebaum and Robinson 2005; Held et al. 1999; Steans 2003). Globalisation in this current neoliberal form has also catalysed considerable debate amongst non-government actors, including ‘environmentalists and polluters, indigenous peoples and corporations, feminists and male chauvinists, human rights activists and authoritarian rulers, nationalists and multi-lateralists, the “North” and “South”’ (Koenig-Archibugi 2003:2).

The neoliberal focus on globalisation as a political-economic phenomenon produces a narrowly constructed discourse that misses the diversity Friedman (2005) envisages in his discussion on Globalisation 3.0. Here he sees a future globalisation driven by ‘a
much more diverse non-Western, non-white group of individuals’ (2005:11), a form of globalisation that would incorporate a much wider range of worldviews adding richness to the globalisation debates. Neoliberalism dismisses other forms of globalisation as lacking in credibility however, for many authors, alternatives already exist and have the potential to become more prominent in the future. These alternative globalisations include ecology, culture, human rights, law, spirituality, consciousness, civil society, technology, and new forms of socially and ecologically responsible economy (Applebaum and Robinson 2005; de Sousa Santos 2003, 2006; de Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito 2005; Eisler 2008; Henderson 2006; Inayatullah 1999b; Ramos 2004). Placing the neoliberal form of globalisation within the context of a specific time and space enables us to view neoliberal globalisation as a unique product of that era. It also enables us to more fully appreciate that this seemingly dominant form of globalisation might not resemble the international relations discourses that preceded it nor does it determine the shape of globalisation for the future (Applebaum and Robinson 2005). This opens up the space for the alternative views of globalisation I will discuss in the next section that are representations of the debates amongst the non-government actor groups listed above.

2.4.2. Globalisation: a Multi-faceted Domain.

Pro-globalisation groups discuss the equitable distribution of wealth and promote globalisation as a means of assisting financially poorer nations with development, whilst anti-globalisation groups and popular news and social media writers speak of ‘ecological damage, exploitation, alienation and cultural homogenisation in the form of Westernisation or Americanisation’, blaming globalisation for the world’s intractable problems such as climate change and health pandemics like S.A.R.S. (Fiss and Hirsch 2005; Scholte 2005:16; Shaw 2006). As well, Western society is perceived by many non-Westerners to be using science and technology to impose its neoliberal principles on the rest of the world (Fiss and Hirsch 2005; Scholte 2005). In addition to the ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ globalisation discourses, globalisation is discussed in the literature as structure, theory and policy (see Cavanagh and Mander 2004; Chandler 2005; Fiss and Hirsch 2005; Giddens 2002; Held et al. 1999; Inayatullah 2001; Lent 2005; Michie 2003; Ramos 2010; Shaw 2006). Adding to the complexity of the topic, Fiss and Hirsch (2005) write that the greater the diversity in communities using the term ‘globalisation’
for sense-making the more variety can be expected in the definitions and the more contentious the framing of discourses. Scholarship in globalisation studies reveals a multifaceted domain and a myriad of perspectives that are contesting and extending the discourse on economic globalisation (Applebaum and Robinson 2005).

As definitions of globalisation vary widely (Applebaum and Robinson 2005; de Sousa Santos 2006; Fiss and Hirsch 2005; Ramos 2010) the term ‘globalisations’ requires interpretation for the purposes of this thesis (Fiss and Hirsch 2005). In this study, I use the term ‘globalisations’ in acknowledgment of the wide range of experiences encompassed by the term and the multiple interpretations of its meaning (Held et al. 1999). My discussion on globalisations is limited intentionally to a small number of divergent alternatives that provide the basis for mapping and analysing possible global governance futures. Furthermore I do not discuss globalisations in detail as structural or empirical processes; rather I provide an overview of globalisations that incorporates the worldviews, metaphors and myths which, when understood, may aid transformative projects. Fiss and Hirsch (2005:32) found that ‘much less attention has been given to this level of analysis’ of globalisation. My more recent review of the literature on globalisation suggests that their findings remain current. Yet it is in these deeper levels of analysis that the more profound meanings, interpretations and bases for transformation may be found and distinctive global governance futures created (Fiss and Hirsch 2005; Inayatullah 2004c). Hence I have elected to focus my literature search on six of the potentially transformative ideologies in the globalisations literature: the hegemonic Neoliberalism, Post-development, Engendered, Global Digital Democracies, Localisation, and Cosmopolitan (Bergeron 2001; Bussey 2006; Cardozo Law Review 1994; de Sousa Santos 2003, 2006; Economist Intelligence Unit 2011; Falk 2000; Falk and Strauss 2000; Fiss and Hirsch 2005; Held 1995; Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2003; Hettne and Oden 2002; McGrew 2000; Ramos 2010; Vedaprajinananda 2006). These six alternatives provide the foundations for the exploration of a range of global governance futures in chapter three and have been summarised in the C.L.A. matrix on page 72. They were selected for their ability to provide the most divergent and distinctive views. In compiling the matrix I have relied on the Bricoleur’s approach discussed in chapter four and stitched together patches of thought and meaning from various scholarly sources. The Metaphors, with the exception of the well-known
Machine metaphor (Gergen 1994) underpinning neoliberal globalisation and twentieth-century ‘progress’ generally, are my own contribution to this growing body of work. Before discussing the alternative globalisations literature, I will provide a synopsis of the literature on the hegemonic neoliberal globalisation by way of context.

2.4.3. The Hegemonic Neoliberal Globalisation.

In the latter half of the twentieth century globalisation was widely understood as an economic phenomenon driven by transnational corporations and neoliberal politicians, and fuelled by rapid advances in information, communications and transport technologies (Cocks 2003). Three key developments influenced this era and the worldview of neoliberal globalisation, and hence are relevant background to this study’s aims of investigating a range of global governance futures. The first development was the political and economic alliance of Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom and President Reagan of the United States, which triggered a shift from Keynesian economics to neoliberal. The second development was the adoption of the Washington Consensus economic policies, regarded by some as the neoliberal blueprint. The third influence in this era of political and economic cooperation was the greater involvement of corporations in international affairs previously the province of heads of State.

The influence of the Thatcher-Reagan alliance on global economic policy was particularly significant during the last three decades of the twentieth century (Mayoux 2004; OECD 2001; Wallerstein 2008). An analysis of U.K. and U.S. politics in the 1970s and 1980s reveals the specific historical dynamics formed by the interplay of a concentration of economic power and interest-driven politics that led to globalisation becoming synonymous with the neoliberal ideology of politically-driven economics (de Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito 2005; Wallerstein 2008; Werlhof 2008; Williamson 2004). Sociologist and world-systems analyst, Wallerstein, views neoliberal globalisation as an old idea that was resurrected in the 1980s as a counter to Keynesian economics and socialism. Neoliberal economists held Keynesian principles responsible for the stagnation of profit, including balance of payment problems for many governments (Wallerstein 2008). Thatcher and Reagan transformed the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) and the World Bank from a Keynesian orientation to a neoliberal one, which led to these organisations playing a pivotal role in lowering trade
barriers and tariffs, thereby further disadvantaging developing States (Smith 1991). They led the establishment of a new convention of global financial integration that was developed further by the World Trade Organisation (W.T.O.) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) through various trade rounds and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Werlhof 2008).

For neoliberals the perceived State interference in market forces was coming to an end. Neoliberal globalisation was portrayed in the popular media as evolutionary and inevitable with Thatcher’s acronym T.I.N.A., ‘there is no alternative’, being widely promoted (Smith 1991; Wallerstein 2008). A marked contrast was evident between the intentions of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’, to subtly guide economic development towards the common good, and those of Margaret Thatcher’s ‘iron fist in the velvet glove’ which warned governments that they would suffer slow economic growth if they failed to abide by neoliberal policies (Werlhof 2008). Progress, for governments, was to be measured by economic growth. From the neoliberal perspective the common good would be achieved by allowing market forces to operate without interference so businesses, including transnational corporations, could have the freedom necessary to create wealth (Bakan 2004; Korten 2001; Werlhof 2008). Friedman (2005) likens the unrestrained market mechanism to an unstoppable force of nature whilst Mies (2005) and Eisler (2011) see it as tantamount to freedom from responsibility and commitment to society.

Giddens, discussing globalisation from a sociological perspective in his book Runaway World: How Globalisation is Shaping Our Lives, writes ‘a pessimistic view of globalisation would consider it largely an affair of the industrial North, in which the developing societies of the South play little or no active part’ (2002:15). There is some basis for this pessimistic view in the form of the second development of the twentieth century that reinforced neoliberal ascendancy: the Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus was a set of ten prescriptive policy statements developed by ‘the industrial North’ in 1989 with the intention of creating global market freedoms, prosperity and economic growth through deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation (de Sousa Santos 2006; Werlhof 2007; Williamson 2004). Over time it became regarded as the neoliberal blueprint underpinned by a worldview of limitless supplies of
inexpensive resources, new markets, and cheap labour to exploit (Chomsky 1997; Friedman 2005; Smith 1991; Werlhof 2008; Williamson 2004). However while the blueprint is considered to have been politically successful in some countries, the economic and social effects have proven ruinous for others. One critic of U.S. foreign and economic policies cites examples of the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, the 1994 Mayan uprising, and a U.S. free trade agreement that led to the decline of the Mexican economy as ‘products of the increasing marginalisation of people who do not contribute to profit-making under the prevailing U.S. dominated institutional arrangements and therefore lack human rights or value’ (Chomsky 1997:187). What the blueprint produces is non-existence ‘in the form of non-productiveness in the context of capitalist economies’ rendering Chomsky’s marginalised people as ‘discardable populations’ (de Sousa Santos 2003:239). Chomsky (1997), de Sousa Santos (2003, 2006) and Eisler (2011) share the view that neoliberal policies, promoted as economic policies to achieve a sharing of wealth with poorer nations can, in hindsight, be seen to have created greater wealth for the richer nations. As Eisler (2011:2) writes:

Neoliberalism is an economics of domination where those on top are supposed to have control. For example, ‘trickledown economics’ goes way back, to times when the general belief was that those on the bottom should content themselves with the scraps dropping from the opulent tables of those on top, whether it was a tribal chief, whether it was royalty or so-called nobles.

The third development was the greater involvement of corporations in international affairs. Some in developing countries view neoliberal globalisation as a new and threatening form of colonisation (de Sousa Santos 2006; Kelleher 2005). Decisions affecting the lives of local people are increasingly being taken by corporate entities so geographically distant that locals are less able to influence their situations (Bakan 2004; LSE 2008). This leads to a sense of helplessness and concern that corporations are manipulating governments in some countries (Bakan 2004; Kelleher 2005; Shiva 2002). The U.N. has at times been perceived as another powerful institution that cannot be trusted. Bakan (2004), Crowl (2001) and Kelleher (2005), for example, write that U.S. government interests funded by multinational corporations have come to dominate U.N. agendas. Korten (1996, 2001) suggests the ideal world of globalisation for corporations would be one in which the world’s money, technology and markets are controlled and
managed by vast global corporations. In this future, there is perfect global competition among workers and localities to offer their services to investors at the most advantageous terms. A common consumer culture unifies all people in a shared quest for material gratification and as relationships, both individual and corporate, are defined entirely by the market there are no loyalties to any place or community. Corporations are free to act solely on the basis of profitability without regard to national or local consequences (Korten 1996:131).

While the original neoliberal agenda was developed by governments to support corporations, over time the power base appears to have shifted to a corporate agenda supported by co-operative governments (Chomsky 1997; de Sousa Santos 2006; Eisler 2011). When we consider that 53 of the largest 100 economic entities in the world are multinational corporations we begin to appreciate that society has created global economic entities of a power and size unequalled in the history of the world (Gabel and Bruner 2003). International media is largely controlled by these powerful corporate interests ensuring that neoliberal globalisation dominates the globalisation discourse (Ramos 2010). Viewed from this perspective it is hardly surprising that corporations hold strong sway over governments and exert influence in international forums, including the U.N. The economic power of transnational corporations clearly needs to be taken seriously when considering alternative globalisations and proposals for new forms of global governance.

In this era of rising corporate power some scholars of international relations and politics are debating the perceived declining power of States (Cocks 2003; Laszlo 2008; Mason 2006; OECD 2001; Suter 2003). In essence, the debate centres on the attrition of States’ sovereignty from above and below. It is eroded from above by the mobility of capital, goods and information across national borders, the transnational character of corporations and production, the integration of markets and financial systems, and various global governance treaties (Cocks 2003; Laszlo, 2008; Suter 2003). It is weakened from below by the renewed aspirations for autonomy and self-rule of sub-national groups (Baker and Chandler 2005; Chandler 2009; Cocks 2003; Sandel 1996) like U.N.P.O. member nations and peoples, by non-state actors and the increasing number of international networks such as non-government organisations (N.G.O.s) and
international non-government organisations (Suter 2003). The proliferation of international non-government organisations over the twentieth century is marked. From 1909 to 1993 they grew in number of from 176 to 28,900, according to the Commission on Global Governance (1995). In the context of a perceived weakening nation-states system, Linklater calls for a more ethical way of constructing political community, viewing States as entities that ‘restrict the bounds of moral reasoning to the boundaries of political association’ (1981:27 cited in Baker and Chandler, 2005). Linklater is not alone in his view. Popular media coverage also suggests there is a widespread disillusionment with politics and, in particular, the type of neoconservative politics that contributes to conflict between nations and regards war as a legitimate policy option (Suter 2003). For Baker and Chandler (2005) the growth and assertiveness of non-state actors in international decision-making, and the rising calls for a more ethical form of globalisation, suggest ‘an alternative view of political community is emerging’ to that of the dominant states and market, ‘previously the only players in town’ (Baker and Chandler 2005:4). In their view, global civil society will become the third actor in their preferred future political community.

Some authors and political analysts suggest that U.S. hegemony may be ending, that the ‘Europeanisation’ of world affairs is declining, and that the current world order is in transition to an as yet unknown form (Bakan 2004; Bennis 2006; Haass 2008; Korten 2001; Lundestad 2012; Suter 2003). Speculations concerning the world’s future superpowers are prominent in recent literature and centred on the roles of China and India in world affairs (Baker and Chandler 2005; Bennis 2006; Cocks 2003; Dittmer and Yu 2012; Lundestad 2012; Mason 2006; Moravcsik 2009; Murata 2006; Schweller and Pu 2011; Sieff 2009). According to U.N. reports, the size of the populations of both China and India are projected to outstrip that of the U.S. with India being the most populous nation in the world by 2060 (Keridis 2012; United Nations 2010). China already wields considerable political influence in international forums and it is reasonable to expect that India, as it continues to develop economically and politically, will likewise play a strong role in international relations in the future. If India and China emerge as political superpowers over the next decade or two we might expect to see a very different world. Would the collectivist orientation of both countries support a planetary ethic and an activist Global Civil Society? India’s post-colonial view of the
world and China’s relatively recent emergence in world affairs suggest differing views of globalisation. Chinese analysts in particular have made their government’s position on global governance clear: they favour a reformed U.N. and seek to champion the causes of less powerful developing nations (Wang and Rosenau 2009). Mason (2006), however, doubts that India or China would champion a global government. In his view, resistance to the establishment of international courts is an indication that the world’s biggest powers, the U.S., Europe, China, Japan, India and Russia, do not favour new global initiatives (Mason 2006).

2.5. The Exclusion Zone.
Scholars and activists calling for a more ethical form of globalisation recognise that neoliberal globalisation has not benefited many of the world’s people. Nations and indigenous peoples, including many U.N.P.O. members, are not sharing in the world’s wealth and many are struggling to survive. Their exclusion from global governance arrangements is merely one example of their marginalisation. As de Sousa Santos writes in his ‘Sociology of Absences’, the dominant nations actively produce the non-existence of the ‘other’ and keep them excluded by five means: first, the dominant Western scientific view of knowledge discredits and excludes other ways of knowing, producing nonexistence in the form of ignorance. Second, the dominant Western nations of the world consider linear time to be correct. People that construct time differently are considered backward ‘variously designated as the primitive or savage, closely followed by the traditional, the pre-modern, the simple, the obsolete, the underdeveloped’ (de Sousa Santos 2004:15) and may therefore be excluded as lacking credibility. Third, the classification of people that normalises differences and hierarchies enables racial and sexual classifications, for example, to be used as means of exclusion and to create dominator societies. Fourth, the high value placed on the global and the universal ensure that the local and the particular are not considered credible alternatives. Fifth, the principal criteria of commercial productivity and efficiency, applied to nature as well as human labour, ‘produces non-existence as non-productiveness ensuring that what is considered non-productive can be discarded’ (de Sousa Santos 2003:238-239; de Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito 2005). For U.N.P.O. members, these means of exclusion are rendering them invisible to the majority of the world’s people, producing further challenges to their aims of recognition and self-determination.
In developing this sociology, de Sousa Santos aims to expose what is produced as nonexistent by the Western scientific epistemology by replacing these five means of domination with five ecologies. The ecology of knowledges challenges the dominance of scientific knowledge and rigour by identifying other ways of knowing and criteria that operate credibly in social practices thereby enabling participation in epistemological debates with other forms of knowledge. The ecology of temporalities challenges the dominance of linear time, exposing it as a product of the dominance of Western modernity. For de Sousa Santos, the aim of this particular ecology is to decentralise social practices to their own construct of time thereby creating the possibility of autonomous development. The ecology of recognition challenges class-based and hierarchical structures that de Sousa Santos argues stem from ‘the colonial mentality of race and unequal sexuality’ (de Sousa Santos 2003:240). It aims to replace classification with equality in diversity. The ecology of trans-scales challenges the hegemonic neoliberal globalisation with the local and the particular and explores counter-hegemonic globalisations. In some instances these are local struggles that have subsequently formed local/global connections and globalised in a counter-hegemonic way (de Sousa Santos 2004). The ecology of productivities challenges global industrialisation with ‘alternative systems of production, self-managed enterprises, workers co-operatives, the solidarity economy, etc’ (de Sousa Santos 2003:240). In doing so it also challenges the current paradigms of development and infinite economic growth. For the U.N.P.O. these ecologies are congruent with indigenous and local epistemologies that are strongly represented within the organisation. Finally de Sousa Santos discusses a sociology of emergences as ‘the inquiry into the alternatives that are contained in the horizon of concrete possibilities’ (de Sousa Santos 2004:26): the potentiality of alternative futures.

These sociologies and ecologies applied to this research produce an interpretation of the U.N.P.O. situation of being excluded from global decision-making forums as being actively produced by a global governance system developed by and for Western civilisation. U.N.P.O., however, recognises many ways of knowing rather than allowing the Western scientific epistemology to dominate. Member nations and peoples

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4 See the discussions in this thesis on the current U.N. global governance system and the history of the U.N. system in chapters three and five.

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have many different ways of making decisions on issues that affect them at the local, collective level that might be considered traditional or outdated to the Western mindset and thus lacking in credibility for the purposes of international decision-making on significant issues. The West knows best as discussed earlier in this chapter. U.N.P.O.’s biennial General Assembly format confirms that the organisation does not reject outright Western thought and practice in international decision-making. U.N.P.O. uses a General Assembly structure as a lingua-franca enabling all its culturally and linguistically diverse members to participate in the meeting and produce policy and action items that are communicable to the major regional and global governance entities, such as the U.N., that remain dominated by an elite group of States and by Western thought and organisational practice.

A study that is interested in futures has time as a central construct. Here I acknowledge de Sousa Santos’ (2003, 2004) concern that the monoculture of linear time can be used to exclude those who know time differently and that, similar to the multiple views of globalisation, there are multiple temporalities. As the subject of time is not the central focus of this research I have elected to limit my discussion to two contrasting perspectives on time to illustrate my point that excluding non-State actors, including unrepresented nations and indigenous peoples, impoverishes our knowledge by excluding constructs more in keeping with emerging schools of thought. The first perspective is the prevailing Western scientific view of time that concerns de Sousa Santos. This temporality is rarely questioned nor are the interests and power-bases of those promoting this view critically examined. Time is linear with past moving to present and into the unknown future. Locating the Western scientific perspective in Hall’s ‘Map of Time’ shown in figure 2.2, which I acknowledge is a product of a Western scientific mind, this perspective sits in the low-context time quadrant indicating its physical, biological nature. Low context cultures require large amounts of technical information on a subject and will privilege data over contextual understanding (Hall 1983). Paraphrasing de Sousa Santos (2003), this version of time is hegemonic: the authoritative version time against which all other ways of knowing time are constructed as absent or inferior.
For the second perspective I have chosen ‘sync time’ (Hall 1983:156), which is consistent with indigenous and local constructs of time, as the U.N.P.O. represents many indigenous nations and peoples including the member registered as the ‘Aboriginals of Australia’. The cultural memory and identities of first Australians are connected to land and shared in their stories of the Dreamtime (Irwin et al. 1999). Stories in this context are educative and teach successive generations how they should live in the present whilst maintaining a deep connection to the ancestors and the time in which the earth, sky and water were created (Irwin et al. 1999). In sync time, time takes numerous forms that co-exist all around, influencing in many different ways the point in time that is now. The ancestors and the future are but two of these influences. It is now that is remarkable for its centrality in the forms of time. Hence in decision-making, transforming the now is the key to creating the preferred future.

*Figure 2.2 Map of Time (Hall 1983:207).*
For Hall (1983), life has a pulse, a beat within which planet, places, life forms and cultures have their own beats that create a natural rhythm. Sync time is measured periodically yet with a sophisticated non-linear patterning of events in accordance with the natural rhythm. Sync time is the ‘interpersonal synchrony into which people enter when they interact: the dance of life’ and is a construct of high-context cultures that do not require large volumes of information on a subject provided the context is well understood (Hall 1983:156, 170-171). In this interpretation, time does not open out into an unknown future but rather intensifies to the present moment through concentric circles of forces and meanings (Muecke 2004). The present moment is at the epicentre and all other forms of time, including the dreaming, sacred and metaphysical time, past and future, converge upon the moment and infuse it with the rhythms of life (Hall 1983). It is physical, unconscious emergent time. My image of this is that of ripples in water where the ripples are moving inwards rather than outwards.

The monoculture of classification (de Sousa Santos 2003, 2004) excludes U.N.P.O. members from the current global governance system by classifying them as nations and peoples subordinate to States that recognise each other in accordance with Westphalian principles, as discussed further in chapter three. This produces global governance as a hierarchy comprising States as dominator societies. In de Sousa Santos’ experience with the World Social Forum the dominant historical influence was colonialism; from the current global governance perspective, it might be termed ‘Westphalianism’. In his ecology of recognition, de Sousa Santos promotes equality in diversity. For Eisler (1995, 1998, 2006, 2011) this would lead to partnership societies and a global governance heterarchy. De Sousa Santos’ concept of the monoculture of universalism and the global excludes U.N.P.O. from the global governance system by rendering members’ particular and local modes of decision-making as inappropriate for regional and global issues. The ecology of trans-scales challenges that perspective, and neoliberal globalisation generally, with multiple alternatives that could incorporate local, particular, national, regional and global decision-making. Two particular challenges present here: the first is the effective articulation of the local to the global in a way that is culturally and contextually appropriate; the second is the ability to overcome the relative powerlessness of a nation or people acting alone. Both can be achieved by local struggles joining local/global entities and globalising in a counter-
hegemonic way, according to de Sousa Santos (2003), which in the context of this research, equates to nations and peoples joining the U.N.P.O. The monoculture of capitalist production excludes U.N.P.O. from the global governance system by privileging corporate interests over those of local communities and their natural environments (Bakan 2004; Korten 2001). In a neoliberal world, economic and political powers hold sway. In the ecology of productivities, however, the myths of never-ending economic growth and endless natural resources are challenged by local productivities, cooperatives, and economies of care that value local enterprise over global (de Sousa Santos 2003; Eisler 2008; Henderson 2006). Progress here is not about growth at the expense of the natural environment but rather harmonious co-evolution.

2.6. Alternative Globalisations.

Having established that globalisation is experienced and interpreted in many different ways, and discussed the influences that shaped the dominant neoliberal form of globalisation in the latter half of the twentieth century, I now enter into the ideological worlds of some of the contestants to the hegemonic form and summarise their worldviews of globalisation, issues of interest, the most prominent discourse in the literature reviewed, the systems produced by each discourse and how progress towards their preferred globalisation might be measured. This summary will be used to inform the matrix of alternative global governance models developed in chapter five. In ideological form, these alternative globalisations are Grassroots Globalism, Planetary Partnerships, Global Digital Democracies, Bioregionalism and Cosmopolitan Democracy.

_Grassroots Globalism._

In this globalisation the world is a battleground of subaltern and subjugated groups skirmishing, politically, with proponents of the neoliberal agenda. They ‘fight’ for human rights, autonomy, self-determination and a much broader developmental agenda than their neoliberal opponents (de Sousa Santos 2003; de Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito 2005; Ramos 2010; Shaw 2006). A key discourse in this globalisation pits North against South wherein globalisation is seen as a product of the North that favours the North and excludes the majority of the world, the ‘global South’, by purposefully
creating their non-existence (de Sousa Santos 2003, 2006; Shaw 2006). This
globalisation discourse also contains a growing religious versus secular element as
European and industrialised nations become increasingly secular whilst ‘the South’ and
developing nations are turning in greater numbers to organised religions (Inglehart and
Norris 2008; Shaw 2006). Grassroots Globalists are arguing for globalisation as a social
equaliser within which progress is freedom and an end to poverty; it is the critical, post-
colonial worldview of globalisation (Ramos 2010) firmly rooted in social systems and
movements. Success would be thus be measured by such instruments as the Freedom
Index, and human wellbeing and happiness indicators.

*Planetary Partnerships.*

In this world the hegemonic form of globalisation is a chasm, an impossibly wide divide
where the ranking of the two halves of humanity, male and female, creates a dominator
form of social organisation (Eisler 1995). Experienced by women as exploitation, sexual
discrimination, lack of voice and representation, gender inequities and of being
undervalued (Ramos 2010), it has generated a sense of global identity of sisterhood and
the need to build alliances for effective resistance amongst disparate women’s groups
(Bergeron 2001). It is the feminist worldview in which one writer sees the ideal
globalisation as cultural evolution through egalitarian societies where progress is
achieved through partnerships and the two halves of humanity are organised by linking
patriarchy within the wider social system. Man is master of all he surveys, including
women, children and nature. Historically, Man is seen as having used violence and
technology to destroy egalitarian societies that appear in mythology as an age of
harmony and peace lasting several thousand years during which significant social,
cultural and technological advances were made (Armstrong 2005; Campbell and
Moyers 1988; Eisler 1995). For Eisler, the central image of the Neolithic period ‘was a
woman giving birth and not, as in our time, a man dying on a cross’ (Eisler 1995:21).
Artefacts from this period show that society was organised around a partnership rather
than a dominator model; by linking rather than ranking. Women played strong roles in
these societies as crafts people, priestesses, goddesses, and as the supreme deity,
particularly in Europe (Armstrong 2005; Bierlein 1994; Campbell and Moyers 1988;
Gimbutas 2007).
In Eisler’s (1998) view, the dominator and the partnerships forms of social organisation have distinctive modes of technological and social evolution. In a dominator society she discusses the use of technology for destruction and domination. In a partnership society, technology is used for peace and the advancement of the human family (Eisler 1995:61). This seems a somewhat simplistic argument, however if less focus is placed on gender demarcation that equates male with dominator and female with partner, and more emphasis is given to the structure of domination and partnerships in societal organisation, we can appreciate them as hierarchy and network respectively. In a hierarchy people are ranked; in a network they are linked. One is compulsion; the other is consensual. Currently the dominant form of globalisation is hierarchical. Those with the highest levels of political and economic power are in charge and the majority are male. What might a globalisation look like if we transitioned from a ranking to a linking system of social organising at the planetary level? Could this lead to a new renaissance in thought, language, music, art and culture as envisaged by Sarkar? (Inayatullah 1996). Success in the ideal globalisation for feminists could be measured by indicators of women’s status in society, the ratio of women to men in key roles, the number of girls and women educated, and by measures placing a value on women’s work. Whilst these new measures are a work in progress, some are to be found in the Millennium Project’s State of the Future indicators and in Eisler’s proposals for a caring economics and an economics of partnerships (Eisler 2008, 2011).

*Global Digital Democracies.*

In the Global Digital Democracies model, technology provides the means for the people of the world to participate in global decision-making. The number of international non-government organisations and social movements increased significantly during the twentieth century signalling a rise in global social activism. In the past decade the people of the world have rallied to exercise their power in demonstrations against neoliberal globalisation, wars, environmental issues and social injustices (Bennis 2006; Henderson 1993, 1996; de Sousa Santos 2003, 2004). They have used this power effectively, mobilising grassroots resistance to form transnational social movements that challenge governments and corporations. One event, the 2003 International March for Peace, involved more than 12 million people marching across cities around the world to
protest against U.S. empire-building and the Bush regime’s military approach to international relations (Bennis 2006).

This level of public activism would have been unimaginable in historic times. First, the means of communication needed to mobilise and co-ordinate people across continents at this speed did not exist. Second, historically people have given their allegiances to family, clan, community, religion, nation and even civilisation, as evidenced in late twentieth century discourse on ‘the West and the Rest’. There is little evidence in the literature of allegiance to the world as a whole. This second point suggests that a planetary consciousness is emerging within civil society that is stimulating the growth of ‘Global Civil Society’. Kaldoor discusses Global Civil Society as a form of politics that is ‘both an outcome and an agent of global interconnectedness’ (Kaldoor, 2003:5). This interconnectedness is facilitated by highly mobile information and communications technologies that enable ‘flash mobs’ to be coordinated at short notice. According to Lipschultz, this level of social activism is increasingly seen as the presage of a re-creation of world politics whether by ‘democratising institutions and global governance, spreading human rights across the world, or the emergence of a global citizenry in a world-wide public sphere’ (cited in Baker and Chandler, 1992:391). Writers such as Baker and Chandler (2005), Clark (2001), Kaldoor (2003), Keane (2005) and others believe Global Civil Society to be the agency necessary to deliver these hoped-for transformations (Baker and Chandler, 2005). Henderson believes citizen movements ‘constitute an evolving form of democratic governance, sometimes rivalling the influence of heads of state, generals, scientists, inventors, and multinational corporate executives’ (Henderson 1993:1). These social movements are highly egalitarian networks that are emerging in a number of domains (Bauwens 2005), for example:

- In technology: file sharing, blogs, online social networks, commons-based peer production;
- In economics: collective intelligence, communal shareholding, spirituality at work;
- In politics: the alternative globalisations movement;
- And in the cultural domains: new dialogues among civilisations, new relationships between individuals and collectives, and new relationships with nature (Bauwens 2005; Henderson 1993,1996; Henderson, 2006).
Citizen movements have emerged as a powerful force in international politics and are transforming global norms and practices (Khagram et al. 2002). These transnational social movements from which a planetary civilisation might emerge in the future are using technologies to sow the seeds of a new form of globalisation. The introduction of technology to geopolitics emphasises the power of social media, peer-to-peer production (Bauwens 2004; Ramos 2010) and the need for wide diffusion and convergence of I.C.T., which is not without its own challenges (The Millennium Project 1996-2010). The number of ‘friends’, hits and visitors to online sites, blogs, and social networks could measure success in this model. I surmise progress would be more people with access to the Internet. The metaphor here is ‘the world is a web’: an interconnected system of technologies promoting self-organisation, a development fostering the notion of a noosphere or global brain. As an enabler of collaboration for communities of interest, globalisation is experienced as technologies connecting people, supporting a new form of politics and the possibility of a new global civilisation (Bauwens 2004, 2005).

Localisation.
Local counters the global in this world where globalisation is rejected in favour of subsidiarity. For proponents of localisation, the metaphor ‘the world is a garden’ reflects their discourses of deep ecology, complex adaptive systems, the global commons, sustainable communities, indigenous knowledge (Ramos 2010) and spirituality (Bussey 2006; Vedaprajinananda 2006). These also underpin the neohuman worldview in which the ideal globalisation would be one that recognises the interconnectedness of all life forms and progress does not come at the cost of social justice or nature (Vedaprajinananda 2006). Concerned that the current economic form of globalisation is ‘running hand in hand with the increasing destruction of the environment and the homogenisation of culture’, the neohuman vision of globalisation is ‘reached following a process of steady local and regional activity’ (Vedaprajinananda 2006:29,33). If a neohuman worldview of globalisation were widely adopted, the measures of success could include, for example, reductions in eco-footprints, or the number of species and natural environments restored to health. The origins of localisation can be traced back to a 1950s intellectual movement that sought to
challenge excessive growth across a number of domains, largely as a reaction to wide-scale industrialism (Ramos 2010). The movement grew during the 1960s and 1970s establishing centres in several areas of the U.S., including the Rocky Mountains Institute, and aligning itself to environmental and educational groups and projects (Aberley 1999; Sale 1996). As knowledge and practice developed, Bioregionalism emerged as a local alternative to global governance.

*Cosmopolitan Democracy.*

In this globalisation the world is a community in which, ideally, everyone has a say in community life. Discourses concern participation, a global civil society, equality of access to legal rights and responsibilities (Hettne and Oden 2002) and the need for global governance to address planetary problems (Ramos 2010). The worldview here is founded in Cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan democracy aims to achieve world order based on democratic principles and the rule of law recognising all peoples as entitled to legal rights at individual, national and global levels (Archibugi 1998). In this ideology, globalisation would be experienced as public participation in world citizenship (Hettne and Oden 2002). Grounded in social and political-legal systems, this law-based globalisation has emerged as the result of the perceived inability of States to address global issues and enforce democracy, regulations and justice (McGrew 2000). Measures of success for proponents of this form of globalisation might include the Index of Democracy, number of signatories to U.N. international laws and treaties and the effective resolution of global intractable problems, such as those that feature in the U.N. Millennium Project (The Millennium Project 1996-2010). The C.L.A. matrix shown overleaf summarises the alternative globalisations selected for this thesis and includes metaphors I have developed from the discourses associated with each ideological worldview.

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5 *Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy rates countries according to five interrelated categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. [www.economist.com](http://www.economist.com)*
Table 4: A CLA Matrix Summarising Selected Alternative Globalisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLA</th>
<th>Hegemonic</th>
<th>Post-development</th>
<th>Engendered</th>
<th>Global Digital Democracies</th>
<th>Localisation</th>
<th>Cosmopolitan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourses</td>
<td>Consumption, nature as commodity. We can model the issues given enough variables; we have the tools to fix it.</td>
<td>Autonomy; broad development; human rights; self-determination [2]. North vs global South[6].</td>
<td>Exploitation; sexual discrimination; lack of voice and representation; low value; gender equity; [2] global sisterhood; global identity; alliances and resistance [3].</td>
<td>Systems theories; self-organisation; noosphere [2]; collaboration; communities of interest.</td>
<td>Deep ecology; complex adaptive systems; global commons; indigenous knowledges [2]; critical spirituality [7].</td>
<td>Participation; global civil society; equality of access to legal rights and responsibilities; [1] global governance for planetary problems[2].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors</td>
<td>The world is a machine.</td>
<td>The world is a battleground.</td>
<td>The world is a chasm.</td>
<td>The world is a web.</td>
<td>The world is a garden.</td>
<td>The world is a dialogue [8].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.7. Implications for Global Governance Futures.

Prominent writers in globalisation studies argue that globalisation has undermined the authority of the State (see Held 1991, 1995; Archibugi and Held 1996; Archibugi, Held and Koehler 1998) and that ‘the impact of de-territorialised, heterogeneous collectives will increase’ (Hettne and Oden 2002:4-5). Whilst views differ on the need for global governance, many writers share the opinion that the current U.N.-centric system is in transition and that the outcome is as yet unknown (Bello 2001; Chase-Dunn 2005; Deacon 2003; Falk 1975; Florini 2006; Hettne 2002; Hettne and Oden 2002; Khagram 2006; Laszlo 1978, 2006; Raskin et al. 2002; Suter 2003). This uncertainty increases the need for a study of possible alternative global governances whilst the need for new knowledge to solve global problems, the posited emerging planetary civilisation, and the emergence of contesting globalisation discourses provide an opportunity for U.N.P.O. to join the global governance debate by offering perspectives from the periphery of the current system.

Laszlo suggests that we need to look beyond the current States based structure to ‘a new social and international order as different from today as today is from the Middle Ages’ (Laszlo 1978:741). The exploration of some alternatives to the neoliberal form of globalisation creates the space for propositions of alternative global governance futures. Hettne (2002:11) then asks ‘what kind of political landscapes are emerging from globalisations? Are more States becoming “pathological anarchies” or has the global village finally arrived?’ Which ideologies are competing for hegemony or at least a strong influence on the future global governance architecture (Khagram 2006)? These questions are answered in the next chapter in which I deconstruct the current U.N.-centric global governance system, discuss a range of global governance futures, and identify the elements of an analytical framework that will be used in chapter five to construct an U.N.P.O. preferred future. The chapter includes a matrix summarising the alternative models of global governance futures.
Chapter Three

Global Governance Present, Past and Futures
3.1. Introduction.

In chapter two I reviewed the literature on societal evolution, humanity’s common affairs and a select number of alternative globalisations to the prevailing neoliberal form. In this chapter I explore the literature on global governance: its history, the current system with the U.N. at its core, and some of the possible futures that could emerge from the alternative globalisations mapped in the previous chapter. In its 1995 publication ‘Our Global Neighbourhood’ the Commission on Global Governance writes that ‘a time of change when future patterns cannot be clearly discerned is inevitably a time of uncertainty’ and ‘there is a need to develop the vision of a better world and the strategies, the institutions, and the will to achieve it’ (The Commission on Global Governance 1995:7). The Commission also pronounced that the people of the world have more power to shape the future than ever before and never has there been a greater need to exercise that power. Yet the means by which the people of the world might exercise their power to handle their common affairs in the future, whilst the topic of ongoing debate, are yet to be agreed. Generally referred to as ‘global governance’, these means are the central topic of this thesis. The Commission defines governance as:

the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest (The Commission on Global Governance 1995:3).

The current system of global governance, established at the end of World War II, makes no provision for the people of the world to participate in decisions affecting their future. The world has changed significantly since 1945 whilst the foundations of the global governance system have not. The Commission’s introduction of uncertainty to the global governance debate recognises that more than one future is possible thus, it is argued in this thesis, the need to develop a vision is predicated on the need to develop a range of alternative scenarios to reflect multiple perspectives of future possibilities. I
discuss some of the possibilities later in this chapter, identifying divergent future global governance proposals, mapping some of the elements and principles that inform their construction and then using these to inform the development of an analytical framework in chapter five. A matrix summarising the selected alternative global governance models on page 91 uses the criteria of future, episteme, structure, agency, history inspired by the work of Ramos (2010) on alternative globalisations and originating in the macrohistorical scholarship of Galtung and Inayatullah (1997). The matrix depicts alternative global governance models that could be created in the future if certain forms of globalisation were widely adopted by the people of the world and certain ideologies that Khagram (2006) identifies are currently jostling for position take centre stage. The C.L.A.-based analytical framework in chapter five will be utilised to further develop the U.N.P.O. preferred global governance future, facilitating U.N.P.O.’s participation in the growing international conversation on global governance.

3.2. The U.N.-Centric Global Governance System.

This section starts by deconstructing the current global governance arrangements using the layers of C.L.A. to better understand how and why this U.N.-centric system was created, and the prevailing worldviews, discourses, metaphors and myths that are maintaining the system. The Litany provides a synopsis of the current system’s history, how it measures its success as a global governance system, and discusses the changing perceptions of U.N. effectiveness. At the systemic level, I discuss the dominant political and economic systems and the social causes that led to them becoming privileged over other systems. A deeper level of analysis reveals the worldview and prominent discourse that continues to shape the way the system and structure are organised. Finally the more subliminal drivers of metaphor and myth are explored. The C.L.A. matrix below maps the discussion that follows and is used for comparative analysis later in the thesis.
Table 5: A C.L.A. Matrix of the Current Global Governance System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C.L.A.</th>
<th>Views of the Current Global Governance System at Deepening Levels of Consciousness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Litany</strong></td>
<td>States as members of U.N; perceptions of U.N. effectiveness; official history: Westphalia, League of Nations, Bretton Woods, U.N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Systems and Social Causes</strong></td>
<td>Political and economic; security and development based.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worldview and Discourse</strong></td>
<td>Dominator, power shared amongst the already powerful. Control versus freedom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metaphors and Myths</strong></td>
<td>Man controls all. Government knows best. West and the rest. The Queen Mary – exclusive cruise ship – limited places at the Captain’s table.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Litany.*

At the litany level, evidence of the success of the current U.N.-centric global governance system is the number of member States participating in its General Assembly. Yet increasingly the effectiveness of the U.N. is being questioned in the media, in international relations literature, and by the U.N. leadership itself. The ‘official history’ of the U.N. is briefly reviewed at this surface level of C.L.A.

Currently, if States are the legitimate unit of measurement by which a global governance system may justify its claim to being global, the U.N. could claim to be the first global governance organisation. Of the world’s 194 States, 193 are members of the U.N. General Assembly. The Vatican City is the only State recognised by international sovereignty treaties not to participate in the General Assembly. The current system of global governance with the U.N. at its core is based on an array of treaties and agreements. These include international treaties by which States recognise each other formally and accord each other sovereign rights over territories, nations and peoples. Some of these agreements date back to the peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 whilst others can be traced back to the formation of the U.N. after World War II.

According to Falk, the antecedents of today’s global governance arrangements are the Treaty of Westphalia, the League of Nations, and the Bretton Woods and U.N. organisations. The Treaty of Westphalia was signed to end the 30 Years War in Europe.
in the seventeenth century with a view to securing peace (political) and prosperity (economic development) for its signatories. It established a new system of international relations based on a set of agreed principles that remain largely unchallenged today. Falk (2002:154) lists these as

- the primacy of the territorial State as political actor on a global level,
- the centrality of international warfare,
- the autonomy of the sovereign State to govern affairs within recognised international boundaries,
- the generalised tolerance of human wrongs committed within the scope of sovereign authority,
- the special leadership role in geopolitics claimed by and assigned to leading States,
- and the absence of strong institutions of regional and global governance.

Framed within these principles, the League of Nations was formed in 1920 after World War I with the aim of fostering international cooperation to achieve peace. However, the ideal of cooperation based on arbitration, disarmament and collective security through the League was ultimately undermined by what Beck refers to as ‘the more enduring methods based upon force, rearmament, and the old diplomacy’ (Beck 1995:175). The failure of the Disarmament Conference in 1934 was the final event that led to the League’s disbandment in 1946 (Beck 1995:175).

The U.N. and Bretton Woods organisations were the next development in the history of global governance systems. The U.N. was formed in 1945 to replace the League of Nations and many of the League’s aims and policies were transferred to the U.N. at this time. The social and financial impacts of World War II encouraged more nations to join an international cooperative effort working for peace, state security and economic development. Financial crises experienced in the period between World War I and World War II prompted economists from 44 countries to meet in July 1944 at the U.N. Monetary and Financial conference at Bretton Woods in the U.S. for the purpose of creating a new international monetary system at the end of the war. During the conference, participants developed a framework for international economic institutions and signed agreements to establish the forerunners of the World Bank and the I.M.F.
The group reconvened in Havana in 1947 to establish the International Trade Organisation, later absorbed into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.), and then the W.T.O. (Falk 2002; Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2003; The Commission on Global Governance 1995). After World War II U.S. policy was developed aimed at suppressing what it saw as ‘radical and nationalistic regimes’ that for Chomsky (1997) were those open to popular pressure to improve living standards and development for domestic needs. In his view, such regimes were not congruent with emerging U.S. policy that identified the need to establish ‘a political and economic climate conducive to U.S. private industry’ and ‘to protect our raw materials in whatever part of the world these materials are located’. In sharp contrast to these goals, Chomsky discusses Latin America’s aims after World War II as ‘policies designed to bring about a broader distribution of wealth and raise the standard of living for the masses’ with the first beneficiaries of a country’s development being the people of that country (Chomsky 1997:120-122). However the economic and political power of the U.S. overcame opposition from ‘the South’. The Economic Charter of the Americas was announced in 1945 along with the U.S. call for an end to economic nationalism and support for the first beneficiaries of development to be its own investors, local business associates, and political alliances (Chomsky 1997). Here, I contend, we have examples of the U.S.’ increasing dominance in international political and economic affairs.

Over the past two decades, the U.N. and Bretton Woods organisations have come under increasing scrutiny and criticism. The present structure of political and economic institutions such as the I.M.F., the World Bank, the G7, and G.A.T.T. are viewed by social movements in particular as underpinning the wealth of the global North and serving the interests of trans-national corporations, banks and investment firms (Chomsky 1997; de Sousa Santos 2004). Galtung (2002) criticised the U.N., describing the organisation as ‘dominated by middle-aged, white, middle and upper class males, often Christian and Anglo-Saxon, from the U.S., U.K. and other rich countries enforcing their caricature of globalisation.’ He believes that in order to achieve a globalisation that supports life in dignity for all, vast civil society movements are needed that can stand up to the IMF, WTO and World Bank (Galtung 2002).
The political system at the heart of the U.N. has also been found wanting with allegations of bribery and corruption in decision-making processes. The process itself currently permits decisions with global implications to be taken by a few powerful nations with little consideration of the perspectives of the less powerful. Should the latter prevail, the right of veto has been bestowed on the powerful few, allowing them to block what they consider to be unfavourable decisions (Kelleher, 2005). In 2003 former U.N. General Secretary General Kofi Annan released a press statement, based on his major statement to the U.N. General Assembly, declaring that the U.N. needed to be restructured in order to re-establish credibility and legitimacy on the world stage (Annan 2003). However there is little information in the public domain to suggest that the transformational change called for in this statement has occurred. Despite considerable efforts on the part of Annan himself to drive the proposed reforms, including changes in the permanent membership of the Security Council, the creation of opportunities for non-State actors to participate, and the need for an emergency U.N. peacekeeping force to intervene in States where natural catastrophes and international humanitarian concerns warrant intervention, Annan could not overcome the resistance to change from within (Falk 2008).

Annan’s drive for the involvement of non-State actors at the U.N. has a historical precedent in civil society’s involvement in U.N. meetings in the 1940s when over 1200 N.G.O. representatives attended the U.N. Conference on International Organisation to contribute to the drafting of the U.N. charter (Keane 2005:41). Clearly there is a precedent here that allows for the inclusion of a Global Civil Society that, if run on democratic grounds, would see the pendulum of power swing towards Galtung’s 1800 nations currently excluded from the current U.N. General Assembly. However, a successful program to engage civil society groups in the 1990s as active yet informal participants in U.N. conferences on issues such as the ‘environment, human rights, women, population and social wellbeing’, posed such a threat to the States-based system ‘that no further global conferences on high-profile issues of interest to civil society have been held or scheduled’ (Falk 2008:316).
Regarding Annan’s proposed emergency peacekeeping force, events such as natural disasters and internal conflicts are considered domestic issues within the current U.N-centric system that upholds the Westphalian policy of non-interference in domestic affairs, as stated in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter (Falk 2002). A peacekeeping force needs the permission of the relevant State authority to enter its territory or approval from the U.N. Security Council. In so far as U.N. led and U.N. sanctioned State interventions are concerned, exceptions to the policy of non-interference are rarely made. Approved interventions have been for humanitarian purposes where the intent is to address large-scale violations of human rights. Even then the intervention must be authorised by the Security Council after a lengthy application process. As intervention might include armed intrusion into member States’ territories where less aggressive measures have failed, decisions taken by the U.N. Security Council to pursue such action are carefully considered and debated amongst Security Council members (United Nations 2011). However, delay in humanitarian intervention has resulted in significant loss of life as in the examples of mass deaths in Bosnia, ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, genocide in Rwanda, and the lengthy arguments concerning the legitimacy of the war in Iraq (United Nations 2004). This led to a review of the management of international crises that involved considerable debate on the issues of sovereign rights and non-interference versus human rights and the timing of humanitarian intervention. In 2004 Secretary General Annan released a statement to the effect that the U.N. recognised:

the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorising military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide or other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violation of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent (United Nations 2004:66).

The U.N. and its member States continue to debate these issues within the framework of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) strategy launched by Annan at the U.N. World Summit in 2005 (Brown 2008; United Nations 2005). The U.N. has formed a high-level panel to lead the debate and provide member nations with recommendations and proposals. Implementation of the R2P strategy was debated at the U.N. 2009 General
Assembly amongst delegates’ concerns that R2P would increase the dominance of the Security Council’s five nations that have the power of veto (United Nations 2011). There is nothing in the literature reviewed to suggest that members of the Security Council are willing to extend their membership or to renounce the veto. Falk’s (2008) analysis of the panel’s proposals to change U.N. policy to accept R2P is instructive here. In his view the proposals suggesting that R2P can be introduced without changing the status of Security Council members and without the institutional support that would give their recommendations ‘meaningful political character’ are naïve:

The only way that the Security Council could be meaningfully empowered to implement the suggested supervision over extended claims of self-defence is to deny the availability of the veto to permanent members, but the issue is so delicate that it is not even mentioned, much less creatively addressed (Falk 2008:326).

Based on the literature reviewed, the Treaty of Westphalia, The League of Nations, the Bretton Woods and U.N. organisations are the antecedents of neoliberal globalisation. Each has reinforced the historical view of global governance as both a political and economic development arena. The principles of Westphalia remained largely unchallenged. The balance of power within the U.N.–centric system is skewed by the power of veto held by a small number of politically and economically dominant countries. Representatives of less influential nations attending U.N. and W.T.O. forums have been coerced by more powerful actors to sign agreements and vote on issues to suit the interests of the dominant powers (Crowl 2001; Kelleher 2005). In such a highly contested politically and economically dominated arena it is challenging for unrepresented nations and peoples to be heard. As well, individuals have no legitimate means of contributing to global decision-making forums, only States do, and only heads of States do within the U.N. General Assembly. As Secretary General Moon reports, less than 10% of countries have female heads of State (United Nations 2012) so that decisions taken at the General Assembly are dominated by men. If non-state actors such as U.N.P.O., the World Social Forum and the Transnational Feminist Movement are seeking to transform neoliberal globalisation and the current global governance system they will need to understand and counter the weight of this history with compelling
visions of alternative futures. This thesis will be of assistance in stimulating debate within these international movements and in the construction and articulation of their preferred futures.

*The Systems and Social Causes.*

Underpinning the current U.N-centric global governance arrangements, and woven through the fabric of the history of global governance as summarised earlier, are two dominant systems: political and economic. Each historical attempt at global governance emerged as a States-based attempt to secure international or global peace through cooperation after a major conflict. The Westphalian system was developed after the European 30 Years War; the League of Nations and Bretton Woods systems were created after World War I and the financial crises that occurred before World War II; and the United Nations was formed almost immediately after World War II as a result of the failure of the League of Nations to prevent war. When the U.N. was established, States were dominant powers and people believed in the ability of governments to protect them and improve their lives. States were focused on preventing another world war and another global economic depression; consequently the ‘establishment of international, intergovernmental institutions to ensure peace and prosperity was a welcome development’ (The Commission on Global Governance 1995:np). However, the result of many of the past victors of wars being rewarded with sovereign rights over their conquests is that we now have Galtung’s (2007:153) ‘2000 nations in 200 countries’, or States, referred to earlier. It is the 200 States that are entitled to membership of the U.N. General Assembly and legitimacy in the current global governance system; the remaining 1800 nations are not recognised as States in the Westphalian system and therefore have little or no access to forums in which decisions are made that affect their futures. For the purposes of this thesis, these are considered to be nations and peoples on the periphery of the current global governance system and the U.N.P.O. participants in this study are a small sample of these nations and peoples.

For Falk (2002, 2008), the first signs that the principles of the Westphalian system might be contested emerged in recent decades when, for example, under the mantle of human rights the ‘generalised tolerance of human wrongs’ has been challenged and the
‘special leadership role in geopolitics’ of a small number of States has been questioned, particularly with reference to the U.N. Security Council and the power of veto held by five nations. Scholars such as Eisler (1995, 1998, 2008), Falk (2002, 2008), Galtung (2004, 2007), and Vedaprajinananda (2006), have questioned this divisive approach to international relations and proposed more inclusive alternatives that will be explored in the discussion of global governance futures later in this chapter. Certainly the definition of global governance provided by the U.N. sanctioned Commission on Global Governance appears to accommodate a broader range of perspectives than is currently admitted to U.N. decision-making forums:

Global governance is effective global decision-making (that) needs to employ the skills and resources of a diversity of people and institutions at many levels [in a] continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken (The Commission on Global Governance 1995:3).

As to the Bretton Woods system one writer views its establishment as ‘transnational economic multilateralism…. another compromise in the dialectic outcome of the two processes of economic and political forces’ (Hettne 2002:7). In their edited book Alternatives to Economic Globalisation, Cavanagh and Mander (2004) are critical in their appraisal of the current impact of the Bretton Woods institutions stating that they are:

bringing about the most fundamental redesign of the planet’s social, economic, and political arrangement since the Industrial Revolution. They are engineering a powershift of stunning proportions, moving real economic and political power away from national, state and local governments and communities toward unprecedented centralisation of power for global corporations, bankers, and the global bureaucracies they helped create, at the expense of national sovereignty, community control, democracy, diversity and the natural world (Cavanagh and Mander 2004:19).

The global governance systems to date can therefore be summarised as being focused on political security and economic development, aiming to achieve and maintain peace and a reasonable level of prosperity for member States. They continue to uphold the principles agreed to in the Treaty of Westphalia.
The seventeenth century Treaty of Westphalia effectively set the scene for the next 350 years of developments in international relations. It established an elitist structure awarding leadership of the system to nations who were the victors of the conflict and rewarding them with territorial sovereignty (Falk 2002; Hettne and Oden 2002). This dominator worldview, where power is shared amongst the already powerful, continued throughout the formation of the League of Nations in 1920 and is in evidence today in the power of veto accorded to five ‘leading States’ in the U.N. Security Council appointed after World War II: the U.S., U.K., France, Italy, and Japan. According to Falk (2008), the U.N. has been unable to adjust to changes in its operating environment since it was formed in 1945, particularly changes associated with globalisation in its many forms. It has been ‘stuck in the Westphalian paradigm that fit global realities reasonably well’ in that era (Falk 2008:317) and the Westphalian system has ‘accentuated the contrasts between “inside” and “outside”, “citizen” and “alien”, and even between “civilised” and “barbaric”’ (Falk 2002:153) or in more general terms the core and the periphery. The most prominent discursive thread running through the global governance literature is control versus freedom. This thread is suggestive of people questioning how a global governance system might deal with intractable problems within States, such as conflicts, abuses of human rights, and genocides, in the context of the Westphalian agreement of non-interference in recognised sovereign territories. It encompasses such concerns as whether or not global ethics and norms can be established whilst respecting local values and customs; and whether issues such as water and food shortages can be managed across agreed territorial borders without creating conflict.

The language around global governance has also been called into question. The U.N., recognising the inconsistencies in terminologies in governance, commissioned a paper in 2006 with a view to defining the basic concepts and agreeing terminology for use throughout the U.N. system (United Nations ECOSOC 2006). For the purposes of clarity at this juncture of the thesis, and to support the argument that global governance language remains that of the dominator, some of the inconsistent definitions are provided here. The U.N.D.P. defined governance in 1997 as ‘the exercise of economic,
political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels’ clearly maintaining the Westphalian principles and privileging the neoliberal agenda. The World Bank defined governance in 1993 as ‘the method through which power is exercised in the management of a country’s political, economic and social resources for development’. Peters and Pierre emphasise the role of the State when they define governance as ‘processes in which the State plays a leading role, making priorities and defining objectives’. The definition that is most congruent with that of the Commission of Global Governance in their 1995 report is that of Pierre who writes ‘governance refers to sustaining coordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives’ (United Nations ECOSOC 2006:3). With the exception of Pierre’s contribution to the discussion, the language in these definitions supports Neoliberalism and the States based system of governance. If we are looking for a means by which the peoples of the world can contribute their knowledge and wisdom to addressing the global intractable problems of the twenty-first century as suggested by the Commission on Global Governance then it appears that the term ‘governance’ might need to be replaced. This can be achieved through the exploration of new metaphors and the dissemination of new memes as replacements for ‘governance’.

Metaphors and Myths.

Futures oriented literature, and particularly literature from the environmental and systems sciences, metaphorically refers to our home planet as ‘Spaceship Earth’ (Boulding 1966; Checkland 1994; Daly and Neal 1993; Ellyard 2011; Fuller 1969; Igoe 2005; Swaminathan 2007). In my view, an appropriate metaphor for the current system of global governance is the exclusive cruise ship, the Queen Mary. The ‘Spaceship Earth’ metaphor has linguistic entailments such as ‘we’re all in it together’ whereas the Queen Mary metaphor suggests there are limited places at the Captain’s table. Underpinning the Queen Mary cruise liner metaphor, I propose, are the myths that man controls all, government knows best and ‘West and the rest’. These myths reflect the assumptions based on European history and scientific and evolutionary principles that Man (gender demarcation deliberate) is master of all he surveys and is superior to all other life forms, including women and children; that governments of States represent
their nations and peoples and know what is best for them; and that European nations and their progeny, the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand, often referred to as ‘the West’, are superior to other nations and civilisations. In this thesis I seek to challenge these myths and assumptions by presenting alternatives in a range of global governance futures.

3.3 Global Governance Futures Past.

As Marchetti (2009:136) discovered ‘the academic discourse on ideal models of global politics is very underdeveloped. Few attempts have been made to map ideological background visions of global politics’. Within this underdeveloped discourse, scholarly literature on normative global governance futures is uncommon, even within the recently released *Journal of Global Governance*. Even more rare are research projects that use formal futures research methods. However one project that deserves attention in this thesis for its catalysing the first noticeable shift away from Westphalian thinking, according to Falk (2002), is the World Order Models Project (W.O.M.P.). Initiated in 1968 by a group of scholars concerned at what they saw as the regressive direction of the human condition in the future, W.O.M.P. was a transnational research initiative involving eight teams of researchers from North America, Latin America, West Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan, India, Africa and a mixed team named Transnational (Beer 1979; Sakamoto 1971). Prominent authors for the volumes comprising the W.O.M.P. research findings are Falk, Galtung, Kothari, Lagos and Godoy, Mazrui, and Mendlovitz, and within this group the works of Mendlovitz and Falk are quoted most prolifically. Beer (1979) surmises that this was due to their U.S. origins, the U.S. being the target audience for these works. W.O.M.P.’s purpose was the research and development of a range of normative futures to improve the human condition and the strategies needed to achieve a preferred future in the 1990s (Beer 1979; Falk 2002). One element of this transnational research initiative was the development of world order values to inform the alternative futures of global politics. The research revealed values of peace, economic well-being, social justice, ecological stability and positive identity, yet surprisingly for Beer (1979), freedom was not included in this list. Other recommendations made by W.O.M.P. included a centralised organisational model that
would focus on the global challenges of population growth, war, ecological issues, and technological innovation, and the establishment of world systems for security, economics, human development and ecological balance (Beer 1979; Falk 1975; Mendlovitz and Weiss 1975).

In his critique of W.O.M.P., Beer (1979) suggests that the volumes produced were too difficult for many people to understand and this, I speculate, may be the reason why this project did not realise its aims. Paradoxically he recommends that future work in this domain needs to achieve a greater level of complexity, including a wider variety of ideological perspectives. In his view, despite the cultural diversity of the researchers, they shared very similar ideological worldviews. He does, however, support W.O.M.P.’s engagement with activists in social movements taking a bottom-up approach to the initiative and concludes ‘intellectuals, social scientists, educators, and political activists may help influence the outcome but they will not produce it. A good share of the world’s people will have to put a good part of themselves into it’ (Beer 1979:17). The experience of this project suggests that, whilst greater complexity and diversity of worldviews need to be incorporated in future research efforts, the means by which the findings are communicated is key to engaging ‘a good share of the world’s people’. Storytelling, I propose, provides the necessary means and will be discussed in chapter four as part of the methodological approach to this research. I now turn to more recent discussions of possible global governance futures.

3.4 Contemporary Global Governance Futures.

Having examined the existing U.N.-centric global governance system and taken into consideration the comments of writers in the globalisation discourses that the States-based system is weakening and there is no clear alternative for it, I now discuss six proposed global governance futures featured in or constructed using extracts from contemporary literature. The discussion is framed by the criteria of future, episteme, structure, agency and history, building on Ramos’ (2010) criteria developed from the macrohistorical writings of Galtung and Inayatullah (1997) and informed by the scholarship of Khagram (2006) on future global governance architectures. This mapping
will allow U.N.P.O. to see how other proposed models and discourses are being constructed and use this understanding towards the development of an U.N.P.O. preferred global governance future. For the purposes of this thesis, the criteria ‘future’ refers to the proposed future global governance model or concept; ‘episteme’ is the way global governance is known in this concept and the key global issues the model seeks to address; ‘structure’ is the concept’s physical form; ‘agency’ concerns the nature and location of power in the model, who is legitimised and who is disempowered by the proposed new system; and ‘history’ gives a brief account of the origins of the model. I define power as ‘the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate’ (Barnett and Duvall 2004:3) and take a particular interest in the different forms power can take in the global governance context. Specifically, for Galtung (1995) power is coercive, economic or normative. Foucault (1976:85-92) analyses how power has been understood in Europe since the Middle Ages when it was typically seen as domination and repression, the patriarch’s ‘power over’ people, wealth, and life itself. He sees this as changing during the ‘Classical Age’ when the understanding of power took a more positive direction becoming power as productivity: dynamic and enabling. Barnett and Duvall (2004:3) add institutional power ‘when actors exercise indirect control over others’, structural power which concerns the ‘capacities and interests of actors in relation to one another’ an example being the construction of a social status of laziness being conferred on a people who do not work according to the norms of the capitalist economy, and productive power which is located in meaning-making, guiding action in specific directions, ‘defining what constitutes legitimate knowledge, and shaping whose knowledge matters.’

The six models of global governance futures are: Assertive Multilateralism, Bioregionalism, Cosmopolitan Democracy, Grassroots Globalism, Global Digital Democracies, and Planetary Partnerships; the last is a term I have developed for this thesis from the works of Eisler. Whilst these futures are synthesised from the scholarship of various writers, the key sources that informed the structure and sub-headings are the works of Ramos (2010) on alternative globalisations, Khagram (2006) on future global governance architectures, and Eisler (1991,1995,1998, 2006, 2008,
2011) on partnerships and the language of communion rather than agency, collective ‘power with’ rather than individual ‘power over’ governance. In drawing on Khagram’s work I repeat his claims that:

these models are clearly internally diverse and by no means fully articulated, mutually exclusive, or necessarily exhaustive……(they) offer an initial analysis of normative-analytic images for further refinement and debate (2006:98).

This chapter makes a contribution to the ‘further refinement and debate’ by presenting normative images of global governance futures in which specific groups, some of the non-government actors trying to make sense of globalisation as discussed earlier, have an interest. As Vedaprajinanananda writes ‘it is not a question about whether there will be a global society in the twenty-first century. It is a question of what kind of global society will emerge’ (Vedaprajinanananda 2006:34). The chapter concludes by summarising the key findings of the literature review.

The following table provides a summary of this discussion and the global governance futures developed for this thesis using the criteria of episteme, structure, agency and history. In chapter five I will draw on this table again, synthesising its contents with those of the alternative globalisations discussed earlier using a framework developed with C.L.A. In that framework, episteme sits within C.L.A.’s worldview layer, structure and agency fall within the systems and social causes layer, and the ‘official’ or generally accepted history becomes part of the litany layer.
Table 6: Alternative Models of Global Governance Futures Constructed in the Context of Alternative Globalisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Future Model</th>
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3.4.1 Assertive Multilateralism.

**Future:** The preferred model of the Commission on Global Governance, Assertive Multilateralism is premised on radical reform of the U.N. that would include a more democratic Security Council, forums that include non-States actors, and a strengthened ECOSOC to take charge of global development (Galtung 1995; Khagram 2006; The Commission on Global Governance 1995). Measures of progress, in line with the neoliberal form of globalisation from which the model springs, are likely to focus on statistics relating to the performance of the reformed U.N. in security and development.

China, already a powerful actor on the global stage, also appears to favour a reformed U.N. and is positioning itself as the champion of developing countries’ interests, according to Wang and Rosenau (2009). Chinese government analysts support many of the Western concepts of good governance and favour a democratic, sovereign States based U.N.-centric model (Wang and Rosenau 2009). They concur that some form of global governance is needed to address global problems and that the current system needs to include non-State actors. Where Chinese analysts challenge the current system is its ‘presumption of validity of Western constructs of good governance’ and, as Wang and Rosenau (2009:6) write, ‘some view this as an illusion of the Global Village’ whilst others are concerned that global governance is another means to promote Neoliberalism.

The Chinese government promotes the concept of a harmonious world order emphasising the importance of equal participation of different actors, as distinct from ‘governance’ which is viewed as the imposition of Western rules (Wang and Rosenau 2009). Whilst China is considering its future role in global governance, Chinese analysts report that the government sees itself as a responsible stakeholder and reformer from within, seeking to champion the interests and secure a greater voice for developing countries (Wang and Rosenau 2009) although the extent to which these analysts are required to conform to government reporting requirements is unclear. China’s four principles for U.N. reform, based on the ‘harmonious world’ concept, are

1. The democratisation of international relations; by which it means equitable participation of governments, ensuring the U.S. is regarded as one country amongst many;
2. Justice and common prosperity; citing the rich/poor divide as one that undermines peace and stability;
3. Diversity and tolerance; arguing for a plurality and diversity of civilisations that coexist and learn from one another; and
4. Peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Chinese analysts are concerned at the ‘tendency to resolve conflict with force’ and the ‘dominance of power politics’ in the current global governance system (Wang and Rosenau 2009:18).

**Episteme:** The U.N. system was established to build peace and a life in dignity for all by engaging States in processes designed to foster cooperation, provide security and aid in development (Falk 2002; Galtung 1995; Hettne and Oden 2002). The proposals for Assertive Multilateralism and a reformed U.N. are maintaining a focus on these goals. Hence in this concept global governance is still primarily a political and economic affair focused on the global challenges of security and development, based on positivist scientific thinking and underpinned by a neoliberal philosophy. Current challenges to neoliberal globalisation, as outlined in chapter two and in Ramos (2010), suggest that if Neoliberalism is to continue in the future it too may need to reform, perhaps becoming neo-Neoliberalism.

In this episteme, change is understood through the linear theories of change as promoted by Marx and Smith and discussed earlier in this chapter. One nation’s past stage of development is another’s future. For Fukuyama, this linear view of modernisation is logical and whilst he writes that humans have agency and can take a different path, he argues that developing nations will become capitalist democracies and join the race for new technologies as this has proven to be the most successful path (Fukuyama 2006). Also assumed in the linear theory of change is the continuous convergence of societies, stability and order (Bauman 1998).

**Structure:** For Hettne, as the U.N. system was always intended to be an extension of the sovereign States system it is likely to decline with the weakening of territorial sovereignty and ‘may therefore be reformable’ (2002:21). Two exemplars of the Assertive Multilateralism approach are outlined here. The first is a restructured U.N.

**Agency:** For Held and McGrew (2002) multilateralism, whilst fostering intergovernmental cooperation in some areas, has it limits. Firstly some governments are powerful enough to achieve their goals without the assistance of multilateral organisations; secondly a large and growing number of people are aware that they are not represented in these organisations and that there is a distinct lack of accountability in these institutions (Held and McGrew 2002). Galtung’s (1995) proposed system of three assemblies enables selected member States representatives, and elected representatives in the peoples and corporations assemblies to make decisions, thus overcoming concerns regarding lack of representation and accountability. Here he sees the bases of power as coercive, economic and normative respectively. Coercive power would continue to be wielded by States representatives with the ability to enforce compliance within territorial jurisdictions; economic power lies with transnational corporations, many of which have larger budgets than some countries; and the peoples’ assembly would have normative power and moral authority to inform its decisions and influence debates. As Galtung (1995:33) cautions, ‘power will not be easily ceded to the people,’ suggesting that Assertive Multilateralism would have a lengthy transition phase during which people power could be conspicuous by its absence in the early years. For this discussion on agency and who holds the power in this possible future global governance model, the U.N. reforming itself would rely on Institutional Power which for Barnett and Duvall (2004:3) is ‘when actors exercise indirect control over others,
such as when states design international institutions in ways that work to their long-term advantage and to the disadvantage of others’.

Whilst U.N. reform is a precondition in this model, proposed restructures see member States retaining dominant agency in the system (Galtung 1995; Khagram 2006). Writers disagree as to whether member States would continue to be dominated by a small number of politically and economically powerful nations as with the present U.N. system, the League of Nations before it (Hettne 2002), and the Treaty of Westphalia before that (Falk 2002, 2008); or if a reformed U.N. would formally recognise all member States as equals (Galtung 1995; Khagram 2006) achieving a more internally democratic U.N. Khagram (2006) envisages that transparency, participation and accountability would be watchwords for the processes of an Assertive Multilateral system with civil society providing feedback through designated forums such as Galtung’s proposed peoples’ assembly.

As for the role of transnational corporations in global governance, writers have very different views about the possibilities. Spencer (1820-1903), who is credited with inventing the term ‘survival of the fittest’, believed large businesses to be the fittest societal structure and speculated that they could bring on the next stage of human societal evolution (Spencer cited in Inayatullah 1999c:n.p). In his view this would be a positive outcome. More recently Galtung (1995) suggests that involvement of transnational corporations could take the form of a council or advisory body styled along the lines of the U.N. ECOSOC. Korten (2001) worries that corporations might ultimately rule the world, fearing that this would be an unmitigated disaster for global affairs. Bakan (2004) likens corporations to psychopaths and is concerned by the power they already hold and their lack of accountability. For Falk (2008) the U.N. Global Compact provides a means for the U.N. to recognise corporations that are responsible global citizens, maintaining standards in human rights, environmental and workplace practices. Yet Falk also reports that the U.N. accepts corporate money to fund some of its activities and representatives of corporations have been invited to participate alongside government representatives in some international forums. This level of involvement of corporations in international affairs has prompted concerns at the
potential to further skew the balance of power towards the U.S. unless the corporations are in some way controlled by an international organisation or by international legislative means (Kelleher 2005). In that regard I see the three assemblies concept of global governance as a longer-term goal with the intermediate step the formation of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly to represent citizens and N.G.O.s.

**History:** The history of this system is described earlier as the history of the current global governance system. In summary, it dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia, the League of Nations and the formation of the U.N. after World War II. It is a history of political and economic development aimed at peace and prosperity. It is also a system controlled by elite nations that have established structures to ensure power is retained over the many by the few.

3.4.2 **Bioregionalism.**

**Future:** Khagram (2006:112), during his review of future architectures of global governance, recommended that a key normative principle ‘should be a re-embedding of economies in societies and societies in natural environments’. He suggested that:

one of the most innovative models for global governance following these principles would be a world state based on ecological units such as water sheds, air sheds, or some other appropriate eco-region, geographically scaling up to the biosphere itself (Khagram 2006:112).

This future model, referred to elsewhere in the literature as Bioregionalism, responds to the need for greater consideration of ecological and cultural relationships in globalisation and global governance debates as called for by neohumanists (Vedaprajinananda 2006), environmentalists, and authors discussing multi-level governance of the commons (Armitage 2008; Dowsley 2008). For its proponents, Bioregionalism could be a way to integrate such connections within a place-based governance framework thereby highlighting bioregional identity within global politics (Lipschutz 1999, Thomashow 1999).

**Episteme:** The concept of Bioregionalism appears to be congruent with indigenous and ecological epistemologies, and Neohumanism as an applied philosophy. Its emphasis on
cultural knowledge, place, local social relations and stewardship of nature mirrors elements many writers have captured as being of importance to indigenous communities such as those in Australia (Chatwin 1998; Irwin et al. 1999; Kelleher 2009; Oldmeadow 2007; Wildman 1996). The model is also congruent with neohuman values of love for all living things, social justice and ecology (Vedaprajinananda 2006:25,30). Here the most pressing global challenges are experienced as environmental degradation and social injustices (Vedaprajinananda 2006). The theory of change in this model is cyclical in accordance with natural rhythms of life.

**Structure:** In an ideal bioregional globalisation, the State is replaced by a ‘tribe of ecology’ (Aberley 1999:16). Lipschultz writes of the ‘development of a political economy of nature’ (1999:103) yet rejects as problematic the notion that States and international organisations would be replaced by bioregions in a global governance framework. Instead he promotes a nested structure of localised ‘resource regimes’ that foster ‘collective action and cooperation’ and articulate to the global level through, primarily, environmental agreements (Lipschultz 1999:107) which are nonetheless grounded in a global economy. From the works of Sarkar, Progressive Utilisation Theory (PRO.u.t.) comprises economic, spiritual, ecological and structural guidance appropriate for implementing a neohumanist bioregional approach to global governance. Eco-friendly technologies would facilitate connections between bioregions (Inayatullah 2005b; Khagram 2006; www.prout.org). According to Vedaprajinananda (2006), neohumanist writers propose the setting up of a party-less form of democracy where candidates run as individuals. They believe this approach would improve the standard of government from the local to the global level. The scaling up of bioregional governance to the global level could be achieved through a ‘two-chamber legislature: one seats countries equally, and in the other seats are allocated according to population’ (Vedaprajinananda 2006:34). Here I would modify the neohumanist proposal by suggesting that the two chamber structure comprise one chamber of elected bioregional representatives equally, the other of elected representatives of supra-national entities thus providing decision-making forums for the global and the local.
Agency: At the global level there would be a gradual transition from States-based power to supra-national entities that would enable the global body to deal with human rights violations within States territories (Vedaprajinananda 2006). Power is normative and moral in nature (Galtung 1995); it is in bioregional communities and is distributed and multilevel. Local communities would contribute to decisions through elected local bioregional governments and community cooperatives; candidates would be required to make their commitments legally binding, and would be removed from office if they reneged (Vedaprajinananda 2006). There is no suggestion in the literature reviewed that this model would facilitate direct engagement of the individual in the global decision-making body hence those legitimised by this system are elected representatives of the bioregions and the supra-national entities. Those disempowered are the heads of territorial States who are currently the only legitimate actors in the global decisions theatre.

History: Bioregionalism, the local governance of a bioregion as a functional, cultural and ecological identity, emerged as a counter to the neoliberal form of globalisation that increasingly saw decision-making power shifting from the local to the global leading to a fragmentation of place (Thomashow 1999). According to Aberley, (1999), the bioregional movement started in the 1960s. A key author of the period, Foucault (1990) describes a much earlier form of ‘biopolitics’ as having its origins in the European eighteenth century agricultural economy. During that time improvements in knowledge and agricultural technologies gave humans the ability to exert a small amount of control over life and reduce some of the risks of death, particularly the risk of starvation. For Foucault, this was the start of life, bios, connecting with the processes of purposive strategy; of knowledge-power becoming ‘biopower’:

For the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political existence; the fact of living was no longer an inaccessible substrate that only emerged from time to time, amid the randomness of death and its fatality; part of it passed into knowledge’s field of control and power’s sphere of intervention (Foucault 1990:142).
More recently, neohuman and bioregional agendas found an ally in Sarkar whose Pro.U.T. movement developed economic, social and ecological positions, and the structures to enact their values at local, regional and global levels (Vedaprajnananda 2006).

3.4.3 Cosmopolitan Democracy.

Future: Cosmopolitan Democracy is the Global Civil Society project (Hettne and Oden 2002). In this model power moves from the States to global civil society as one means of achieving what Falk (2002:158) refers to as ‘humane global governance’, involving individual accountability, collective security, rule of law, nonviolent revolutionary politics, human rights, stewardship of nature, cosmopolitan democracy, and the reduction and abolition of war (Falk 1995). He sees this as positive citizenship that extends to involve all relationships of a participatory nature, including those with institutions, as distinct from nationalistic citizenship that can require citizens to defend the national identity to the death, as discussed by Sen (2006). Writers such as Falk (2000, 2002), Kaldor (1999), Held (1995), and Archibugi and Held (1995) differ slightly in terminology, referring to this ideology as global democracy, cosmopolitan democracy, global cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan governance respectively. However, they agree that the rule of law is key to implementing this concept. In this thesis the term ‘Cosmopolitan Democracy’ is used, that being the most recent in the literature (Falk 2002).

Episteme: According to Turner (2006) an epistemology of ‘recognition and mutual evaluation’ underpins this model from both sociological and political-legal perspectives. In his view, this involves an understanding and recognition of the Other as well as the need for ‘critical recognition and evaluation of other cultures including notions of jihad and crusade’ (Turner 2006:145). Whereas some models privilege the interests of power over morality (Chandler 2005; Risse et al. 1999), this concept takes a constructivist stance claiming that it is norms and values that shape the behaviour of the majority of States (Chandler 2005). In the constructivist theory of change, States, their identities, values and interests are constructed through the process of international interaction (Chandler, 2005:151) and can therefore be changed through the same process. For
Chandler (2005) global civil society is influential in transforming ideas held by individuals into collective norms and establishing these as State practice. In this future model it is therefore reasonable to imagine that constant interaction between states under pressure from global civil society to adopt a more caring and compassionate approach to international relations, one that is pro-poor and seeks to include rather than marginalise nations, could produce what Falk terms ‘humane global governance’. Based on ‘values of peace, sustainability, human rights and global community’ (Falk 2002:164), enacted through the rule of law and monitored by global civil society, for Falk this humane global governance provides the means of addressing the challenges of inequalities and social justice.

**Structure:** Khagram (2006) outlines a possible future global governance structure that appears apt for this future model. Describing it as ‘Institutional Heterarchy’ the structure:

> involves a world of multiple types, forms and levels of authoritative political organisations and units but all would meet some minimum threshold of democracy [and] individuals and collectivities would be subject to an evolving global constitutional and legal framework (Khagram 2006:101).

However such a structure is not yet well articulated in the literature and as Falk (2002:170) writes, it is a ‘work in progress’. Whilst talk of accountability, transparency and participation will presumably influence a preferred future structure for Cosmopolitan Democrats, it is likely the International Criminal Court would play a strong role, along with a global peoples’ assembly (Falk 2002). Galtung (1995:31) suggests a peoples’ assembly could be organised such that each nation or people would ‘elect one representative for up to one million members and then one additional representative for each additional million members’.

**Agency:** Whereas political and economic powers currently dominate the world of interstate politics, moral and legal powers define the Cosmopolitan Democratic political approach. Moral power governs the extended international sphere of global civil society (Risse et al. 1999) whilst the rule and power of law is foundational in this concept (Falk 2000). Global civil society would make decisions through the peoples’ assembly,
however as some writers emphasise, it relies on transnational social activism to define global civil society (Herkenrath et al. 2005) in a context where, in Falk’s view, ‘it seems evident that a coalition of market forces and especially political actors are resistant to all efforts to give coherent political form to the strivings of global civil society’ (Falk, 2000:36-37). For Lipschultz, increasing levels of social activism are the precursor of a re-creation of world politics whether by ‘democratising institutions and global governance, spreading human rights across the world, or the emergence of a global citizenry in a world-wide public sphere’ (cited in Baker and Chandler, 1992:391). Writers such as Baker and Chandler (2005), Clark (2001), Kaldor (2003), Keane (2005) believe global civil society to be the agency necessary to deliver these transformations.

Taking a dialectical Gramscian approach to the topic, one writer argues that global civil society is ‘undergoing a slow process of counter-hegemonic formation’ that the network is ‘well-integrated but still underdeveloped’ and that a ‘counter-hegemonic historic bloc’ might emerge in the future (Katz 2006:344-345). What is unclear from the literature is whose agency is legitimised in this model, whether individuals could be heard at the peoples’ assembly or if some form of elected representative attends; this too might require transnational social activism to determine. Falk (2000), however, urges the need for caution when promoting concepts like global civil society. He cites the disparity between nations’ material wealth and cultural orientation as one of the reasons why it would be unwise to generalise aspirations and propose an image of governance that could be adopted by all. For Falk (2000:25), ‘the new assertiveness of non-western civilisations has challenged the assumption that western normative projects deserve universal acceptance’. His advice on the matter is to approach the topic of planetary governance tentatively, inviting dialogue across boundaries (Falk 2000).

History: The end of the Cold War saw the increasing participation of individuals and citizen groups in international relations matters previously the sole domain of governments of sovereign States (Kaldor 2003). Sandel (1996) considers the implications of this change and concludes that, as their effective sovereignty weakens, nations gradually lose their hold on the allegiance of their citizens and are increasingly
unable to link identity and rule thus leading to an increase in civil society groups. The origins of the model itself can be traced back to the 1960s scholarship in the W.O.M.P. described earlier in this chapter.

3.4.4 Grassroots Globalism.

**Future:** The rejection of the position taken historically that it is necessary to enforce order or impose control structures creates space for the idea that ‘non-manipulative social systems that maximise individual differences and values are necessary to attain peace’ (Falk and Mendlovitz in Stohl 1975). Grassroots Globalism emphasises autonomy, broad development, human rights and self-determination in a future global governance model that is socially activist in orientation (Khagram 2006). An exemplar of this approach is the World Social Forum (W.S.F.) and its associated activist movements (Ramos 2010). Starting life as an event in Brazil in 2001, the W.S.F. has developed into a permanent open public space that provides opportunities for organisations, communities and individuals to exchange information and work together to create a better world (Kapoor 2007).

**Episteme:** In this model global governance is a socio-ecological phenomenon that accommodates many ways of knowing. It is ‘deeply democratic’, seeking to challenge neoliberal globalisation and the power of transnational corporations (Khagram 2006:99). A paradox here is that in challenging the hegemony and seeking to have counter-hegemonic voices heard, the various social movements that comprise the W.S.F. may need to become more integrated and better organised so that a voice of solidarity emerges, without the W.S.F. becoming hegemonic in its own right (Katz 2006).

**Structure:** If the movements associated with the W.S.F. were to become better organised we might speculate that global governance in the future could be more socially and culturally driven. For these international activists, there would be a radical decentralisation of existing State and international organisational authorities to the local level where all members of a particular society could participate in self-governing
arrangements (Khagram 2006). Herkenrath et al (2005:168) observe an interesting paradox here:

If the current world-system is one of complex interdependence where agents are linked at various levels -regional, national, global- the question of world society comes to the fore. Has the world-system been transformed into a world society? The answer to this question is essential. On the one hand, the genesis of global antisystemic movements, global democracy, or global organisation is inherently dependent on core attributes of societies, i.e. shared norms, values, and expectations, and shared identities and myths. On the other hand, the solution of global problems, as pointedly argued by Chase-Dunn, is bound to the successful creation of global institutions by antisystemic movements.

According to Clark, the time is ripe for a form of ‘ethical globalisation morally underpinned by new activist citizens networks’ (Clark 2001:18). Khagram (2006:99) envisages a world of ‘multiple cooperative regionalisms’ replacing States governed territories with various ‘political units and societies’ organised in different ways. This may seem unrealistic, however as Khagram writes ‘given that some 300,000 political units existed around the world at one time several millennia ago and that now less than 200 cover the globe, another century might be all the time needed for a smaller set of regionalised political units to emerge or be imposed’ (2006:111).

In this model transnational corporations would be abolished and modes of production and consumption would return to the local level, embedding economies in local natural environments (Khagram 2006). In his ‘five ecologies’ de Sousa Santos promotes a similar approach in the ‘ecology of productivity’ which values multiple systems of production, ‘cooperatives, self-managed enterprises, solidarity economy’ (de Sousa Santos 2003:239) that for him are constructed as absent by the proponents of neoliberal globalisation.

Agency: With the devolution of authority to the local level, Khagram (2006) envisages empowered citizens would make decisions in this model and that their power would reside in moral authority. He sees community renewal as occurring ‘through the cyclical
emergence and waning of transgressive social movements (eg feminist, ecological) from
time to time’ (2006:99), indicative of cyclical theories of change, as advanced by
Sarkar, Spengler, Sorokin, Toynbee (in Inayatullah, 2004) and more recently by
Diamond (2006), that discuss expansion and contraction, rise and fall of societies and
civilisations, and major disruptions in complex social and environmental systems. The
image is of history repeating itself and the influence of structure over human agency
(Inayatullah 1998a). Again who is legitimised in a system of self-organisation is unclear
and perhaps legitimacy itself is decided upon at the grassroots level. What is clear is
that the States’ coercive power and the economic power of transnational corporations
(Galtung 1995) would be significantly reduced in this model (Khagram 2006). For the
Grassroots Globalism approach to succeed, a historic bloc would need to be created that
would require ‘all subjugated groups to engage’, according to Katz (2006:345). Deacon
identifies another challenge for global governance reform: the sheer number of
organisations, summits, ad hoc reports, think-tank meetings and outputs of scholarly
gatherings that make their way to the various U.N. agencies. The fragmentation of the
international social ‘sector’, he believes, poses a serious challenge to the furthering of a
social agenda of global decision-making (Deacon 2003).

History: Turning to Ramos’ (2010) scholarship on globalisations, I suggest that the
Grassroots Globalism ideology may have been generated by seventeenth to twentieth
century colonisation and decolonisation processes, although the literature on this
ideology is not yet well developed. On this shaky foundation I nevertheless propose that
the rise of international non-government organisations during the twentieth century has
influenced this ideology. From 1909 to 1993 the number of international non-
government organisations grew from 176 to 28,900, according to the Commission on

3.4.5 Global Digital Democracies.

Future: One writer suggests that Global Digital Democracies will start life as online
citizen movements and evolve into virtual nations aided by advances in global
technology networks (Skrzeszewski 2002). One futurist believes citizen movements
‘constitute an evolving form of democratic governance, sometimes rivalling the
influence of heads of State, generals, scientists, inventors, and multinational corporate executives’ (Henderson 1996:27). These highly egalitarian movements and networks are emerging in a number of domains including online social networks, commons-based peer production, collective intelligence, spirituality at work, new dialogues among civilisations, and new relationships between individuals and collectives (Bauwens 2005; Henderson 2006).

**Episteme:** In this model global governance is seen through the lens of technology and as a means of creating the noosphere, the third stage of evolutionary complexity according to Huxley (1932) and de Chardin (1964). A global challenge identified by the Millennium Project is the convergence of information and communications technologies and how countries might use technology generally to improve the human condition (The Millennium Project 1996-2010).

**Structure:** Here the structure is horizontal. Khagram envisages that global technology networks will facilitate cross-sector networking between government, private and non-government entities in ‘loose institutional arrangements’ (2006:99). For Rossman (2006), as technologies improve and are more widely diffused, they provide the means for all of the world’s people to engage in debates and decision-making. Bauwens (2005) sees technology as the facilitator of peer-to-peer (p2p) social organisation, enabling the mobilisation and coordination of people with access to the technologies for events such as the 2003 International March for Peace (Bennis 2006:1-3). He also emphasises the role of peer-to-peer in knowledge exchange and the importance of influence on the internet gained, it is proposed, by sharing and disseminating information and knowledge (Bauwens 2004). Some of the more dysfunctional uses of technology, including the organisation of terrorist activity, are identified by Bauwens (2004) as a challenge to the ideal system of knowledge exchange which is free and open source access. Syntegrity, from the work of Beer (1994), provides the process for groups of 30 people to join in a non-hierarchical way to build group consciousness with meetings being modelled on the twenty-sided icosohedron. Software supports the process and could be used to scale up local groups into national, regional or global as required. Davis, self-styled candidate
for world president and creator of the world passport for world citizenship, promotes this form of engagement (Davis 2011).

**Agency:** For Cogburn, the emphasis on knowledge foregrounds epistemic communities that interact with policy-makers in ‘policy-actor networks’ to influence global governance using knowledge as a way of ‘organising cognition collectively’ (Cogburn 2005:59). Decisions would be taken online either directly (Bauwens 2004, 2005) or via Syntegrity teams (Beer 1994). World citizens have decision-making power in this model however, whilst technology provides the infrastructure to support this level of involvement, access to technology and knowledge in its use would currently exclude many in the non-industrialised societies. This would further widen the technology have-nots divide whilst ensuring power remains with the wealthier, industrialised nations. In his study of the use of information and communication technologies in global governance, Cogburn recommends further research ‘to strengthen the ability for developing countries and civil society organisations to participate more effectively in these processes, helping them to move from pawns to partners’ (Cogburn 2005:56).

**History:** When global governance is viewed as a societal evolutionary phenomena, the internet is the latest in a series of communications developments that have enabled societal transitions over the millennia (Raskin et al. 2002). For some writers, communication has evolved from the time of paintings on cave walls, to language in the Stone Age, writing in Early Civilisation, Printing in the Modern Era, and the Internet in the emerging Planetary Phase (Raskin et al. 2002). The printing press, for example, enabled Erasmus and his sixteenth century scholarly contemporaries to disseminate their new ideas and create conversations across national borders in what they termed ‘a republic of learning’. Erasmus said, to a friend in 1522, ‘ego mundi civis esse cupio’ – ‘I should like to be a citizen of the world’ (Davis 2010).

3.4.6 **Planetary Partnerships.**

**Future:** Feminist literature is yet to yield a unified model of global governance, with writers emphasising the plurality of the field and the need to acknowledge ‘feminisms’ (Eschle 2000; Steans 2003). The most developed arguments for an egalitarian approach
are found in the works of Eisler where the term ‘governance’ itself is challenged as language constitutive of a ‘power over’ system whereas in the partnerships approach more appropriate language would convey ‘power with’ (Eisler 1991, 1995, 1998, 2011). As an alternative to the term ‘global governance’ it is proposed that ‘Planetary Partnerships’ is used, borrowing from the works of Eisler and recognising the feminist calls for gender equality and a more participatory form of organising.

**Episteme:** A synthesis of some feminist writings suggests Planetary Partnerships is founded on an epistemology of a politics of connection (Eschle 2000). Its values are relatedness, cooperation and care based on a deep understanding of the systemic nature of humanity’s common affairs (Eisler 2011; Held 2004). Those supporting this form of social organisation favour economic redistribution (Bergeron 2001) and an extended economy to value other modes of contribution (Eisler 2008, 2011). Their main concerns are the ongoing competitive, rather than cooperative, gender hierarchies (Eschle 2000; James 2004), and gender inequalities (Steans 2003).

**Structure:** The literature reviewed thus far offers a number of alternative global governance models however the alternatives proposed still appear as governance, suggesting a form of power over others, rather than modes of power sharing. This inherent dualism in the word ‘governance’ is consistent with dominator thinking that creates dichotomies as though these were the natural order and acculturates them in society to ensure their longevity (Eisler 1991, 1995, 1998, 2011). These dichotomies include human over nature, man over woman, and us over them. For Eisler, history reveals two basic forms of social organisation: the dominator and the partnership. In the dominator form, people are organised by ranking systems, typically in a hierarchical structure based on force or threat of force, and are male centred (Eisler 1991, 1995). Eisler (1995), and more recently Connell (2000), share the view that the dominator paradigm is experienced as a violent, hegemonic masculinity that is pervasive in political, social, economic and other institutions. In India, for example, the word ‘governance’ is controversial for some, due to its association with the Washington Consensus, and good governance is opposed because of its inherent neoliberal conditions (Chandhoke 2002). In the partnership form people organise themselves by
linking so that diversity is not equated with inferiority or superiority (Eisler 1991). Hierarchies may still exist but in Eisler’s view these would be ‘hierarchies of actualisation based on power to, as well as power with; accountability would be top down as well as bottom up’ (Eisler 2006:196). The planetary partnerships structure is therefore based on linking, rather than ranking, people (Eisler 1995) and by consensual, rather than coercive, forms of organisation (James 2004).

Feminist writers support a reformed U.N. approach (Chase-Dunn 2005; Eisler 2011; Steans 2003). Steans (2003), for example, advocates institutional reform to include transnational feminist networks formally. Eisler (2008, 2011) promotes a care economy with measures of economic wealth that include volunteer and home-based economic contributions, the contribution of nature to the economy, and illegal economies, in addition to more established measures. Eisler (2006) also discusses the use of cultural narratives as a means of creating new values and aiding in the transition to a partnerships form of global governance.

**Agency or Communion?** In the partnerships model, decision-making forums would be gender-balanced and information and communications technologies would facilitate widespread participation. Power is in moral authority, is consensual rather than coercive, and is global, multidimensional and interactive (Eschle 2000; James 2004). An ethics of care is prevalent in this morality (Held 2004). With the literature suggesting a focus on reforming the U.N., the Planetary Partnerships model legitimates the role of States in global decision-making whilst advocating for a broadening of that power to a more egalitarian form, both in relation to gender and the inclusion of others in the global polity. Whereas the term ‘agency’ is used to describe the individual’s ability to act in a given situation, the term ‘communion’ might be more appropriate here as reflective of the unity of partnerships.

**History:** For Chase-Dunn (2005) the history of feminist involvement in the global governance debate can be traced to the nineteenth century transnational feminist movement that formed to challenge global capitalism. Some feminist writers view the struggles of the women’s movements of that era to be focused on suffrage for
themselves and for women in Western colonies; counter imperialist and capitalist activism was important but not the main issue of concern (Hawkesworth 2006; Mendoza 2002). Yet whilst these early feminists saw it as their duty to liberate women in developing colonies and secure their rights to participate in politics, their critical contemporaries have analysed the historical role of white women in nationalism and found that these women were complicit in colonialism (Mendoza 2002). Hawkesworth (2006), recounting the history of feminism through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, writes that women in Europe and the Americas defied the conventions of the day that prohibited women publishing in their own name. They formed international networks using printed materials to promote their causes and to support each other in achieving their aims for political and domestic emancipation. The notion of a global sisterhood was promoted.

By the early twentieth century, having weathered significant setbacks in some countries, feminist activists had launched several international organisations to raise the status of women and to progress women’s involvement in international decision-making. Women’s international non-government organisations were not invited to participate in major forums such as the Paris Peace Conference, however the French women’s suffrage movement organised their own forum and subsequently the League of Nations incorporated the recommendations from the women’s meeting into the League’s covenant (Hawkesworth 2006). The Second World War saw increasing numbers of women joining the workforce in industries previously considered to be the province of men, thus advancing their aim of equality. However, Steans (2003), considers the 1976-1985 U.N. decade for women to be a definitive period in the history of the transnational feminist movement citing examples of the extensive support received from the U.N. during that decade and since.

### 3.5 Chapter Summary.

Globalisation is eroding the States’ power from above and below leading to what one writer describes as current world *disorder* (Suter 2003; my emphasis). The Westphalian system of States that began three centuries ago is declining and as yet there is no clear
alternative to it (Chandler 2009; Falk 2002; Raskin et al. 2002; Suter 2003). Many writers share the view that a new order is needed yet base their discussions and proposals on the assumption that the State will remain in a central role (Archibugi and Held 1995; Barnett and Duvall 2004; Chomsky 1997; Falk 1975, 2008; Hawkesworth 2006; Held 1995; Hettne and Oden 2002; Marchetti 2009; OECD 2001; Vayrynen 2002). For Laszlo (1978, 1997, 2006), however, the search needs to go beyond States-based systems. In that regard this chapter has explored, and in some instances constructed, alternative global governance futures based on the most divergent perspectives in the alternative globalisation discourses. What has emerged during this review is the realisation that the global governance futures literature is in its embryonic state and that alternatives to the Westphalian States-based U.N. model are not well articulated when consideration is given to their future form, episteme, structure, agency and history. Other gaps identified in the literature include the lack of use of formal futures research methodologies in the study of global governance futures, and the underrepresentation of non-Western writers in global governance futures. The W.O.M.P. experience suggests that whilst greater complexity and diversity of views need to be incorporated in future global governance research efforts, the means by which the findings are communicated is key to engaging ‘a good share of the world’s people’ (Beer 1979). I propose that storytelling provides this means as expanded upon in chapter four. Finally Falk’s advice on the matter is to approach the topic of global governance tentatively, inviting dialogue across boundaries (Falk 2000).

The study of these works has guided the research design for this thesis that I will describe in the next chapter. Collectively, the authors encourage the challenging of globalisation as a neoliberal construct and of global governance as a political and economic undertaking. They expose the need to look beyond the dominant perspectives on these issues and to seek other ways of knowing. They emphasise the importance of social research in futures studies, the need to look to the deeper layers of consciousness to discover social truths, the significant role of power interests in global affairs and the value of grounded utopias in effecting peaceful change. Particular actor groups, including the Commission on Global Governance, feminists, environmentalists, neohumanists, indigenous peoples, social movements, neoliberals, technology analysts,
and Chinese global governance analysts, favour the normative approaches outlined in this chapter. The voices of unrepresented nations and peoples have yet to be included in the emerging global governance conversation. This study now seeks to address that gap by developing a preferred U.N.P.O. global governance future using the criteria established in the analytical matrices in chapters two and three to frame the U.N.P.O. model and present their preferred future in story form, thus creating their image of the desired future whilst making a contribution to the growing ecology of knowledge.
Chapter Four
The Quilt Maker’s Journey: Research Design
4.1 The Apprentice Bricoleur.

In chapters two and three I reviewed the literature on global governance futures and discussed the key influences that are beginning to contour an international conversation on the subject. I identified several non-State actor groups with strong views on the matter and constructed six alternative global governance futures based on their ideological worldviews and their discourses. In this chapter I will describe the methodology designed to answer the research question:

By what means might international non-State actors transform global governance in alternative futures and what is the preferred global governance future of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation?

and meet the research objectives presented in chapter one. The chapter builds on the methodological overview provided earlier and draws from the research domains of Futures Studies, Critical Globalisation Studies and Global Governance Futures Studies.

Denzin and Lincoln (2005) describe the qualitative researcher as ‘bricoleur, a maker of quilts’ taking pieces of material and stitching together a ‘set of representations that is fitted to the specifics of a complex situation’. They also advise that ‘in texts based on the metaphor of quilt making many different things are going on at the same time – different voices, different perspectives, points of views, angles of vision’ and that ‘choices regarding which interpretive practices to employ are not necessarily made in advance’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2005a:4-5 adapted). This was the case at the U.N.P.O. General Assembly where as bricoleur I needed to apply my skills and knowledge to whatever materials I could in the situation. The resultant bricolage, quilt, emerged as a unique piece of work. I will use Denzin and Lincoln’s metaphor of researcher as bricoleur to organise this chapter’s content in three sections: in section 4.1, the Apprentice Bricoleur, I learn my craft from past writers and the theoretical base for the research design is explained. In 4.2, Designing the Patchwork Quilt, I create a bricoleur’s stencil and the research design, methodology and methods are discussed from the theoretical perspective. In 4.3 I summarise this chapter and segue to chapter five where I don the pince nez (magnifying spectacles) to analyse my findings and stitch the quilt. The design allows for three of the four research objectives to be met:
1. To explore the views of U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly delegates as to the major issues facing the human family;
2. To discover how delegates view the prospect of social organisation at the planetary level;
4. To develop a preferred global governance future for U.N.P.O. to enable them to join the international conversation.

In the next section I will provide an overview of the research domains that form the foundation of the theoretical approach to this study: Futures Studies, the primary domain of enquiry; Critical Globalisation Studies; and Global Governance Futures Studies. These three domains inform the research design that I will describe later in this chapter.

4.1.1 Futures Studies.

Futures Studies emerged as an academic discipline after World War II taking two distinctly different paths, according to Dator (1994). The first served the political and economic interests of the U.S. military and later included the interests of corporations. Here Futures Studies focused on predictions of narrow domains of interest; single point forecasting. Technology was viewed as the driver of desirable change and technological solutions would be promoted by military, then corporate, entities. The second path strived to serve the interests of humanity as a whole by incorporating many ways of knowing and by considering the multiplicity of influences shaping futures (Dator 1994). Rather than single point forecasting, the aim was to expand the field of attention and choice (Dator 1994; Slaughter 1999) and to engage in Futures Studies in a more democratic way. Here Futures Studies focused on transformation through the creation of desired and hopeful images of futures (Inayatullah 1999a; Masini in Stephenson 2006) and encouraging purposive action. This thesis is located in the second of these pathways.

Ontologically, the orientation of this futures study can be summarised as one of immanent realism. According to de Chardin’s theory of knowledge:

by introducing a time dimension and conceiving the reality of the universe as a process, the reference point for all knowledge and the meaning of the universe
must be found in the realisation that the universe is engaged in a process of becoming. The future represents reality, being, truth and the omega point; the present represents a state of becoming and of reality in the making. The future must already exist (Minerbi 1997:106).

The constructionist element of the research paradigm assumes a relativist ontology: that there are multiple realities, (Denzin and Lincoln 2008a), all of which, as de Chardin writes, ‘are in the making’.

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that deals with knowledge and is concerned with the boundaries of knowledge, what is accepted as knowledge and how the researcher will know it when it is discovered. Historically, much of the domain has focused on justification of truths and beliefs. In recent years, however, there has been considerable debate on the topic of what is and what is not knowledge. Choo and Bontis (2002), quoting Lawson (1989), Suchman (1987), Latour (1987), and (Law 1992), claim that postmodernists have challenged the idea of fundamental truth by suggesting that truth is a story; cognitive anthropologists, ethno methodologists and symbolic interactionists have demonstrated the significance of situated skills and pragmatic knowledge; and sociologists have ‘challenged deep-rooted assumptions about the privileged status of explicit abstract knowledge by studying knowledge creation as a cultural process and by deemphasizing conventional distinctions between people and technology’ (Choo and Bontis 2002:55). Foucault (2007) shifts the focus to the truth about truth and how it becomes accepted as true. Truth, like knowledge, is not discovered but is socially constructed. It produces, and is a product of, multiple worldviews. Shujaa (1997) proposes a more intimate link between epistemology and worldview arguing that worldviews and systems of knowledge are symbiotic therefore the conditions under which people live and learn shape both their knowledge and worldview (cited in Denzin and Lincoln 2000). For these writers the ways we perceive and know the world are inextricably linked to our cultural and familial upbringing.

The origins of critical futures studies are found in the works of Galtung, Steenbergen and Dator in the 1970s (Inayatullah 2009) and later in the writings of Inayatullah (1999b, 2001, 2004b), Milojevic (1999), Nandy (1999), Sardar (1993, 1999b) and
Slaughter (1999). Dator’s 1975 article ‘De-Colonising the Future’, for example, was particularly influential in opening up the dominant futures discourse to dissenting images when he wrote ‘we discover that we are being colonised in what truly seemed to be the last frontier: the future’ (Dator 2005:102). For the U.N.P.O., and in particular its indigenous member nations and peoples, Smith (2006) writes that the dismissal of indigenous views of history as ‘primitive’ was a foundational part of colonisation, thus a reclaiming of multiple histories is foundational to decolonisation projects. Sardar’s (1999a) seminal edited work in critical futures studies, Rescuing All Our Futures: The future of futures studies, included chapters on feminist futures, de-westernising futures, rethinking and reorienting futures, and dissenting futures by some of the above cited authors and others. These works illuminated the importance of social research in futures studies reflecting the concerns of some scholars that the field was engaging rather superficially with the economic trends and technological predictions of interest to decision-makers rather than the broader approach envisaged by Bell (1997, 2008): that of the future of humanity. Slaughter (1999), for example, finds the truths in social futures in the deeper symbolic realms of human existence. Inayatullah incorporates deepening levels of consciousness and symbolism in his layered approach to critical futures studies. Drawing on the works of Foucault, Shapiro and Ashley, Inayatullah presents a post-structural view of critical futures studies that acknowledges reality as socially constructed whilst retaining a commitment to the deconstruction of power (Inayatullah 2004a, b, c, 2011). Here the dominant power is challenged, its hegemonic status questioned and the vested interests supporting particular institutional arrangements examined (Kincheloe and McLaren 2000).

For Inayatullah (1998b) critical futures researchers assert that the present is fragile, merely the victory of one particular discourse or way of knowing over another. In his view, the goal of critical futures studies is to disturb present power relations through making problematic our categories and evoking other places and other scenarios of the future (Inayatullah 2004a). In this view of critical futures studies, truth is not absolute, rather there are multiple patterns of truths that shape the way we perceive and create our worlds (Inayatullah, 2004). Thus critical futures studies ‘recognises the partiality of traditions, cognitive frameworks and ways of knowing’ (Slaughter and Bussey

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2006:11); it decolonises the future making visible the many ways that cultures and epistemes conceptualise their futures.

4.1.2 Critical Globalisation Studies.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, one of the key influences on the future of global governance is the form globalisation might assume in the future. Exploration of the literature on critical globalisation studies provides the means to situate future global governance models within current distinctive and contesting critical globalisation discourses. It also provides the theoretical platform for constructing future, hypothetic models that consider history, power bases and social interests: ‘grounded utopias’ (Mittelman 2005:21).

For Applebaum and Robinson (2005:xiii) the purposes of critical globalisation studies are to ‘understand globalisation and engage in global social activism’. Critical globalisation studies is characterised by dissent in its theoretical challenges to the dominant economic form of globalisation and by its intent to apply theory to practice (Applebaum and Robinson 2005). For Mittelman (2005:20) critical globalisation researchers aim to ‘deconstruct existing knowledge (of globalisation) and to construct new knowledge about what exists and what ought to exist on the basis of transformed relations of power’ and not solely from the scholarly perspective. He also emphasises the important contribution of ‘major statements’ made by ‘public intellectuals…partly based on participant-observation’ to the field (Mittelman 2005:19). This recognition of public contributions bodes well for any future statement the U.N.P.O. Secretariat might wish to make concerning their preferred future model of global governance. U.N.P.O. is committed to non-violent means of resistance; for Mittelman ‘peaceful change requires both utopian visions and critical realist analysis’. This thesis creates the visions and delivers the analysis required to assist U.N.P.O. in their work for peaceful change. Ramos’ doctoral thesis on alternative globalisations made a significant contribution to this study’s framing of critical globalisation discourses. He concluded that the field of critical globalisation studies ‘is a multi-disciplinary, multi-perspective convergence of scholarship on globalisation for the common good’ (Ramos 2010:118-119).
4.1.3 Global Governance Futures Studies.

Global governance is a topic that is attracting considerable interest in both scholarly and public domains. An Internet search for the term ‘global governance’, for example, produces over 3,000,000 results\(^6\) including links to several scholarly institutes engaged in this field of research\(^7\). As discussed earlier in chapter two, the perspectives on global governance vary widely from the global management of financial systems, to climate change to piracy. Yet despite this sizeable and relatively mature body of knowledge there are few global governance futures studies, particularly those that consider the planet as a unit of analysis and utilise formal futures research methods. Scholarship in this sub-domain appears to be in its embryonic stage. Khagram (2006) encountered similar difficulties and endeavoured to initiate a discourse on structural possibilities based on competing ideologies.

Having drawn from these research domains the importance of social research in futures studies, the need to look to the deeper layers of consciousness to discover social truths, the significant role of power interests in global affairs, the value of grounded utopias in effecting peaceful change, and the unique role U.N.P.O. could play in contributing a developed future position to the emerging global governance futures conversation, I incorporate these findings in the research pattern (design) that follows.

4.2 Designing the Patchwork Quilt.

As discussed in the methodological outline in chapter one, a research design describes a flexible set of guidelines that link theoretical paradigms to strategies of enquiry and then to methods (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). As this thesis is concerned with creating images of the future of global governance from the perspectives of U.N.P.O. members attending the 2010 General Assembly a qualitative approach is appropriate. For Burns (2000:388), ‘the qualitative researcher is not concerned with objective truth, but rather with the truth as the informant perceives it’. Qualitative research analyses information

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\(^6\) As at June 29, 2011.
\(^7\) See London School of Economics www2.lse.ac.U.K./globalGovernance, the Shanghai Institute www.siis.org.cn/en, University of Connecticut www.polisci.uconn.edu for examples.

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collected through direct fieldwork observations, in-depth, open-ended interviews, interactive workshops and written documents. Qualitative futures researchers analyse inductively, producing patterns and themes to generate rich narrative descriptions and construct scenarios (Tesch 2002). Within the ambit of qualitative research, this project draws upon a theoretical paradigm of Critical Social Constructionism, uses Participatory Action Research as the methodological strategy of enquiry, and employs semi-structured interviews, an Anecdote Circles Futures workshop and personal observations as methods for collecting empirical materials (Denzin and Lincoln 2005b). Critical Discourse Analysis, an analytical method congruent with Critical Social Constructionism, was conducted using an analytical framework developed from themes in the macrohistorical writings of Galtung and Inayatullah (1997), the alternative globalisations work of Ramos (2010) and the layers of C.L.A., a blend of the matrices in chapters two and three. I then wrote short stories to create images of the future of each model of global governance developed from the framework. The U.N.P.O. preferred future was developed in greater detail using the concept of backcasting to structure the storyline.

4.2.1 Theoretical Framework: Critical Social Constructionism.

Michel Foucault (1997:323) wrote poetically of a form of criticism that would ‘multiply signs of existence’ rather than judgements; that would create as well as critique. Achieving the emancipatory aim of this project to ‘multiply…signs of existence’ requires an approach that highlights the hidden sources of power in the domains of political ideologies and social classes, situating the research project within the theoretical paradigm of Critical Theory (Bache and George 2005; Denzin and Lincoln 2000). Critical Theory calls for a ‘radical restructuring of society toward the ends of reclaiming historic cultural legacies, social justice, the redistribution of power and the achievement of truly democratic societies’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000:1056). It takes the ontological position that today’s reality has been shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, environmental, ethnic and gender values that have converged over time and that the present is merely the victory of one possible future over many other possibilities that existed in the past (Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Inayatullah 2004c:71).
Three writers who have contributed a significant body of work to critical and social theory influenced the approach to critical theory in the design of this thesis: Habermas, Foucault and Derrida. Habermas’ work is imbued with pragmatism and characterised by two key aspects: critique and transformation. Through critique his intention is to expose social injustice, hence questions arise as to whether situations are being skewed by power imbalances or bias, and whether the views of all participants are given equal opportunity for expression (Habermas 1984, 1987). Transformation to address the exposed injustices is Habermas’ project. Foucault’s work, which Inayatullah (2004b) associates with poststructuralism, has been particularly influential in critical analysis from the perspectives of power and politics. Derrida’s writings call attention to the importance of language, emphasising the role of metaphor in critical analysis of texts (Derrida 2001) and political institutions (Giri 2006). Both Foucault and Derrida use deconstruction as a means to unpack current thinking and language. Both challenge the essentialism of universal categories. In his review of social criticism Giri (2006) agrees with Foucault’s and Derrida’s views of universality and considers that more is needed. He writes:

the task of social criticism is also to describe and understand the manifold relationship between the universal and the particular that exists today with a view to working out an emancipatory space that inhabits both and transforms the space to one of creative reconciliation (Giri 2006:10).

Reason and Bradbury (2006:6), however, are concerned ‘that the deconstructive postmodern sentiment will exacerbate, rather than heal, the modern experience of rootlessness and meaninglessness’. They view the critiquing of existing social structures as insufficient. Hetrick and Lozada (1994) draw attention to the need for such projects to go beyond critique which they see as ‘freedom from’ or ‘negative freedom’, by creating alternative social structures that enhance human freedom and self-determination, perceived as ‘positive freedom’ or ‘freedom to’. In this thesis I draw from these writers seeking to examine the existing global governance system and futures discourses, identify the nature and source of power in a select number of discourses, and create the emancipatory space alluded to by Giri (2006) to co-create with U.N.P.O. a future model of global governance as an expression of positive freedom. However critical theory, as discussed in chapter one, has its foundations in
histories whereas this thesis is futures oriented, thus requiring an approach to the production of knowledge that allows for reconstruction after deconstruction. Hence I include elements of Social Constructionism in my theoretical approach to the research design. Social constructionists are interested in inter-subjective social knowledge and the active construction and co-creation of such knowledge (Guba and Lincoln 2005). In a constructionist paradigm realities are the social products of the interactions of people and institutions (Flick 2009). This inter-subjectivity differentiates social constructionism from social constructivism where, in a study such as this, the participants produce meaning subjectively. In social constructionism, meaning exists solely where there is participation between people in making that meaning; knowledge is co-created by researcher and participants (Flick 2009). For Schultz the interactive and inter-subjective nature of social constructionism reduces researcher bias by ensuring the work produced is checked by participants (Schultz 1962 cited in Flick 2009).

Ontologically, the constructionist assumes that multiple social realities exist and that reality for a particular group is inter-subjectively created (Cresswell 1994; Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Fuller and Loogma 2008), a product of the participants’ and researcher’s collaboration to produce socially constructed meaning. In the constructionist epistemology subject and object emerge as partners in the generation of knowledge (Flick 2009). This does not deny the existence of an objective reality but recognises that human knowledge of it depends on human perception (Von Bertalanffy, 1975). Knowledge is therefore constructed during the course of social interactions, reliant on the role of language during those interactions, and has social functions (Flick 2009:71). For this study the social interface took place primarily at the U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly, with an occasional follow up email through the secretariat to encourage a continuing interactive knowledge generation process.

4.2.2 Strategy of Enquiry: Participatory Action Research (P.A.R.)
Having established the theoretical framework for the research I will now discuss the methodological strategy of enquiry, Participatory Action Research, which comprises the methods and practices I will use in my interactions with the delegates at the U.N.P.O.
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General Assembly 2010. As P.A.R. requires my active participation in the research, I first discuss the assumptions and values that have guided my approach to this study.

The way we design research, collect, analyse, and interpret data and other materials is informed by the way a study is theoretically framed which, in turn, is influenced by the researcher’s own ideological assumptions and values (Kincheloe and McLaren 1994). Researchers in the tradition of critical theory ‘enter into an investigation with their assumptions on the table, so no one is confused concerning the epistemological and political baggage they bring with them to the research site’ (Kincheloe and McLaren 1994:140). The epistemological assumption at the outset of this study is that I will interact with the research and bring my own worldviews into the relationship (Creswell 1994), hence my own cultural and familial upbringing adds to the diversity of influences on my thinking that shape the way the research is designed.

It would be too simplistic to claim a Western civilisational upbringing, although I was raised in England and now live in Australia. My formative childhood years were spent in London in a multi-cultural neighbourhood where I was exposed to many other civilisational influences including African, West Indian, Eastern European, and Middle Eastern; and religions including Judaism, Christianity (Catholic, Evangelical, Salvation Army, Church of England), Islam; and spiritual practices from the West Indies. The music, food smells, colours, clothing, religious and spiritual practices, were, on reflection, a mini-world, and this to me was ‘normal’. In cultural studies this background is considered advantageous as it assists researchers to keep a more open mind when faced with cultural differences and fosters a greater awareness of our own cultural influences. I believe this awareness helps me to appreciate the limitations of my understanding and encourages me to listen deeply to the participants in this research to ensure that their voices are heard (Creswell 1994). From my perspective, the world exists independently of attempts to interpret it however the way we know it is shaped by culture, life experience, society, evolution and personal development. Thus it is important to understand the ways in which people know their worlds in order to

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8 This perspective differs from Critical Realism in that I see myself as being in the world and not as a separate entity. In my view, there is an interaction between all things, a giving and receiving of energies, that makes complete separation impossible.
interpret their worldviews; to appreciate why they see things the way they do. In that regard I enter this research with what Reason and Bradbury (2006:7) describe as a ‘participatory worldview’; I believe that all those with a stake in the future should have the opportunity to contribute to shaping the future and that my participation in the research as co-creator of futures with U.N.P.O. members during their General Assembly is more likely to produce a useful outcome for U.N.P.O. than if I were to remain distanced from the subject and participants as required by the positivist research tradition. My political and epistemological orientations can therefore be considered emancipatory in the sense that I aim to assist U.N.P.O. in their work to achieve positive freedom towards self-determined alternatives to their current social arrangements using their own wisdoms. The strategy of enquiry I use to achieve this aim is P.A.R.

P.A.R. is a strategy of enquiry that invites co-creation. Reason and Bradbury, prominent authors and editors of a series of books and papers in the field of action research, define P.A.R. as:

a participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes, grounded in a participatory worldview. It seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to people, and more generally the flourishing of individual persons and their communities (Reason and Bradbury 2001:1).

McArdle and Reason (2006) discuss P.A.R. as one of the foremost forms of action research. For them it is explicitly political and has two key aims congruent with the Critical Social Constructionist paradigm: the first is to produce knowledge and action directly useful to a group of people and the second is to empower those people ‘through the process of constructing and using their own knowledge’ thus revealing the political motivations underpinning the production, use and privileging of certain forms of knowledge by those in power (McArdle and Reason 2006:128). However, P.A.R. has been criticised in the academy for its break with conventional theories and methods (Marshall and Reason 2007). For me this produces a tension in using this strategy of enquiry for this thesis. My assumptions of what comprises quality work for a PhD are that formal language and high theory are two key determinants of quality, requiring a
somewhat prescribed approach to structure and reporting. Seemingly opposed to this is my ethical and moral obligation expressed in the need for the participants’ voices to be heard in their own way and to produce a useful, practical outcome, aims which are ideally suited to P.A.R., and to use plain English so that U.N.P.O. members for whom English is a second or third language can more easily read the thesis. Here I sought to resolve this tension by acquiring a greater understanding of what is considered knowledge in the context of P.A.R. theory.

Premised on an extended epistemology, P.A.R. recognises practical knowledge as constructed in many different ways and in many different places, ‘valuing the experiential, narrative and aesthetic, alongside the propositional and conceptual’ (McArdle and Reason 2006:4). One perspective of an extended epistemology in P.A.R. is that it comprises four forms of knowledge (Heron and Reason 2001; Reason 2006). First, experiential knowing acquired during a meaningful direct encounter; second, presentational knowing that emerges from the experiential and presents the meaning and significance of images through creative means such as dance, art, and story; third, propositional knowing through ideas and theories expressed as information; and fourth, practical knowing or know-how, which is expressed as an ability. For Reason and Bradbury (2001:23) all ways of knowing serve the ability of humans ‘to act intelligently in the pursuit of worthwhile purposes’. In their view ‘the knowing is more valid if it is grounded in experience, expressed through stories and images, understood through theories which make sense to us, and expressed in worthwhile action in our lives’ (Heron and Reason 2001:14). They see the central aim of P.A.R. as ‘to break the monopoly on who holds knowledge and for whom social research should be undertaken by explicitly collaborating with marginalised others’ (Reason and Bradbury 2006:11). For Kindon et al (2007) ‘those who have been most systematically excluded, oppressed or denied carry specifically revealing wisdom about the history, structure, consequences and the fracture points in unjust social arrangements’ (2007:9). P.A.R. encourages shared ownership of the work, a collective approach to the identification, analysis and critique of social issues that are maintaining inequalities or exploitatations, and is action-oriented (Kemmis and McTaggart 2005; Tesch 2002). The research itself becomes a ‘transformative activity that assists participants to learn of and from each other and to
make choices based on that knowledge’ (Tesch 2002:66). Thus a P.A.R. project ultimately leads to the production of practical knowledge that is useful for addressing worthwhile purposes, and to an enhanced ability in participants to create knowledge from their everyday lived experiences. McArdle and Reason (2006) briefly comment on the growing interest in storytelling as one of a few action research practices that is based in presentational ways of knowing and provides a means for participants to share their experiences. These elements of P.A.R. informed the design of the Anecdote Circles Futures workshop that I will discuss in the following section on methods.

Kindon et al. (2007) take the argument for practical knowledge further, writing that a key characteristic of P.A.R. is that it ‘measures the credibility/validity of knowledge derived from the process according to whether the resulting action solves problems for the people involved and increases community self-determination’ (Kindon et al. 2007:14). In considering matters of quality and validity in action research Reason (2006) emphasises the importance of social relevance, participation and practical outcome as dimensions of quality whilst discussing the elements of choice and transparency in selecting and reporting the research methods used, the findings and the outcome. In his view quality is demonstrated when the researcher understands and clearly articulates the choices made. Participants in the research and colleagues in the field of enquiry ultimately make the judgement as to what is considered ‘quality’ action research. In his discussion of validity, Reason rejects the empiricist view that he regards as nothing more than ‘policing and legitimating’ research and, citing work on the deconstruction of validity in qualitative research generally, offers alternative considerations for action research such as ‘the practical, the political and the moral’ and a mode of validity that encourages questions and stimulates dialogue amongst researchers (Reason 2006:189-191). McArdle and Reason (2006:7) go on to challenge action researchers to move ‘beyond the individual and local to influence societal discourses and address issues of policy formation’.

This study engages researcher and participants in a form of collaborative social learning that aims to produce useful knowledge from meaningful interactions at the U.N.P.O.

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Transforming Global Governance: Contesting Images of the Future from People on the Edge of the Periphery

2010 General Assembly thereby enabling U.N.P.O. to join the international conversation on global governance futures. In that regard it makes a modest contribution towards meeting the challenge set by McArdle and Reason. More importantly from an ethical standpoint is that the proposed P.A.R. approach to the research is consistent with the U.N.P.O. principle of self-determination.

4.2.3 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis.
In the context of these theoretical and methodological orientations I will now discuss my approach to sampling and triangulation, introduce the national delegations that contributed to this research, and describe the participatory constructionist research methods used to gather and interpret information inter-subjectively and to develop the preferred U.N.P.O. future model.

In his typology of sampling procedures in qualitative enquiry, Cresswell outlines two sampling strategies that are in use in this study. The first, criterion based sampling, requires that all cases meet some predetermined criterion (Cresswell 1998:119) which in this thesis is membership of U.N.P.O. The second, convenience sampling, involves engaging with participants who are available and willing to offer insights to the project and is premised on an understanding that it may not be possible to obtain materials from the entire population base. In these circumstances Weiss (1994) suggests talking to people at events where members of the subject population are likely to congregate. This study adopts convenience sampling from within the criterion-based approach by obtaining participants’ views concerning their exclusion from the international conversations affecting their future, the posited emerging planetary civilisation, and how decisions might be made on issues that affect all the world’s peoples, at the U.N.P.O. General Assembly in Rome, Italy in May 2010.

The U.N.P.O. endeavours to hold a General Assembly every two years. It is a formal proceeding with established protocols similar to those used by the United Nations. The formalities of the General Assembly generally last for two to three days but with associated events can extend to five days or more. Each General Assembly has a thematic thread in addition to the formal agendas. For 2010 the theme was ‘Developing
Democracy’ and provided an ideal context within which the interviews, discussions and workshop for this thesis could make an immediate contribution to U.N.P.O. aims. The Non-violent Radical Party provided a significant level of support to U.N.P.O., arranging for the Italian Parliament to host the General Assembly and my workshop in their parliamentary buildings, organising for government ministers to contribute to the proceedings, arranging media coverage of the General Assembly and associated events, conducting interviews in Italian on behalf of U.N.P.O., including U.N.P.O. delegates in Party meetings and functions and generally making delegates feel welcome in Rome.

Participants in this research were delegates to the U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly. They ranged in age from their early twenties to mid sixties. There were 54 contributors in total: 42 male and 12 female. 25 of the 54 participants were the formally appointed representatives of their nations and peoples at the General Assembly and other contributors were members of the national delegations. Whilst some live in their homelands, others live in exile, forced to seek refuge in other countries due to threats of personal violence against them and their families for speaking out against the dominant regime. The population base for this study, limited by the criterion of U.N.P.O. membership, was further limited by the inability of some members to leave their homelands to attend the General Assembly or to use communication technologies to provide input should they wish to do so. These restrictions are imposed by repressive regimes in some countries as described by delegates in their video taped presentations available on www.radioradicale.it. Delegates from the following nations and peoples contributed to this research:
Table 7: Nations and Peoples Participating in this Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abkhazia</th>
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<tr>
<td>Afrikaner</td>
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<td>Assyria</td>
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<td>Balochistan</td>
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<td>Cabinda</td>
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<td>Chittagong Hills Tract</td>
<td>Sindh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Circassia</td>
<td>Southern Azerbaijan</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Turkistan</td>
<td>Southern Cameroon</td>
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<td>Gilgit Baltistan</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hmong</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungarians in Romania</td>
<td>West Balochistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>Zanzibar</td>
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<td>Iranian Kurdistan</td>
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</table>

All members of U.N.P.O. were invited via the U.N.P.O. secretariat to participate in the research and participation was voluntary. Those unable to attend the General Assembly were invited to email or write to me either directly or through the U.N.P.O. Secretariat and respond to the same set of questions used to guide the interviews. Participants were asked to sign a consent form after reading a detailed explanation of the study informing them of the purpose of the research, the voluntary nature of participation, how materials would be collected and how confidentiality would be maintained. A few participants declined to sign the consent form on the basis that any documentation identifying them individually could put them at personal risk. However, participants willingly presented to the General Assembly in the knowledge that the Non-violent Radical Party would video and audio tape the formal proceedings and post this material on their website in full public view. Some participants are keen to have their nations and peoples identified in this research to ensure their voices are heard and their existence is acknowledged.

A modified version of the Anecdote Circles workshop method was used at the U.N.P.O. General Assembly 2010 to facilitate the sharing of stories and experiences in small groups. All delegates attending the workshop were asked to sign the workshop
participation form. They were also given an overview of the workshop process and a repeat assurance of de-identification of materials at the start of the workshop. The materials collected are reported in aggregate form and direct quotations have not been attributed to an individual or an institution without their written authorisation. All individual participants were allocated an identification code and the real names of individuals are not used in the final report other than in the introductory section where they, and their nations and peoples, are acknowledged for their contribution. I will hold transcripts and any other records electronically for a period of five years and copies will be held at the University of the Sunshine Coast with the exception of the presentations that are held by the Non-violent Radical Party in Rome, Italy.

**Methodological Triangulation.**

The limited, and prior to the U.N.P.O. General Assembly unknown, number of participants in this study suggested that methodological triangulation would yield a richer, more complete, knowledge of the research topic from the participants’ perspectives (Flick 2009). For Flick (2009:445) contemporary qualitative researchers view triangulation as ‘less about validating results and procedures and more about providing an alternative to validation and a means of extending and completing the possibilities of knowledge production’. Hence collection of the empirical materials from U.N.P.O. delegates at their 2010 General Assembly employed three methods: observations through my participation in the General Assembly and associated activities, semi-structured interviews, and an Anecdote Circles Futures Workshop. As Flick (2009) writes, interviews:

> focus on subjective knowledge and experience and allow issues of the past to be introduced at the first approach…. Observation focuses on practices and interaction at a specific moment and thus adds a new perspective’ (Flick 2009:448).

Anecdote Circles in workshop form allows for the sharing of old stories and the creation of new ones (Snowden 2008).

Each of these methods for collecting materials requires the subsequent analysis of texts. In qualitative research, texts serve three purposes. They provide ‘essential data on
which findings are based; the basis of interpretations; and the central medium for presenting and communicating findings’ (Flick 2009:75). The methods used in this research, which included a literature review, semi-structured interviews that are narratives, the Anecdotes Circles Futures Workshop during which notes were taken and then transcribed, video taped presentations by U.N.P.O. delegates, and the observations generated from personal participation in the General Assembly, noted as texts, all require the interpretation of texts to understand social realities (Flick 2009). The following diagram illustrates how experiences generate empirical materials that are constructed as texts, interpreted by the researcher and returned to the everyday contexts, in this study by reading or listening to the presentations of the findings (adapted from Flick 2009:79):

![Figure 3.1 Relationship Between Construction and Interpretation](image)

**Construction:** texts as versions of the world

**Interpretation:** understanding, ascription of meaning

**Experience:** natural and social environment, events, activities

*Figure 3.1 Relationship Between Construction and Interpretation*

*Source: Flick 2009:79*

**Observation and Participation.**
Creswell (1998) promotes a qualitative approach in which researchers become participant observers within a particular group to gain greater insight about the meaning of social action from the perspective of group members. Participant Observation is an immersive process whereby the researcher observes from a group member’s perspective and can also influence proceedings by participating as a member (Flick 2009). It is customary in a P.A.R. project for the participant-researchers to interact during several meetings over an extended period of time thereby allowing for periods of reflection and ongoing revision. This practice has developed with the ongoing use of P.A.R. as an organisational or community development method in a localised setting where participants are readily accessible and free to participate at will. However, as discussed earlier, P.A.R. researchers have been challenged to extend its use beyond the individual and local into areas of societal discourse and policy formation (McArdle and Reason 2006). For this particular research, that required adaptation of the generally accepted and locally utilised P.A.R. model to account for the U.N.P.O. Diaspora.

U.N.P.O. members live in many different countries, some are unable to communicate freely with the outside world, others do so at great personal risk and some live outside of their homeland meeting once or twice each year to participate in U.N.P.O. activities. Thus the biennial General Assembly is the only forum attended by a larger group of U.N.P.O. members. The eight days of meetings and activities in Rome in 2010 presented the best opportunity for me to immerse myself in their affairs, observe their actions and interactions, participate in their activities and facilitate the members’ discussions towards the creation of their preferred global governance future. Our meetings were therefore necessarily concentrated into a more intensive period than is typical of a localised P.A.R. project. This had two notable effects on the application of P.A.R. as a strategy of enquiry. First, the intensive period and full General Assembly program left no time for group reflection on the work we completed during our allocated interview and workshop times. A few delegates discussed their thoughts on the research privately with me in casual settings, a few sought me out after the workshop with invitations to visit their homelands, others were particularly keen for me to let the world know of their existence through any communications channels available to me, and one member committed to exploring how U.N.P.O. might use futures
research in future. However, there was no time for the group to reconvene and debrief or collectively agree the next steps; we were limited to a closing statement at the workshop that the research findings would be fed back through the Secretariat. The second effect was that the intensive period produced a much deeper immersion in U.N.P.O. work than I had anticipated, as there was no break in observation or participation for those eight days. I opened myself to the immersion and became one of the delegates rather than an intermittent visitor, as has been my experience in more locally oriented P.A.R. initiatives. This gave me greater insights into the meaning of social action for the delegates, a greater understanding of their issues and how they feel about them, and a sense of bonding in friendship with many of the delegates.

The lack of freedom of communication and ongoing participation of U.N.P.O. General Assembly delegations does, however, complicate my ability to ensure that my ongoing research and development of their materials supports U.N.P.O. rather than being complicit in their exclusion from international discussions and affairs. A paradoxical ethical issue became apparent here. I could continue to develop the U.N.P.O. preferred future model with little or no ongoing input from the delegates and rely on my own composition of the materials, thereby risking their exclusion by superimposing my voice on theirs. Or I could choose to do nothing without them, thereby risking their exclusion by the non-production of research that would enable them to join the international conversation. I chose the first option as it provides U.N.P.O. with the means to join the discussions on global governance futures. I fully accept that U.N.P.O. might wish to further develop the research findings to produce their position and/or policy on this issue. Delegates might wish to rewrite the future story at the next meeting. Such engagement with this thesis will further validate the research, which considers usefulness a criterion of validity. I have further addressed the communications and ongoing participation complications by following the U.N.P.O. Secretariat and Presidency briefings on their website, joining their Facebook page and subscribing to their newsletter which the General Secretary uses as the medium to keep U.N.P.O. members and supporters updated on campaigns and major news items. I have also maintained contact with the Secretariat staff by email and have sought opportunities to present a draft of the research findings to the members. The 2012 General Assembly
will be the first of such opportunities. In the interim I have sent extracts from the thesis to the Secretariat and requested feedback when possible. Despite these challenges, the method of data collection through participant observation was selected for the research design with a view to obtaining as many empirical materials from U.N.P.O. members in whatever form they presented them throughout the General Assembly and its associated activities.

Kindon et al (2007) emphasise the importance of building trust in communities and organisations where participant observation is used. In that regard, the initial contacts with the U.N.P.O. Secretariat served to reassure the organisation of my intentions to support their aims with this research and informal contact with delegates prior to and during the General Assembly assisted in building relationships. My participation in the General Assembly enabled me to experience first-hand the conduct of the proceedings. As each delegation presented their report or resolution I took field notes, subsequently reviewing and transcribing them in more detail as video tapes produced and posted on the Internet by the General Assembly organisers became available.

**Semi-structured Empathetic Interviews.**

The purpose of interviews in this research design was to obtain the views of U.N.P.O. delegates who have experiential knowledge of the particular circumstances of member nations and peoples and who preferred to share their views in depth in a more private setting or were unable to attend the workshop. According to Fontana and Frey (2008), researcher and narrators interact first and foremost as people in the interview situation and that ‘taking a stance becomes unavoidable’. I have maintained throughout this research that my interest lies in assisting U.N.P.O. to develop its voice in the international conversation concerning global governance futures; it has both critical and social activist orientations. These political and ethical interests therefore informed the way I conducted the interviews using Semi-structured Empathetic Interviewing. Here Fontana and Frey (2008:116) write:

> The interviewer becomes an advocate and partner in the study, hoping to be able to use the results to advocate social policies and ameliorate the conditions of the interviewee. The preference is to study oppressed groups.
In their view a bond is often created between the two parties to the empathetic interview. The interview becomes less about interviewer eliciting data from interviewee and more about a shared conversation. From an ethical perspective, as the narrators respond to the apparent interest of the interviewer and disclose more than they might in a more formal, structured interview, the narrator’s vulnerability increases. I respected the rights of the delegates to privacy and elected not to take notes on personal matters that were unrelated to the research.

I prepared an interview guide (see Appendix 1) with questions developed from the research outline provided to the U.N.P.O. in advance of the General Assembly to ensure an interview could be completed within approximately 40 minutes thereby assisting delegates with time constraints. Ideally I would have audio taped the interviews, however the narrators had reservations about being recorded in this way. One explanation of this might be concerns about unrehearsed narratives being recorded as it was quite clear from the video taped recordings of the formal General Assembly presentations, speeches well prepared by delegates in advance of the Assembly, that most delegates welcomed the opportunity of publicly presenting the issues and concerns of their nations and peoples. For the one-to-one interviews, they were willing to talk about the topics of interest to this research quite expansively on the understanding that notes taken would be read back to them towards the end of the interview and that any changes they required would be made in the notes before the interview concluded. For ethical reasons, having assured delegates that participation was entirely voluntary, I did not press the issue of audio taping however this meant that I needed to take more extensive notes to ensure as much of the conversation was recorded as possible. It also meant that there was a greater possibility of researcher bias where my own worldviews could influence what I heard and what I elected to write. Kidd et al. (1996) faced with a similar dilemma relating to the need to interview in a busy, noisy, interactive environment used a similar interviewing approach in a study in the farming industry and found that written recording methods ‘best captured the individual’s point of view and secured rich descriptions of the situation’ when audiotaping could not be used (Kidd et al. 1996:225).
Seven in-depth interviews were conducted at places of the delegates’ choosing which, for practical purposes were the delegates’ hotels, the Italian Parliament buildings and at the Rome headquarters of the Non-violent Radical Party of Italy. The timing of each interview was determined by the narrator’s availability; some interviews were scheduled appointments while others took advantage of intervals in the Assembly proceedings. One took place during the lunch break in the main meeting room of the Non-violent Radical Party in the presence of some 30-40 other people at the request of the narrator. Each interview lasted for between 40 and 60 minutes depending on the delegate’s interests, willingness to continue the conversation, and competing time constraints. Each participant was asked open-ended questions about their people’s experience of being an unrepresented nation as a means to begin the interview process. From this point the interview generally became less structured and more interactive, resulting in what Holstein and Gubrium describe as a ‘contextually bound and mutually created story’ (cited in Fontana and Frey 2008:116) with occasional prompts from the prepared interview guide as a means of eliciting their views of a future planetary civilisation and how it might manage humanity’s common affairs. I recorded participants’ responses in a general notebook and read the key points back to the delegate at the end of each interview, inviting additional comment to ensure all information of importance to the participant was included. All interviewed participants indicated that the notes corresponded to the interview and all notes were transcribed within the week.

In interviews people tell stories about their experiences. Some writers agree that if knowledge of experiences is shared through language then story is what grounds language as a symbolic system common to all people (Armstrong 2005; Bettelheim 1976; Bruner 1986; Campbell and Moyers 1988; Hsu 2008). Contemporary thought concerning knowledge systems suggests a growing acceptance of many ways of knowing other than propositional (Inayatullah 2004c). One of these recently rediscovered sources is the knowledge embedded in storytelling (Kohler-Reissman 2008; Kvale 1996; Martin 2008; Snowden 2005), which for action researchers is a presentational form of knowledge. The research design therefore included a workshop
that synthesised two methods: Anecdote Circles, a method of short storytelling, and the Futures Workshop, which aimed to create a shared future.

**Anecdote Circles Futures Workshop.**

As Bell (1997:141) writes ‘members of collectivities find meaning and purpose in stories about their own history and in their charter of founding myths’. For this thesis, storytelling, in a facilitated Anecdote Circles workshop, was used to share information within a culturally and linguistically diverse group of delegates at the U.N.P.O. General Assembly 2010. Anecdote Circles are gatherings of 10-15 people convened for the purpose of collecting anecdotes or short stories on a particular topic or issue. Participants in the circle attach signifiers to their anecdotes indicating the parts of their story they feel particularly strongly about. The circle’s proceedings can be recorded, transcribed and stored for further reference (Snowden 2008). According to Snowden (2008) this eliminates one bias associated with interviews; that of the researcher forming patterns of meaning from the information collected after as few as two or three interviews. It also assists in reducing the extent to which the researcher’s cultural bias informs the interpretation of information as the researcher analyses the signifiers, not the original story, to identify patterns of meaning that reveal the deep myths underlying participants’ stories (Snowden 2008). This method was selected as part of the original research design both as a means of collecting stories and to design a forum for collaborative social learning. Additional notes on the method are provided in Appendix 2. The workshop, entitled ‘Stories from the Past, Changes in the Present and Images of the Future: U.N.P.O. Speaks to the World’, was promoted by the U.N.P.O. Secretariat prior to the General Assembly using the following paragraphs that I wrote for that purpose:

There are a number of common issues affecting the human family’s future such as water, food, energy, peace, population growth, environmental problems and the current growing interest in a future planetary civilisation. Yet U.N.P.O. members struggle to be heard in international forums where these matters are explored.
This workshop will explore the distinctive experience U.N.P.O. delegates and their nations and peoples have as peoples not recognised, and often not admitted to, global decision-making forums. It will provide delegates with the opportunity to discuss the changes happening in the world today and the emerging possibility of a future planetary civilisation: What form might this take? How would a planetary civilisation make decisions about common issues? Does this affect identities? Is there a role for Unrepresented Nations and Peoples in this future and if so what is it? What unique knowledge and wisdoms should a planetary civilisation learn from U.N.P.O. member nations and peoples?

Through facilitated discussion and the sharing of our stories – past, present and future – delegates will then be asked to write letters to the world sharing wisdoms from the past and hopes and fears for the future of the world.

My original intention was to run Anecdote Circles with a small number of delegates sharing stories about the way their nations and peoples experience their unrecognised status in the global polity and to audio tape and transcribe the proceedings. However whilst I had arranged with the Assembly organisers in advance for a room suitable for the workshop, and a separate quiet area with audio equipment, on being escorted through the Italian Parliament building to the appointed venue it was apparent that the facilities were not conducive to the workshop design. The room itself was smaller than expected and the number of delegates who wished to participate had increased during the General Assembly as delegates came to know me and became more interested in the research. Consequently there was insufficient space for comfortable round-table style discussions, no audio equipment, no quiet area for delegates to retreat and record their stories, and too much noise in the room itself and from the streets outside for my own hand-held recording device to capture the stories.

Here again I needed to adapt the original research design from one of recorded individual stories to one of stories and information shared amongst participants in a form of collaborative social learning. I adapted the Anecdote Circles method of sharing stories by blending it with elements of a Futures Workshop, specifically facilitating a
process that aimed to collect the materials needed to create a shared future (see Jungk and Mullert 1987 for example). The Futures Workshop method has its foundation in critical theory and is useful when working with groups such as grassroots organisations that might consider themselves powerless in a particular situation yet wish to be involved in the creation of their futures (Nielsen 2006). I also presented delegates with the STEEP acronym, Society, Technology/science, Economic, Environmental, and Political/legal, as a means of helping them broaden their thinking from the political focus of the General Assembly to encompass developments in other systems that might assist them in creating their preferred future. This resulted in workshop participants sharing stories about the past, sharing knowledge of the changes occurring in the present, challenging assumptions as to what might or might not continue, and exploring hopes, fears and possibilities for their futures. In doing so they discussed their values for a global governance system and came to some common understandings of the global issues that the system might deal with in future.

On arrival participants signed an attendance sheet as a general record of participation. I introduced the workshop, explained the process, provided the background to the research and ensured participants were aware they could leave at any time. This addressed ethical issues of ensuring participation was voluntary whilst also addressing the practical issue of the delegates’ competing schedule demands. Almost all participants remained for the entire workshop. The workshop lasted for two hours and was loosely organised in four sections of approximately half an hour each with prompts to stimulate discussion should the conversations falter. U.N.P.O. secretariat staff took notes for each small group of participants and I moved from group to group during the workshop to hear the discussions first-hand. After each section I explained the next part so that participants and note-takers stayed reasonably focused on the key themes:

- Stories of the past: How did your nation or people come to be unrepresented?
- How would you traditionally make decisions about issues that affect everyone?
- What could global decision-making bodies learn from this?
Knowledge of the present: What are the major issues and changes happening in the world today that affect the human family's future? Which of these do you believe should be handled at a global level?

Hopes for the future: Do you believe a planetary civilisation is emerging; why or why not? What do you see as good about that? What would concern you?

How do you think global decisions should be made?

A letter to the people of the world, summarising the above.

I was also interested in the directions the conversations took when allowed to run freely so I elected not to intervene when people started talking about other matters. For example, a few people began a conversation about how U.N.P.O. might use the information generated by the workshop and how they might ‘champion this futures thinking’ going forward. I took this as an indication that delegates and the U.N.P.O. Secretariat members in attendance were seeing value in both the content of the small group discussions and the sense of empowerment and heightened solidarity produced through the sharing of stories.

My role became that of facilitator as well as participant observer, managing the larger group dynamics, ensuring everyone had the opportunity to say something, supporting the note-takers, and answering questions from the small groups during the workshop. Considering the linguistic diversity of the group, there were very few difficulties communicating in English and I acknowledge the role played here by the more fluent English speakers in the group and their willingness to assist other group members. Four of the five groups became excited and highly motivated through the course of the workshop as though their interactions, their stories, their similar struggles, and simply the ability to talk about future possibilities in a constructive way gave them a sense of empowerment and fostered the solidarity that I believe to be at the core of U.N.P.O.’s purpose. The fifth group was taking the discussion very seriously, was much quieter than the others, yet seemed equally engaged. Unsolicited feedback from many participants at the end of the workshop suggested that the experience had been a powerful one for them, generating new shared insights into global challenges and
localised problems, creating a sense of U.N.P.O. agency that further enhanced solidarity, and providing a forum for the sharing of stories.

All materials, including notes, pamphlets, a compact disk and website links, were handed to me by delegates and note-takers at the end of the workshop. I transcribed these within a week of the General Assembly in preparation for analysis. General Assembly delegates who participated in the workshop and interviews were given my contact details again with an open invitation to email me should they wish to add anything to the information collected during the General Assembly. For those unable to attend the workshop due to participation in other General Assembly activities, semi-structured interviews were offered outside of the formal meeting agenda. As it transpired only one person wrote a ‘story to the world’. I believe this was due mainly to time constraints, partly the challenge for some to write in English, and I sensed that a few delegates were simply unenthusiastic about writing a story. In hindsight this part of the workshop might have been more successful if I had asked people to write something more transparently useful, such as a media release.

Whilst the adaptation of the Anecdote Circles method might have reduced the richness of information provided for this study there are two points I have reflected on since then. First, the delegates’ reluctance to have their interviews audio taped might have extended to a reluctance to tell their stories into a microphone thereby effectively closing down this part of the workshop. Second, the energy and enthusiasm with which delegates engaged in the group discussions, in small groups and in the group as a whole, fostered a greater degree of collaborative social learning for delegates than might have been the case had individuals frequently left their groups to record anecdotes elsewhere.

From an analytical perspective, Snowden (2010) subsequently advised that there were insufficient anecdotes for effective use of Sensemaker software for myth analysis and that a few hundred anecdotes would be needed. Thus a limitation of the software that I was unaware of prior to participation in the U.N.P.O. general assembly is its reliance on data quantity. In that regard the use of C.L.A. as the central method for this study took on greater importance and provided the framework needed to use metaphor for sense-making.
**Critical Discourse Analysis and C.L.A.**

The critical research lens assumes that language encodes and embodies power relationships. It seeks to analyse the discourses of power, including its social and historical origins, and to expose the fundamental role of language in the formation of power relations (Kincheloe and McLaren 2000). The analytical framework designed for this thesis uses a form of Critical Discourse Analysis based on the works of Foucault where critique, power and ideology are emphasised to a greater degree than in other forms of discourse analysis (Flick 2009:340). The framework, developed from the matrices in chapter two, uses the futures research method Causal Layered Analysis (C.L.A.) to structure content and develop the alternative models of global governance futures. Linking this to the theoretical paradigm of Critical Social Constructionism, Fuller and Loogma (2008) cite Inayatullah’s work in Critical Futures Studies as congruent with Social Constructionism. They write that C.L.A. is:

>a futures oriented form of post-modern deconstruction concerned with creating distance from …and problematising socially constructed categories in order to identify what could or needs to change to produce alternative futures….an analytical methodology informed by critical social theory, its links to Social Constructionism are explicit (Fuller and Loogma 2008:6).

I applied the Foucauldian model of Critical Discourse Analysis using a modified version of Parker (2004); converting all texts into written form as soon as possible after the General Assembly, noting any themes in the texts that suggested civilisational, ideological or epistemic worldviews of a particular issue; and searched for clues as to structural preferences for a future global governance system. I summarised these in table format and focused on the text as the object of study, seeking groups of phrases that suggested hidden metaphors, myths and deep stories. I then searched all transcribed texts for U.N.P.O.’s preferred view of rights and responsibilities according to ideology, power and agency. Finally I used a matrix to map the patterns in language, discourses, and located them in relation to ideologies, power bases and institutions (Parker 2004 cited in Flick 2009) within vertical and horizontal layers of C.L.A.
As briefly discussed in the methodological overview in chapter one, in this thesis I use C.L.A. as a means of mapping the literature in chapters two and three, of deconstructing the present and alternative futures of globalisation, to inform the framework for the discourse analysis used to create alternative global governance futures, and to offer a synthesis reconstruction in chapter five. C.L.A. is used as both method and theory (Inayatullah 2004c). As method, it is a multi-layered futures research approach that explores topics at ever deepening levels of consciousness, seeking to open up the present and past to create a broader base for the generation of alternative futures. It is particularly useful where there is a need for deeper enquiry that includes other ways of knowing and it can be used to create transformation of our empirical and ideational worlds whilst ensuring deep participation in this transformation. This is not just better representation but a genuine engagement with Others ways of knowing. For Inayatullah, ‘the ultimate benefit will be a better world at all levels’ (2004c:49). C.L.A. opens up space for the articulation of constitutive discourses, which can then be shaped as scenarios (Inayatullah 2004c). C.L.A. is suitable for this thesis as it accommodates the many ways of eliciting past, present and future stories at multiple levels as Bruner (1986:7) suggests when he writes ‘literary and general linguists have always insisted that no text, no story can be understood at a single level’. C.L.A. enabled participants in the study to socially construct their futures inter-subjectively using stories: a medium that is known and accessible to all nations and peoples (Armstrong 2005; Bruner 1986; Campbell 1991; Campbell and Moyers 1988; Hsu 2008). Telling the stories of marginalised people can also help create a public space requiring others to hear them (Denzin and Lincoln 2008b) which is congruent with U.N.P.O. aims.

As outlined in chapter one, C.L.A. comprises four vertical layers: The Litany, The Systems and Social Analysis, Worldview and Discourse, and Metaphor and Myth. As one of the aims of this study is to evoke images of the future I assigned images to each layer of CLA representing my own visualisation of the vertical layers. In contrast to most other writers I have placed greater importance in the Worldview and Discourse, and Metaphor and Myth layers. As discussed in chapter two, analysis of globalisation at these levels is underrepresented in the current literature thereby enabling this thesis to make a contribution to knowledge.
Vertical Layer 1: The Litany on the Digital Screen.

The litany level of C.L.A. generally comprises quantitative trends and issues, statistical measures and ‘official histories’. At this level, trends, issues and statistics are often presented in news media and websites as problems, such as ‘the ageing population’. According to Inayatullah (2004c), little analytic capability is required at this level and data are rarely questioned. The image evoked is that of a digital screen representing the way in which people increasingly receive information about their world. Televisions, computers and mobile phone screens present the news, official statements, expert commentaries and the like, supported by statistics. For Gidley (2004) and Inayatullah (2004c) ‘official histories’ are politically motivated accounts, and not necessarily accurate records of past events, often commissioned by those in power at the time of writing. For example, at a time when cities were forming in different parts of the world, myths and legends were being written on behalf of rulers to secure fealty from the people by creating a sense of shared identity which, when deemed necessary by the rulers, was to be defended to the death (Osborne 2001; Sen 2006). As new rituals and ceremonies were created that linked rulers with citizens and gods, the ruler’s command over social order was reinforced (Berry 1999; Yoffee 2005). More importantly, and regardless of the differences in historical accounts, the advent of historical time enabled the writers of ‘official histories’ to demarcate eras according to rulers, dynasties or religious leaders as dictated to them by those in power (Eisler 1995; Raskin et al. 2002). Whilst this thesis takes a critical view and seeks to challenge the ‘official history’ of the U.N. system by unmasking its politically motivated origins it does so solely to open up the space for alternative futures. Accordingly the discussion of histories is brief and for context purposes only. The primary function of the Litany level of analysis for this thesis is the identification of measures of progress and issues of interest most congruent with the ideologies of the different groups supporting or promoting a particular future form of global governance.


The image here is that of the kaleidoscope, a tube of mirrors containing loose coloured objects that produces fractal-like images as the tube is rotated. As the kaleidoscope produces a different pattern with each turn of the tube, so the systems and social.
analyses produce a different pattern of insights according to the dynamics of the interplay, hence multiple patterns are discernible at this level producing alternative maps of the interconnected systems under review. Mendlovitz and Weiss (1975) stress the importance of thinking about the interconnectedness of the global problem areas and the need to consider all systems connected to the central issue of global governance futures. Confucian knowing supports this thinking, seeking:

a comprehensive and unobstructed awareness of interdependent conditions and their latent, vague possibilities where the meaning and value of each element is a function of its own particular network of relationships (Ames, 1991:231).

At the systems and social analysis level, the subject matter was analysed in the context of the interplay between trends and issues emerging from social, technological, economic, environmental and political systems as identified by U.N.P.O. delegates during the Anecdote Circles Futures Workshop. Questions I asked of the data and literature at this level included: what system/s are dominant in this view of global governance and how did this come about historically? Who are the proponents of the global governance models, what are their interests and what form of power do they rely on? What is the system that has created their knowledge of global governance? Who has agency in the proposed model? Here I identify the dominant systems that are producing the litany data and the social causes that have influenced those systems. I also suggest a form the organisational structure might take that is consistent with the ideology. For the U.N.P.O. preferred scenario I mapped the system using a Qualitative Non-linear Dynamics Portrait based on Laszlo’s (1996) general systems theory and the principles underpinning complexity science. In this mapping, social systems are viewed as dynamic networks of interactions and relationships that respond to small changes in initial conditions such that an intervention in one part of the system causes the system to learn and adapt to new conditions. The function at this level of analysis is a broader understanding of the issues connected to the topic of interest.

Vertical Layer 3: The Prism of Worldviews and Discourses.
The prism is the image evoked for the worldview and discourses level of C.L.A. A beam of white light passes through a prism revealing its many colours. I see this as representative of the questions I am asking being interpreted and responded to in many
different ways. Whilst neuroscience has shown how the brain, eyes and related faculties provide us with information about the world around us, our interpretation of what we see is influenced by our worldviews (Greenfield 2010; Hollick 2006; Rose 2005). As human cultures have evolved in different environments each has socially constructed unique realities that form integral parts of its worldview (Matilal 1991). At this level of CLA the worldviews might be ideological positions, ‘civilisational worldviews, epistemic commitments, stakeholder interests and multiple and/or contesting worldviews’ of the same topic (Inayatullah 2004c:541). The discourses entailed with the worldviews typically verbalise deep ideological or cultural allegiances, such as values and beliefs, which underpin the worldview.¹⁰

As Inayatullah (2004:12) writes, ‘at this stage, one can explore how different discourses do more than cause or mediate the issue, but constitute it’. In seeking new metaphors and mythologies for future global governance systems based on the culturally diverse views of nations and peoples across all continents my aim at the worldview level of analysis is to discover ‘deeper social, linguistic and cultural processes that are actor-invariant … and to some extent system-invariant. To analyse discourse at the sub-levels of stakeholder interests and ideological positions’ (Inayatullah 2004c:12). For this study I chose to analyse discourse at the sub-levels of ideology and epistemology having already briefly commented on stakeholder interests in the Litany level of analysis as ‘issues’ and established in the literature review and in the analytical framework itself that these global governance futures were emanating from contesting worldviews. I had originally considered analysis of civilisational worldviews however found no evidence in the literature reviewed, with the exception of Huntington’s highly contested Clash of Civilisations, or the U.N.P.O. texts to suggest that civilisational analysis was warranted. For U.N.P.O.’s ideological and epistemological commitments I analysed the U.N.P.O. materials seeking a common worldview within the diversity of the U.N.P.O.; for the other proposed models I stitched together pieces of data from the literature on alternative globalisations and global governance futures, building on the works of Khagram (2006) and Ramos (2010).

¹⁰ For examples, see the summary C.I.A. matrix in chapter two and Ramos (2010).
Vertical Layer 4: The Cultural DNA of Metaphor and Myth.

The fourth and deepest layer is concerned with myth and metaphor, focusing on ‘the deep stories, the collective archetypes, and the unconscious and often emotive dimensions of the problem or the paradox’. At this level ‘the language used is less specific, more concerned with evoking visual images, with touching the heart instead of reading the head’ (Inayatullah, 2004:13). The intent and function is to draw out and deconstruct deeply ingrained myths and metaphors, articulate alternative stories, and bring the subconscious and the mythic to futures research (Inayatullah 2004c).

The image evoked here is that of human Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) that fulfils the role of long-term storage of biological information in the human body. It is my contention that myths fulfil the role of long-term storage of cultural information and can be as deeply embedded in our minds as DNA is in our physical selves. Another parallel between the two is that biological genes can be turned on and off, and cultural DNA can be resilient or destroyed. Cultural DNA can be used for progressive or regressive purposes, such as fundamentalism. The DNA Double Helix appears to comprise two intertwined strands. However there are small gaps between the horizontal strings so that the vertical cords are in a never-ending dance around each other, close but never quite touching. To me this is symbolic of the outer and inner worlds of reality, and of the two worlds of the elite nations and the marginalised, and sometimes invisible, majority of people on planet Earth.

Language forms the framework for concepts and ways of knowing on which cultures construct their worldviews (Hollick 2006). At this level of analysis I make use of two forms of seemingly intertwined language: metaphor and myth. The first, metaphor, I use to make sense of the recent past and present worldviews and as catalytic language for the shift in worldviews that appears to be underway in this second decade of the twenty-first century. The second use of language is myth, by which I mean deep stories and collective archetypes, and here my aim is to identify the myths shaping current realities for U.N.P.O. and identify or create new stories of alternative futures. As Berry writes:
The historical mission of our times is to reinvent the human at the species level, with critical reflection, within the community of life systems, in a time-developmental context, by means of story and shared dream experience (cited in Laszlo 2001:152).

The rediscovery of the power of story for organisational and societal transformation has engaged many writers in the past 30 years (Armstrong 2005; Bettelheim 1976; Bruner 1986; Campbell and Moyers 1988; Eisler 1995; Hsu 2008; Inayatullah 2004c; Kohler-Reissman 2008; Martin 2008; Snowden 2005, 2008; Yoffee 2005). Ricoeur describes stories as ‘models for the redescription of the world’ (in Bruner 1986:7). Psychologists and neuroscientists have studied the human attachment to storytelling and how the emotional and cognitive effects of story influence our beliefs and decisions (Hsu 2008). Their studies reveal that storytelling is one of the few human traits that are universal across cultures and throughout history (Campbell 1991, 2003; Hsu 2008), hence stories are appropriate for the aims of this study in that they provide a common platform for participants to exchange information about the past and create new worlds for the future. As Wildman (1999) cautions, the majority of the world’s cultures are oral; they rely on myths and stories to express themselves. The use of story therefore also plays a central role in ensuring the products of this study are communicated in a form that is understandable across many cultures.

**Myth.**

A particular form of story relevant to the transformational aims of this research is that of myth. Myths have existed in every known society and appear to be an intrinsic, albeit subliminal, element of human culture (Armstrong 2005; Campbell 2003; Campbell and Moyers 1988). Myths are arrangements of the past ‘in patterns that resonate with a culture’s deepest values and aspirations’ (Wright 1992 cited in Osborne 2001:10). They create meaning and evolutionary direction for a culture. Campbell defines myth as ‘stories of our search through the ages for truth for meaning for significance …myths are clues to the spiritual potentiality of human life’ (1988:5). Rowland’s more pragmatic definition states ‘myths are stories which symbolically solve the problems facing society, provide justification for a social structure or deal with a psychological crisis.'
Myths are the most important stories in society’ (Rowland 1990:7). Myth also performs a powerful role in shared identity formation, according to Osborne (2001), such as might be required if humans are to assume the identity of Planizens (planetary citizens) of Earth. Laskin (2005) introduces a political note when he describes myth as both ‘a psychological phenomenon of the collective unconscious and a sociological phenomenon that unites people’. Barthes (1964) writes that myths are not necessarily stories but can be embedded in the language of a culture or encoded in symbolism and ritual. In Gebser’s work on stages of consciousness, as early humans formed larger social groupings they developed a shamanistic symbolic universe in which myth became the primary form of expression in the shift in consciousness from magical to mythical (Mickunas 1997). For Laszlo (2006) myth creation offers a means to disturb current social realities and introduce more desirable patterns into societies. Hence myths can serve both social and political functions; create, sustain, challenge or strengthen values, beliefs, ideologies and power bases; and shape communication and evolutionary direction. In this study I take the stance that new myths are needed to aid in the transformation of human thought and behaviour required to deal effectively with the challenges facing the human family this century. I seek to expose existing myths and propose new stories that might contribute to this transformation by using metaphors for sense-making and as ‘catalytic’ language (Judge 1993).

Metaphor.
Myths can be difficult to access, embedded as they often are at a subliminal level of consciousness. One way of accessing hidden myths, and promoting new ones perceived as desirable or necessary for transformational change, is through metaphor, defined by Lakoff and Johnson (1980:104) as ‘the essence of understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another’. Metaphors and their linguistic entailments are in everyday language, subtle yet powerful influencers of thought and action. Unlike similes that describe one thing as being like or similar to another, metaphor says that one thing IS another, for example ‘ideas are commodities’ is the conceptual metaphor which is evidenced in the language when we use expressions like ‘she won’t buy that idea; he’s been a source of valuable ideas; there’s a market for good ideas’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:105). Metaphors ‘assist in sense-making processes’ and because they
Hidden metaphors can therefore be discovered and insights gained to an underlying myth by analysing language through discourse analysis. At this juncture, assuming the myth is one that we wish to change to create a preferred future, the new story can be shaped, a new metaphor framed and everyday sayings created and disseminated to instil new thought and action in society. The process of transmitting the new language in this manner calls upon work in Memetics, from the word ‘Meme’ described as ‘a unit of cultural transmission that propagate itself in the meme pool by a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation’ (Dawkins 1989:192 adapted). In this sense Memetics operates within the context of general evolutionary theory as advocated by Laszlo, Eisler and others who propose that culture (Laszlo 2006) and language and stories (Armstrong 2005; Campbell 1988; Eisler 1995; Eliade 1971) offer the means to bring about the deepest levels of societal transformation. In this study the language and discourses analysed using the C.L.A.-derived framework are used to generate metaphors and myths for a range of ideological positions on globalisation and global governance. These metaphors and myths were not explicit in the literature, hence those provided in this study are my interpretation of what would be congruent with the ideologies examined and are offered to catalyse further discussion.

Scenarios.

Popular management literature on scenario planning recounts its emergence in the twentieth century from the French School’s business scenarios in Europe and the RAND Corporation’s military scenarios in the U.S. However a few writers interested in the history of the theatre argue that scenarios were originally developed for European plays. Used as a means to improvise during the performance of a play, scenarios were different stories that actors could use if they wanted to respond to the changing conditions in the theatre, such as public ridicule. Scenarios were also alternative lines that might be brought into play to steer the performance into a different, yet rehearsed, storyline (Andrews 1993). Sixteenth century playwright Shakespeare created the concept and metaphor of the world as a theatre and audience members as interactive
participants in the plot and the design of the storyline; hence scenarios enabled the quick improvisation and transition from one story to another in response to audience participation (Oatley 2000). In general terms scenarios function much like this today but are now more commonly used for business planning and policy development. However they remain true to the idea that a story already exists (history) and that being sensitive, and responding, to changes occurring in the surroundings of the present enables us to develop scenarios of alternative futures and improvise by changing the story to create the ending we prefer. For this thesis, a synthesis of insights emerging from all facets of the research was used to create images of future global governance models in the form of visionary stories as symbolic texts representing knowledge generated about alternative futures (Fuller and Loogma 2008).

At the start of the project three scenario creating methods were considered as potentially suitable: the double driver method, the archetype method, and my own emergent futures method. These were subsequently rejected as the information that emerged from the literature review and from empirical materials provided by U.N.P.O. participants suggested that they were not the best methods for producing multiple future images for this particular project. As the theoretical research and the interaction with U.N.P.O. progressed, the approach to assisting U.N.P.O. to join the international conversation on global governance futures increasingly became one of understanding the nature of the conversation itself and creating a U.N.P.O. position that would enable them to participate on an equal footing. Having discovered several actor groups engaged in discussions amongst themselves and their constituents about aspects of global governance, I then analysed their ideological worldviews and discourses to reveal the nature of their interest in the topic and the type of system their worldviews might support. None of the groups selected had a clearly developed position on global governance futures that would support their transformational aims, and I include in this comment the Assertive Multilateralism proponents, such as the Commission on Global Governance, who are seeking to reform the U.N. From a scenario development perspective, therefore, the double driver method, generally used when two critical uncertainties emerge from the data to form a matrix of four scenarios against which strategic plans can be tested, is multi-linear and would not adequately reflect the
contesting ideologies. The archetype scenario method produces interesting stories, however each archetype would need to be written for each contesting ideology thus producing a large number of scenarios when literature on the method shows a smaller number, ideally four to six, to be the most useful for organisational policy and planning purposes (see, for example, Godet and Roubelat 1996). My own emergent futures scenario method is non-linear and ideally suited to the task of creating new and alternative futures for organisations and communities, however the U.N.P.O. have clearly stated their preference for a reformed U.N. rather than new forms of global governance. Therefore whilst I had originally sought to develop a number of scenarios, the participants were interested in telling their stories, discussing future-related issues, and creating a collective image of a preferred world future. Congruent with the P.A.R. approach, I responded accordingly and have adapted the method of Visionary Scenarios (Gordon 2011) to generate a distinctive image of global governance in story form for each of the six selected actor groups and for the U.N.P.O.

The Visionary Scenarios method is best used in situations where there is high ambiguity as defined in the uncertainty mapping approach of Courtney et al. (1997). The stories produced represent the shared hopes of a collective and are therefore suitable for developing the U.N.P.O. preferred future in accordance with their value of solidarity. In this visioning method, contrary to scenario methods where multiple scenarios are developed and used to test or create strategy or policy, one clearly preferred, shared image of the future is co-created by the audience and actors. According to Gordon (2011) visionary scenarios can be used to help build consensus and to foster public engagement in national, regional, and in this instance global, debate. He does, however, identify a weakness in this method in that it lacks the adaptive capacity of working with a range of scenarios. In my view it would also be unsuited to most scenario projects as it might encourage the linear thinking that scenario methods in general are designed to challenge. However, Gordon (2011) contends that robustness is achieved by identifying common leverage points across scenarios to produce the preferred scenario. This thinking has been applied in this thesis in a different way by using the common elements of global governance futures identified from the literature, as distinct from the more systemic leverage points approach, to structure the multi-linear alternative futures.
matrix and the range of preferred futures. I considered the weakness identified by Gordon (2011) and created a preferred future for each competing ideology, thereby developing a range of visions on the topic and providing some adaptive capacity for policy makers and planners who might be interested in tracking the emergence of particular futures, or the increasing dominance of a particular ideology, and changing their own stories accordingly. Each posited future model of global governance summarised in the matrix has an accompanying short story that generates an image of that future, whilst the preferred future narrative for the U.N.P.O. is developed in greater detail by incorporating the results of key actor analysis with the model generated by the analytical framework in chapter five, thereby ensuring the scenario considers how other actors might react if the U.N.P.O. preferred story were to be played out. This approach is more consistent with the original use of scenarios in the theatre where ‘all the world is a stage and everyone in the theatre can change the play, different actors appear and others disappear according to the rules established for scenario development’ (Marchais-Roubelat and Roubelat 2011:131). As in the theatre, the approach takes the story of global governance to a point and then addresses the high ambiguity of the global governance futures domain by allowing different actors’ interests, worldviews and influential myths to change the story and end the play on a different note.

4.3 Chapter Summary.

In this chapter I outlined the theoretical paradigm for this thesis and provided the research design used to answer the focal question posed in chapter one. Framed within a qualitative research design, the methodological approach to this thesis is informed by Critical Social Constructionism, employs Participatory Action Research as the strategy of enquiry, and uses a range of data collection and analysis methods. I chose the bricoleur metaphor (Denzin and Lincoln 2005a) as it allowed for the piecing together of disparate materials to achieve a harmonious whole: in sewing terms a patchwork quilt. The metaphor was particularly important for this research that relied upon materials produced during interactions with U.N.P.O. delegates from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds with many different ways of knowing. As this thesis seeks to express images of the future held by non-State actor groups and nations and peoples, I
designed the research in a way that would encompass an extended epistemology where many ways of knowing are recognised, a participatory approach wherein researcher and respondents co-create understandings, and methodology and methods that support these aims (Denzin and Lincoln 2008a). I used methodological triangulation to collect materials through three different methods to make it as easy as possible for all delegates to contribute. The three data collection methods were Semi-structured Empathetic Interviews, a facilitated Anecdote Circles Futures Workshop, and my own observations from participation in the General Assembly as a guest of the U.N.P.O. Secretariat.

This generated a broader view of global governance futures to that previously discovered in the literature by including perspectives that are usually ignored. The inclusion of such perspectives challenges the current limited view by creating different worlds based on a more internationally representative set of worldviews and synthesises these perspectives within future stories. By critiquing and questioning both dominating and potentially liberating social constructs, actors in a planetary civilisation are encouraged to create a global governance or planetary participation system that liberates ‘the people of the world’ (Commission on Global Governance 1995). As a philosophy of pluralism is adopted in the approach to analysing participants’ contributions to the study, my challenge as bricoleur is now to stitch together the diverse individual, culturally and ideologically informed perspectives of humanity’s common affairs, a planetary civilisation, global governance, and other contributions into higher constructs that accommodate the diversity within the context of the U.N.P.O. mission and values. In the following chapter I don the magnifying spectacles, the Pince Nez, to study the fabric, thread the needle and start sewing the swatches of material together to form the patchwork quilt: a bricolage of U.N.P.O. responses to the research question and objectives posed in chapter one that emerged in prismatic fashion during the U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly.
Chapter Five
Donning the Pince Nez: Analysis of Findings
5.1 Introduction.

In the previous chapter I discussed the methodological approach to this thesis. In this chapter I will describe the experience of applying the research design and collecting the research materials. I will analyse the findings, develop a matrix of preferred global governance futures, create images in the form of short stories for each of the alternative futures, and then further develop the U.N.P.O. preferred future. Over a period of eight days from May 25 - June 1, 2010 members of the U.N.P.O. who attended the General Assembly in Rome, Italy voluntarily contributed their views on the global issues facing the human family, the prospects of a planetary civilisation, the U.N., the challenges facing their nations and peoples, and their ideas and traditional stories concerning decision-making for matters affecting the collective. As described in chapter four, these empirical materials were collected through Empathetic Semi-structured Interviews, a facilitated Anecdote Circles Futures Workshop, my observations and experiences during the formal proceedings, and the informal conversations that occurred outside of the formal research design during the General Assembly and associated activities.

5.2 Collecting the Materials: The Participatory Action Research Experience.

This section describes the application of the theoretical research design during the U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly and relates specifically to the collection of research materials: swatches of fabric for the eventual quilt. Here I provide accounts of the interactive experiences of Empathetic Semi-structured Interviewing, the Anecdote Circles Futures Workshop, U.N.P.O. delegates’ presentations, and the building of relationships through participation as a delegate in the formal proceedings and associated events of the General Assembly, which privileged me with deeper insights to the perceptions of delegates concerning possible futures for their nations and peoples. For each interactive data collection method I draw out some constructs and themes focusing on what I observed to be important to the delegates during these sessions and providing some of their comments to illustrate the points made.
The General Assembly provides, for most U.N.P.O. members, a rare opportunity to publicly communicate their struggles for life and freedom. This became evident in the reports presented by each delegation and in the pleas made to the U.N.P.O. Presidency and members, Italian government ministers, the Non-violent Radical Party, and even to me, to get their stories and messages out into the world concerning the atrocities that are being committed in their homelands. In addition to their exclusion from numerous international decision-making forums, the voices of U.N.P.O. nations and peoples are being silenced by executions, forced disappearances, torture, and embargoes of goods and communications. Their education systems are being closed, their literature confiscated, their languages banned, and their religious and spiritual practices forbidden to them (UNPO GA 2010). Listening to the presentations was an intensely emotional experience as I learned of the atrocities being perpetrated on millions of people whom I didn’t know existed. One particular report was a list of the people who had been killed, tortured or disappeared in the months leading up to the General Assembly. Suddenly this research, which had been an emotionally distanced intellectual challenge for me, became charged with meanings as I began to more fully appreciate how the knowledge produced could be used by U.N.P.O. in media interviews, in meetings at the U.N. or European Parliament, and to promote the very existence of these ‘invisible’ nations and peoples.

Once a particular resolution was passed at the General Assembly by simple majority these impassioned calls for support became more formally worded resolutions that led to action by the collective on behalf of the individual nation or people. The General Secretary or a member of the Presidency team will arrange meetings with organisations, such as the U.N. Human Rights Council or the European Parliament, which might be able to assist with, or at least raise awareness of, a particular issue. Formal statements condemning human rights violations; calls for the international community to pressure States to lift trade, travel and communications blockades; a peaceful demonstration in a public place with media in attendance are some of the action-oriented outcomes of the 2010 meeting.
Initially I formed the impression that some delegates were a little reluctant to open up to me as someone from a university and that lack of trust might be a barrier to the storytelling planned for the Anecdote Circles Futures Workshop. However, as I came to know delegates through the various meetings and side events, I received more invitations to meet informally over breakfast or dinner, to visit local art galleries, explore the sights of Rome and generally socialise as one of the U.N.P.O. delegates. The level of trust between delegates grew and as conversations became more relaxed and open, more information was voluntarily offered for the research. With the delegates’ oral permission, I took brief field notes of a few of these conversations. One particular side event, and an example of U.N.P.O.’s commitment to non-violent protest, was the Peace Rally. The Peace Rally was organised for U.N.P.O. delegates and guests by the Non-violent Radical Party and provided another opportunity for me to learn more about U.N.P.O. members. Delegations that chose to participate walked through the streets of Rome in colourful national costumes proudly carrying their national flags. The march ended in a rally in a prominent city piazza. Thanks to the promotional work of the Non-violent Radical Party and U.N.P.O. Secretariat, the event attracted Italian news media attention and several delegates were interviewed for that evening’s TV news programs.

5.3 Donning the Pince Nez.

Steps for Analysis and Interpretation: Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis.
As discussed in chapter four, drawing on Parker’s steps for the Foucauldian model of Critical Discourses Analysis (cited in Flick 2009:340) I transcribed all U.N.P.O. texts shortly after the General Assembly. I then scanned the texts for themes that suggested a particular worldview, civilisational, ideological or epistemic, and these were colour-coded for ease of reference and subsequent transfer to the analytical framework in Table 10 on pages 174 and 175. Clues as to structural preferences for global governance were also sought and highlighted in a similar fashion. I then reviewed the language in the texts, seeking groups of words or phrases that suggested hidden myths and metaphors. This level of analysis revealed a key meme, ‘cultural genocide’, that was introduced by one delegate and was rapidly taken up during the General Assembly’s formal and
informal proceedings as being descriptive of the day-to-day experiences of many unrepresented nations and peoples. The metaphor of the world as a village and ‘one world’ as the myth of a preferred future global governance system were presented by U.N.P.O. participants who believe that a unified approach to some of the world’s common affairs and challenges is desirable. Symbiosis also emerged as both metaphor and structural preference. The hidden metaphor revealed by my deeper analysis, which I will discuss later, is from the spirit of Ubuntu ‘I am because we are’. I then examined the U.N.P.O. materials for insights as to the nature of power and agency in their preferred future model and mapped these elements into patterns of relationships in an analytical framework (Table 10 on pages 174 and 175). Building on the C.L.A. matrix of alternative globalisations in chapter two, I conducted discourses analysis using the analytical framework incorporating the criteria of episteme, structure, agency, history and future with C.L.A. levels to arrive at hypothetical normative global governance models. The framework is then used to analyse U.N.P.O. materials, to construct a model of their preferred global governance future and to further develop the U.N.P.O. scenario. Upon completion of the hypothetical global governance futures models in the analytical framework I created short future-oriented stories for the original six discourses mapped in the literature review in chapter two. I then finalised the more detailed U.N.P.O. story to create an image of their preferred future.

Questioning the Use of C.L.A.

At this juncture I also questioned whether or not the use of C.L.A. was justified in the design for this study. I have drawn heavily on C.L.A. as a means of structuring and analysing the literature and participants’ materials. Here I asked the question ‘given the perspectives of U.N.P.O. delegations as expressed in their texts, who is using language commensurate with the four C.L.A. levels?’ The following table summarises my analysis of the participants’ language in interviews, conversations, presentations and the workshop to determine whether or not the various levels of C.L.A. as described in chapter four are reflected in the materials provided:

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11 My aim is to present these findings to the U.N.P.O. 2012 General Assembly.
Further analysis revealed that levels 1, 2 and 3 of C.L.A., the Litany, Systems and Social Analysis, Worldviews and Discourses, were all strongly represented in the majority of texts. Metaphors only surfaced in my subsequent analysis of the texts and, with the exception of the ‘One World’ myth that was discussed by several participants, myths and stories were only shared when I specifically requested the information. The results of this analysis could be influenced by linguistic diversity. However for this study, with its interest in the worldviews of U.N.P.O. members and their influences on images of the future, the use of C.L.A. as a thoughtful framework for Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis produced a clear understanding of the diversity of worldviews within the U.N.P.O. membership whilst also highlighting those issues.

Table 8: Analysis of U.N.P.O. Members’ Content by De-identified Delegation

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<tr>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Litany</th>
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members have in common. As U.N.P.O. aims to foster member solidarity my focus was on the common themes that could be used to construct a shared, preferred global governance future.

**Constructing the U.N.P.O. Preferred Global Governance Future.**

In arriving at the U.N.P.O. preferred global governance future I have taken U.N.P.O. values and principles into account, extracted explicit themes from delegates’ materials, and interpreted the use of language by analysing it for linguistic entailments suggesting metaphors and myths. U.N.P.O. members value democracy, self-determination, human rights, Gandhian nonviolence and non-violent civil resistance, political tolerance, environmental protection, and the right to determine their own future. These values are enshrined in the covenant and principles of U.N.P.O. and are lived values of the member nations (UNPO 2010:section 2/1). For example during the formal proceedings one nation reported:

“150 people were jailed last year for organising peaceful protest against the organised criminal acts of the military. 5 people hanged and 19 executed. 29 schoolteachers were arrested and transferred to unknown locations. [This year] 26 year old male hanged; 35 men executed; tribal chief executed”.

In spite of these extreme provocations the people remain committed to nonviolent protest and civil resistance.

In this section I will discuss the key themes that emerged from U.N.P.O. materials and provide examples from their texts to support my summary of the preferred U.N.P.O. global governance future in Table 9. In the Litany layer of C.L.A. the surface level of U.N.P.O. materials will be analysed for themes that might, for example, form part of their website promotional strategy. These are the public stories. Here U.N.P.O. delegates share their history of becoming unrepresented and the global issues they consider most important. I then offer suggestions as to suitable measures of progress towards their preferred global governance future based on these concerns and the U.N.P.O. principles and values. The Litany analysis will therefore discuss history, global issues and measures of progress as summarised in Table 9 later in this chapter. At the Systems and Social Causes level I will examine the nature of the current global
governance system and its underlying social causes from the U.N.P.O. perspectives and then segue to U.N.P.O.’s preferred structure and agency, discussing who would make the decisions in their preferred future, how the decisions would be made and the source and nature of power. At the worldviews layer of C.L.A., I will explore the U.N.P.O.’s ideology, epistemology and their views of an ideal globalisation, seeking to understand how delegates value knowledge and how their preferred globalisation might produce a new form of global governance. The associated discourses will be interrogated to produce the values that underpin the ideology. Finally, at the fourth layer of C.L.A., I consider what U.N.P.O. language and anecdotes reveal about the form they would like a planetary civilisation to assume in the future and search for veiled metaphors and myths that are shaping the delegates’ views of societal evolutionary direction. Collectively these levels of analysis address research objectives 1, 2 and 4:

1. To explore the views of U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly delegates as to the major issues facing the human family;
2. To discover how delegates view the prospect of social organisation at the planetary level;
3. To develop a preferred global governance future for U.N.P.O. to enable them to join the international conversation.

Following the analysis, a tabular summary of U.N.P.O.’s preferred future will be reproduced alongside the preferred futures of other non-State actors enabling U.N.P.O. to join the international conversation on global governance futures. Themes from the analysis will then be synthesised with those from the literature to develop visionary stories. Congruent with the philosophy of P.A.R., the analysis will be reported to the U.N.P.O. Secretariat enabling them to review the findings and presentation mode of them, comment if they choose to, and have their feedback incorporated before wider publication and dissemination of the materials. This will occur after the thesis examination process.

Responses have been analysed according to the 25 participating delegations. Given the relatively low number of participants in this study, and the need to ensure all U.N.P.O. delegates’ voices are heard, I consider all themes relevant to the construction of an
U.N.P.O. preferred global governance model to be useful for that purpose. In the analysis I use general terms to mean the following: a few (2 to 5 respondents); some (6-10); many (11-16); most (17-20); almost all (21-25). Where the symbols “” are used, the words that follow are those of a delegate or delegation, with minor edits solely to correct spelling, thus ensuring the authentic voices of U.N.P.O. are heard with their form of expression unaltered.


U.N.P.O. delegates identified security, the environment, social justice, inequalities, identity, exclusion and neo-liberal globalisation as the major issues facing the human family today. A key issue for some U.N.P.O. members is that of ‘cultural genocide’. The phrase was used in one delegation’s presentation and was rapidly adopted and frequently repeated by other delegates. Each issue is briefly discussed below:


Most of the delegations represented nations or peoples that have been overwhelmed through violent conflict and for many the violence continues to the present day. Words such as ‘aggressive, oppressive, colonial, brutal’ appear in some texts and ‘rights’ and ‘human rights’ in most. Some want the security of their real national borders rather than ‘false borders’, as one respondent described them, to live in peace in their homelands and enjoy and benefit from their natural resources.

The Environment: Indigenous Peoples Knowledge Vital to Environmental Stewardship.

Many U.N.P.O. members identify themselves as the indigenous peoples of their countries with unique knowledge and skills in caring for their local environments. Some specifically mentioned their strong connection to land and nature:

“Ecology in area before used to be respected; it was bountiful. Everyone had something to eat but now that people have interfered, exploitation, pollution has created major problems. Fishing has been forbidden”. [We are skilled in] “using natural resources efficiently. A nomadic people, we have understanding of the land”.
“Ecology is badly disturbed by toxic material used for exploration of mines and water resources”.

“The good [past] experience of our people has been the period when our environment did not suffer any destruction. A period when food production and fishing were bumper”.

Here U.N.P.O. members were more explicit concerning the possibility of a future planetary civilisation. They look forward to equality, solidarity, access to human rights, and a life in dignity for all. As one small group said:

“We believe in equal rights for all people – women’s rights, right to communication, ecology rights, human rights”.

Another group wrote:

[planetary civilisation] “is a change only for the people that have opportunities” and “clashes of civilisation…. people learn after catastrophes”.

Inequality: U.N.P.O. Members Identify Inequality as a Global Issue.
One delegation was opposed to a Planetary Civilisation. In their view if it does emerge new levels of ‘haves and have nots’ will be created. A delegate remarked:

“Geneva is wealthy from money looted from 3rd world. Fight poverty not the poor”.

Some are experiencing the technological aspects of globalisation as a challenge. On the one hand it is seen by one group of delegates in the workshop as a good opportunity to raise issues and an enabler for those who have it:

“One click on Google provides mass information”.

The same group also see internet technology as a negative and a means for ‘the oppressor’ to assimilate minorities. As one participant said:

“We become dehumanised sometimes as a result of globalisation”.

Another delegation emphasised the inequalities in access to basic human rights. A third group stressed the need for women to be included and valued in decision-making forums. The inequalities resulting from unequal distribution of natural resources occupied a fourth group in discussion. These discussions reveal a general U.N.P.O.
preference for a more egalitarian society, which I have incorporated as a major theme in the future global governance model.

With self-determination as an U.N.P.O. principle and value, the subject of national, as distinct from State, identity features prominently in the U.N.P.O. texts. Most U.N.P.O. members’ national identities are not recognised by most States, hence their limited ability to participate in global conversations at the U.N. and other international forums and the claim to unrepresented status. The issue of identity, for U.N.P.O. delegates, goes much deeper than doors closed to global decision-making forums. When some U.N.P.O. respondents discussed their unrepresented status, despite the varying circumstances that led to this situation, the responses were common to all who addressed this question:

“The people ceased to exist at that time; we ceased being”.
“We’re not allowed to use our name”.
“We are ignored our identity”.
“[Our] people living in exile for 145 years”.
“Not able to see the future with hope.
“It is humiliating. Feel cheated and neglected by the U.N.”.

I noted here that U.N.P.O. delegates were not asking for independence from their State, rather the focus is on achieving recognition of their existence and a level of autonomy that would enable them to determine their futures in a way that facilitates peaceful coexistence with neighbouring nations and States. U.N.P.O. promotes non-violent protest, however as one delegate said in relation to a conversation concerning different religions:

“Islam is strongest religion – OK to fight back for family, land. Islam is the only way forward”.

Neo-liberal Globalisation: U.N.P.O. Reports Corporate Irresponsibility.
Whilst the terms ‘neoliberal globalisation’ and ‘corporate responsibility’ were not used specifically by any respondents, concerns were expressed at the potential for a future globalisation to be a continuation of the recent past, which many delegations have
experienced as victims of corporations and governments. A few provided examples of corporate social and environmental irresponsibility, including natural resources exploitation and “theft”, ecological “disaster” and pollution caused by “corporate greed”:

“Government are killing a generation of [national name] leadership because they are questioning the destruction of the environment and the taking of natural resources. [X] corporation funded an army to get rid of the people”.

“Our economic resources are exploited and don’t benefit us”.

“Concerns with corporations control”.

“We are calling upon these companies to respect our environments”.

“[Corporations X and Y] tight control internet and systematic defence”. (This comment was part of a discussion on the role of corporations in communications blockades).

History of Becoming Unrepresented: Wars and Decolonisation.

Some respondents gave comprehensive accounts of their nation’s history and were proud of their past achievements. However within these accounts were the stories of how their nation or people became unrepresented and two common themes of wars and the U.N. decolonisation process emerged. I use the term ‘war’ broadly here to represent all armed conflicts:

“This was independent country until …military offensive launched”.

“Military occupation; our lands were annexed”.

“A new colonisation; given by colonial powers to others without our consent”.

“[Aggressors] use helicopters to spray poisonous chemicals on people and starvation tactics are used to force surrender”.

A few delegates discussed the effects of the U.N.-led Decolonisation Commission, which they view as incomplete and the cause of many of the conflicts in their region:

“The U.N., the chief orchestrator of our lost political identity and status”.

“The U.N. violated its own resolution and charter”.

“Botched decolonisation process”.

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On many occasions during the interviews and workshop the topic of how life has changed over time arose. One delegate humourously responded to my request for anecdotes from history by saying:

“a man used to give 100 camels for a good beautiful wife – now it’s only 15 or 20. That’s inflation for you”.

The Need for Broader Measures of Progress.
U.N.P.O. concerns for wealth and wellbeing, environmental and social issues, and continuing nonviolent struggles for self-determination and democratization suggest that Genuine Progress Indicators (Talberth et al. 2007), indices of democracy, freedom and planetary wellbeing would provide useful measures for determining whether or not their preferred global governance future is on track.

Cultural Genocide.
Many U.N.P.O. nations and peoples live under constant threat of physical violence in the form of torture, execution, and forced disappearance. The term ‘cultural genocide’ was used in one delegation’s presentation. It describes the deliberate attempts by the aggressors to erase all traces of a culture. Examples provided included the execution of teachers who taught traditional language and cultural practices, burning down schools, banning and destroying books and cultural artefacts, and prohibiting spiritual and religious practices. A combination of physical and cultural violence over time is expected to eliminate a culture thereby eliminating challenges to the dominant nation’s rule of the State and its own cultural norms.

Layer 2: A Kaleidoscope of Systems and Social Causes.
Interconnected Systems and Dominator Societies.
The Litany issues of concern to U.N.P.O. have been produced by interconnected systems that span social, ecological, political, economic and technological domains.
Consistent with indigenous and neohuman epistemologies, U.N.P.O. understands this interconnectedness at the centre of which, in their view, is the human relationship with the natural environment:
“[Future story] live in harmony with each other and nature around to know life as a form of education”.

“As we don’t own the land it is a disaster social”.

“Ecology must be dealt with globally; and economic – a new system, a global one, different from capitalism”.

“Technological advancement has taken but social political ecological economic national and international governance have not really improved as much as the pace of technology”.

The system that has excluded them from involvement in U.N. decision-making processes has been created by Dominator societies whereby ‘to the victor go the spoils’.

The current States have either acquired their constituent nations by winning armed conflicts or by default during a decolonisation process.


Almost all U.N.P.O. members are nations and peoples that are dominated in States where violence has been used to overthrow the old order for the new order to take control. In a few cases, a nation has been given to another nation as part of the decolonisation process, which, as U.N.P.O. argues, is contrary to the stated right of self-determination in the U.N. charter and to the agreed decolonisation process itself. A few delegates feel strongly that the U.N. is at the root of their problems citing the ‘botched’ decolonisation process in Africa and a perceived inability or lack of will to go into places where atrocities are being carried out, to enforce agreed treaties and to deal with abusers of human rights:

“We feel cheated and neglected by the U.N.”.

“Resolution v1514 in 1960 UN General Assembly makes decolonisation unconditional so people should enjoy complete freedom”.

“U.N. violated own resolution and charter … we have no voice to state our case”.

“U.N. is almost a joke…human rights council has some very undemocratic countries”.

Corporations and economic powers dominate other U.N.P.O. members:
“Corporations very powerful in the world”.
“[New] economic system should be global but not capitalist”.

Yet despite their disappointing history with the U.N., most U.N.P.O. members support a reformed U.N. model of global governance. The U.N.P.O. preferred future U.N. would admit non-state actors. It would be democratic in line with U.N.P.O. principles, egalitarian in the gender and cultural senses and ensure power sharing. One participant proposed that structural reform accommodate a U.N. Parliamentary Assembly to ensure the direct representation of the people. Ongoing environmental problems experienced by U.N.P.O. members at the hands of corporations, or those representing corporate interests, suggests U.N.P.O. would not welcome a reformed U.N. system that gave corporations more power than they already hold, for example in a Corporations Assembly. In one delegate’s view the future global governance organisation would:

“start with regional groupings having the lowest level of voting for any issue”.

Another envisaged the ideal global governance system as:

“a symbiosis of nations” “we need to work together”
in this instance referring to all nations as distinct from the States with voting rights in the current U.N. system.

**Decision-making**

Decision-making would be decentralised to the local level enabling local leaders to contribute to and enact global decisions in a manner sensitive to the natural environment. Here I envisage the structure as heterarchical. An example of this is Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980) Rhizome in which:

any point is connected to any other point … is reducible neither to the One or the multiple….has no beginning or end but a middle from which it grows….the Rhizome pertains to a map that is always….detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight (Deleuze and Guattari 1980:21).

Regarding agency in the new system, however, the strongest meme that emerged in some presentations was ‘cultural genocide’ describing the experiences of having
cultural artefacts, educational systems, language, books and the like destroyed by the oppressors to ensure a nation’s cultural norms are not handed down to the next generation. The term also suggested a sense of powerlessness that seemed at odds with delegates’ determination to continue their struggles for life, freedom and access to their human rights. By the second day many delegates had adopted the term ‘cultural genocide’ and were using it in presentations, interview responses, the workshop and casual conversations. Some agree that their nation’s power is in moral authority. A few made comments that included the need to continue an honour system:

“never kill the delegation coming for talks”
the power of truth in an argument:
“logic didn’t win, truth won”
and the importance of human rights:
“we have different outlooks but the same interests in right to life, global peace and justice”.

The use of the phrase ‘cultural genocide’ in the texts reveals how the worldviews discussed below have found linguistic expression in relation to systems of power and agency. The frequent repetition of this phrase also ensures its place in the U.N.P.O. litany.

Layer 3: The Prism of Worldviews and Discourses.
At the outset of this study I had expected the data to reflect a wide variety of culturally informed worldviews concerning the thesis topic. However, with the exception of a few traditional stories shared by some delegates concerning past social rules and governance, this was not the case. The language used by delegates revealed a strong foundation of indigenous and ecological epistemologies and the worldview of the excluded and the ‘non-existent’, described by de Sousa Santos (2003, 2006) as a constructed product of neoliberal globalisation. I therefore changed the intended focus of the analysis of U.N.P.O. worldviews from one of extant cultural or civilisational perspectives to an analysis of their ideology and values as expressed in the language used by the members individually and the organisation as a collective. This produced what I have termed ‘a worldview of Ubuntuism’, an epistemology that recognises many ways of knowing, and a preferred globalisation and planetary civilisation as unity of the
world’s people and a means to reduce conflicts. Discursive themes that emerged strongly in the analysis of U.N.P.O. texts were self-determination, solidarity, non-violence, equality, indigenous knowledge, and love of nature. Progress is peace, unity of the human family and worldwide recognition of nations as distinct from States.

A Worldview of Ubantuism.
The solidarity fostered by U.N.P.O. is expressed as a worldview of Ubantuism from the African spirit of Ubuntu. Whereas Europeans are familiar with ‘I think therefore I am’, a highly individualistic statement, in Africa the spirit of Ubuntu says ‘I am because we are’, reflecting a collectivist nature. Some delegates expressed concern that the traditions of community responsibility in their homelands were being eroded by individualism whilst others saw individualism as empowering:

“Today responsibility more for family not so much for community”.
“Individuals used to work for the best of society, community”.
“Some changes of code of honour beneficial, especially for women”.
“What can improve solidarity between (U.N.P.O.) members?”
“Seeking U.N.P.O. open solidarity for indigenous peoples of the world”.

This worldview produces a preferred globalisation and planetary civilisation that fosters unity of the world’s peoples and a means to reduce conflicts.

U.N.P.O. Promotes An Epistemology of Many Ways of Knowing.
Whilst most U.N.P.O. members identify themselves as the indigenous peoples of their homelands indigenous epistemology, isolated elements of the texts suggest U.N.P.O. members value many ways of knowing. As one delegate said:

“Not monopoly of wisdom”.

Whilst another said:

“Dances and poetry were used to promote cultural norms/behaviours”.

One of the U.N.P.O. principles is that of tolerance and is defined by U.N.P.O. as follows:

“Political tolerance is the willingness to extend basic rights and civil liberties to persons and groups whose viewpoints differ from one's own”.

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U.N.P.O. Discourses.

Self-determination: In exercising their right of self-determination as codified in Article 1 of the U.N. Charter, U.N.P.O. members interpret self-determination broadly ‘as a process providing a wide range of possible outcomes dependent on the situations, needs, interests and conditions of concerned parties’ (UNPO 2010: section 2/2). Article 1 reads:

All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

What I found particularly interesting was that none of the nations appear to be seeking independence. A few talked about autonomy simply being the freedom to live as they choose in harmony with others and with nature. Some do not want to be forced into religious practices that restrict their freedoms. Others are going down the path of Islam because it is the only religion that allows you to fight back. Here I cite excerpts from U.N.P.O. texts concerning the meaning and importance particular nations and peoples attach to self-determination:

“Recognition that we are people”.
“Recognition that we are people”.
“We want to live in communion with nature”.
“Many (U.N.P.O. members) have been subject to political, cultural, linguistic social and physical genocide”.
“Our future is connected to self-determination giving us the rights of our homelands”.
“Complete independent state and accepted”.

Solidarity: In their presentations to the Assembly 11 delegations called on U.N.P.O., meaning the membership as one entity, to support them in 12 petitions for their human, cultural, and self-determination rights to be upheld. Provided each petitioner was prepared to answer questions for clarification purposes, the petitions were supported, in some instances conditional upon more formal documentation being provided to support the member resolution. Members not petitioning offered to assist in the preparation of the documents. A few offered to collaborate on a specific issue where they faced the
same aggressor. The final copies of these resolutions are presented in one brief to media channels, the EU, the U.N. and other international organisations that U.N.P.O. might seek to engage with on occasion such as the International Courts.

**Non-violence:** U.N.P.O. members commit to non-violent protest when they join the organisation. This commitment is challenging for a few nations that are under extreme provocation from their oppressors to fight back:

“We are fighters; [occupiers] try to make wolves become sheep”.

“Can’t fight we’re too small; soft way whilst being true to protect self.”

“Dialogue to avoid wars- instruments of democracy, open negotiation.”

**Equality:** U.N.P.O. delegates value a more egalitarian society and emphasise the importance of women in decision-making roles. They also promote greater civil society activism:

“[Historically] warriors to manage and protect; elders for wisdom; religion for knowledge”.

“Women on committees, women fighters, women are effective in society”.

“Active civil society and organisations, environmental, indigenous people, more activist”.

**Indigenous knowledge and love of nature:** Consistent with most delegations identifying with their indigenous origins, U.N.P.O. values the wisdoms in indigenous knowledge, promoting sustainability and humans in harmony with all life:

“Sustainable society for the future, respect nature, animals, totems”.

“Need harmony with each other and earth”.

**What does progress look like to U.N.P.O.?** Progress towards a desirable planetary civilisation would see world peace, unity of the human family, and recognition of the existence and rights of unrepresented nations and peoples:

“Planetary civilisation would be seen as threat to identity and culture as we have fought for so long to be recognised”.

__________________________________________
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“All countries will move in that direction [union], historical boundaries are impeding progress”.

In relation to societal change, as one delegate said earlier:

“All countries will move in that direction [union], historical boundaries are impeding progress”.

In this thesis I use metaphor, myth and story to explore possibilities of global societal futures and to convey, through story, how the societal transition from the present to the U.N.P.O. preferred future might be implemented.

Metaphor for the U.N.P.O. preferred planetary civilisation: the world is a village.
The word ‘community’ was used by most participants in the texts in relation to a sense of responsibility for the collective at local, national and global levels, and is evocative of the African proverb ‘it takes a village to raise a child’ (Bowles and Gintis 2002). One participant wrote:

“In the past society was in little groups. No communication. Only after a while did we see that the world is much larger. The world is a global village. The view is much smaller”.

Another envisages:

“The end of empires leading to the emergence of new independent countries in other forms”.

There were also a few suggestions of divisions that might need to be overcome for a planetary civilisation to emerge peacefully, and the need for tolerance:

“Make big gap – big cultural differences and religion, strong one”.

“Islam – OK to fight back for family, land, power and energy; only way forward. Islam doesn’t allow murder”.

“Shamanism – spirit, nature, can heal. Shamanism and religions don’t conflict”.

“Create tolerance – we’ve suffered and don’t want others to”.

“Respect other faiths”.

Transforming Global Governance: Contesting Images of the Future from People on the Edge of the Periphery
**Global governance myth: ‘One World’**.

The myth of ‘One World’ emerged spontaneously during interviews, reflected in the worldview of Ubuntuism:

- “World coming to become one; identity not so important”.
- “Global approach in the interest of humanity”.
- “Global community; address issues at grassroots level”.
- “Every available hand – commitment to tackling problems”.
- “We need room; space to create new things and global organising”.
- “One world – religion, race, colour would not count”.
- (Planetary civilisation) “might create values to transform for universal values”.
- “The U.N. charter says ‘we the people’ not we the nations (States)”.
- “One world, one country, one government”.

Here I discovered the paradox of Galtung’s 2000 nations and One World; on the one hand U.N.P.O. is calling for recognition of nations, as distinct from States, and on the other hand a unification of nations under One World.

**Stories and Images of the future?**

A few participants responded to an open request for stories and images of the future:

- “Feeling like we’ve been here before a long time ago – not *déjà vu* or recent recall”.
- “Our people have the chance to choose their destiny, to live peacefully”.
- “Champion ongoing study to enhance futuristic thinking; what are we going to do to help ourselves get a future?”
- “We see the living, the dead and future generations are a complete family unit”.

One delegation provided a leaflet on their program ‘thinking about the future without forgetting the past’. This relationship to time is consistent with Hall’s Sync Time discussed in chapter two as the understanding of time most congruent with indigenous peoples’ way of knowing. Table 9 overleaf summarises the key themes that emerged from the U.N.P.O. materials:
Table 9: C.L.A. Summary of the U.N.P.O. Preferred Global Governance Future.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Systems and Social Causes</td>
<td>Interconnected systems and dominator societies. Reformed U.N. Democratic; egalitarian; power sharing. Decentralised authority to the local level. Symbiosis of nations. Heterarchy structure. Power is in moral authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldviews</td>
<td>Ubuntuism. Epistemology of many ways of knowing. Globalisation as unity of the world’s people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourses</td>
<td>Self-determination; solidarity; non-violence; equality; indigenous knowledges; love of nature. Progress is peace, unity of the human family and recognition of the 2000 nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphor and Myth</td>
<td>The world is a village. Symbiosis. ‘One World’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4. Stitching the Quilt: Global Governance Futures.

The previous sections in this chapter reported and analysed the empirical materials generated at the 2010 U.N.P.O. General Assembly. The aim of this section is to interpret these findings in the futures context by developing short stories as images of the preferred futures of each of the competing ideologies and then to more fully develop the U.N.P.O. story. Here I am mindful of the need for the U.N.P.O. story to be plausible to be useful to them; visionary, such that it evokes clear images of their preferred future; communicable to their constituencies and stakeholders in many nations, resolving cultural and linguistic challenges; and congruent with their values and principles, supporting their solidarity. To achieve this end I will move from a scholarly style of writing to storytelling mode. The following matrix blends the criteria used in the matrices of alternative globalisations and global governances in chapters two and three. This framework is then used to summarise possible global governance futures and to develop the stories, thereby achieving research objective three ‘to understand the positions of other non-State actors that are engaging in the international conversation on global governance futures.’ Included in the matrix is the preferred future of the U.N.P.O. as summarised previously in Table 9:
### Table 10: Matrix of Preferred Global Governance Futures

|---------------|---------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
### Epistemologies of Ideologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourses</th>
<th>Metaphors and Myths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology of the many ways of knowing. Globalisation as social equaliser. Spiral time.</td>
<td>Indigenous and ecological epistemologies. Globalisation as interconnectedness of all life forms. Time is cyclical and seasonal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation as economic agent. Linear time.</td>
<td>Epistemology of recognition and mutual evaluation. Globalisation as public participation in world citizenship. Time is highly organised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation as social equaliser. Spiral time.</td>
<td>Epistemology of many ways of knowing. Globalisation as unity of the world’s people. Sync time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Discourses
- **Consumption**, nature as commodity. Progress is industrialism, materialism, competition, growth. We have the tools to fix the problems.
- **Autonomy**; broad development; human rights; self-determination. North vs global South. Progress is freedom and an end to poverty.
- **Exploitation**; sexual discrimination; lack of voice and representation; low value; gender equity; global sisterhood; global identity; alliances and resistance. Progress through partnerships.
- **Systems theories**; self-organisation; noosphere; collaboration; communities of interest. Progress is more people with access to the internet.
- **Deep ecology**; complex systems; global commons; sustainable communities; indigenous knowledges; spirituality. Gaia tech. Progress without ‘growth’.
- **Participation**; global civil society; equal access to legal rights and responsibilities; GG for global problems. Progress as world order based on law, democracy.
- **Self-determination**; solidarity; non-violence; equality; indigenous knowledges; love of nature. Progress is peace, unity of the human family and recognition of the 2000 nations.

### Metaphors and Myths
- The world is a machine. ‘Survival of the fittest’.
- The world is a battleground. ‘Unity in adversity’.
- The world is a chasm. ‘Planetary Partnerships’.
- The world is a web. ‘The Matrix’.
- The world is a garden. ‘Gaia of civilisations’.
- The world is a dialogue. ‘The Great Transition’.
- The world is a village. Symbiosis. ‘One World’.
Images of Global Governance Futures.

Visionary Global Governance Story for Assertive Multilateralism.
In this future, global governance is a modified version of the current U.N. system. Still concerned with issues of political security and economic development, an elite group of States rely on coercive and economic power to dominate decision-making forums and policy formulation. The widely debated U.N. reforms of the early twenty-first century did not eventuate. The States-based membership was extended to allow for some deliberative processes with non-state actors such as international NGO’s, corporations, and occasionally indigenous peoples but the promise of decisions by Planizens is still a chimera. The weight of the past continues to influence the present and the future in an organised, linear progression. A hierarchical structure is maintained; States dominate the hierarchy and the elite States dominate the less politically and economically powerful. The metaphor ‘the World is a Machine’ has evolved to ‘the World is a Green Machine’ but the underpinning myth remains: ‘Survival of the Fittest’.

Visionary Global Governance Story for Grassroots Globalism.
In this socially oriented system the Grassroots Globalists have succeeded in their battle against Neoliberalism. Global governance operates in a non-linear structure that facilitates decision-making at local levels enabling relatively small communities to have direct participation in social, economic and political life (Ramos 2010) energised by social movements. Moral power is used to ensure the system is inclusive, recognising many ways of knowing, including multiple constructs of time. In this future, globalisation is viewed as a social equaliser. All nations and peoples are recognised and their rights to self-determination, local autonomy and their own form of development are upheld. Progress towards a world where all are free and none live in poverty is monitored by the Freedom Index, Planetary Wellbeing and Human Happiness indices. The metaphor of the world as a battleground has transitioned to Solidarity World. The myth of ‘Unity in Adversity’ has become ‘Unity in Diversity’.
**Visionary Global Governance Story for Planetary Partnerships.**

In this future there is no such term as ‘global governance’; it has been replaced by Planetary Partnerships, acknowledging the dominator language inherent in ‘governance’ terminology. Power in moral authority is global, multidimensional and interactive. All decision-making forums have equal gender representation. The Planetary Partnerships system consists of entities that operate in linking, consensual organisational models. All of the former institutions of the hierarchical U.N. system have been restructured in this way, including the transnational feminist networks (TFNs). Globalisation has transitioned from the twentieth-century neoliberal form to a form of cultural evolution through egalitarian societies. Significant advances are being made in societal, cultural and technological domains as new language and inspiring symbols of male/female unity are spreading through international feminist networks and promoting a new renaissance for the human family. Cyclical women’s time has softened the linearity of Western scientific time, creating a loose spiral of societal progress. The global economy is a Care Economy that recognises the value of all forms of work. Economic redistribution is underway to redress the problems associated with unrecognised female labour. The ‘world is a chasm’ metaphor has been replaced by the ‘Yin/Yang’ symbol depicting the small amount of male within the female and the small amount of female within the male. The myth of Planetary Partnerships is becoming reality.

**Visionary Global Governance Story for Global Digital Democracies.**

In this future, global governance is Global Digital Democracies, an online system founded on the ‘Universal Right to Communicate’ (Cogburn 2005:78). Building on the philosophy of the sixteenth century European men who were known as ‘the republic of letters’ that used the new printing technologies to share scholarly papers (Davis 2010), the online Global Digital Democracies use social media, peer-to-peer production and internet technologies to enable the Planizens of global civil society to debate and democratically vote on global issues. It is a networked structure using the icosahedrons three-dimensional structure devised by Beer to ensure optimal communicability of world issues, presentation and decision-making forums and voting opportunities, effectively crowdsourcing governance. Time is 24/7 online. Planizens receive information and education about planetary issues, and civil society interest campaign
groups are mobilised within hours or days. Power relies on access to information and communications technologies. Political responses are yet to catch up with the speed at which civil society can lobby for particular policy interventions (Warkentin and Mingst 2000). It appears to be a horizontal web-like structure. However, due to lack of access to technology infrastructure, maintenance skills and training in the earlier years, and despite some notable successes, developing countries and civil society groups overall are less successful than transnational corporations and States in influencing the contents of the online voting agendas. These powerful actors often marshal epistemic communities, using the power of their intellectual arguments to persuade the public that the actors’ agenda items are in the best interests of the world. Some say the developing nations and civil society are ‘pawns rather than partners’ (Cogburn 2005) in this system which privileges the elite nations that use technology to dominate and oppress. The myth of ‘The Matrix’ remains firm: the world seen online is not the real world and only by unplugging do we maintain our humanity.

Visionary Global Governance Story for Bioregionalism.

In the Bioregional preferred future story environmental global governance takes priority over other forms. The structure is an organic, party-less democracy. Local communities make decisions through elected local government and cooperative representatives. Power is in community; it is distributed and multilevel. In this future, globalisation is the interconnectedness of all life forms. Time is cyclical and seasonal. Gradually over the twenty-first century this new worldview permeated public conversations about ecology, spirituality, sustainable and resilient communities. Building on the knowledge of indigenous peoples and learning from nature itself, a Planetary Civilisation emerged that saw progress through the eyes of learning, cultural advancement, restoration of damaged environments, and technology used in service of the Planet’s life systems. Spiritual growth is seen as more important than other forms of growth. Economies operate within the Bioregions themselves ensuring that no human activities exceed the limits of the natural environment to replenish itself. The myth of a Gaia of Civilisations underpins the metaphor of ‘the world is a garden’ and is seen as a considerable shift in thought and language from the historical machine metaphor of the twentieth century.
Visionary Global Governance Story for Cosmopolitan Democracy.

In the Cosmopolitan Democracy model, global governance of the future is dominated by the legal system ensuring Planizens have equal access to their human rights and understand their responsibility to participate in world citizenship. Cosmopolitan Democrats have successfully established a democratic world order. Time is understood as a precise, highly organised construct. Two key institutional structures are at the core of a heterarchical structure: the peoples’ assembly and the International Criminal Court. Here power lies in the law and the moral authority of global civil society. The former enforces the rights of the people, democracy, regulations and justice, whilst the latter determines the preferred Planetary Futures. Both monitor and evaluate the other. The ‘world is a dialogue’ in legal terms and the myth of ‘the Great Transition’ underpins a desire to ensure global societal evolution occurs in a manner that is socially just.

Visionary Global Governance Story for the U.N.P.O.

In this future, global governance is a reformed U.N. called ‘One World’. The old U.N. model has been democratised with global civil society admitted to planetary decision making forums through a civil society assembly. Security Council membership has been extended, the power of veto abolished, and Right to Protect measures have been introduced ensuring that genocide is a distant memory and that the human and cultural rights of all people are protected. The decolonisation commission has been reinstated and is negotiating peaceful terms of settlement between nations in conflict over twentieth century settlements. ‘One World’s’ democratic and egalitarian decision making processes ensure gender balance in major forums and encourage decentralisation of authority to local levels. This enables the leaders of almost 2000 nations that have accessed their right to self-determination to engage in democratic processes that use communications technologies to facilitate local, regional and planetary participation. Planetary civilisation is taking shape as more people assume the additional layer of identity of planetary citizen and the world becomes a global village.

I now move to storytelling mode to describe the transition from the U.N. to the U.N.P.O. preferred ‘One World’. My adoption of storytelling acknowledges the rediscovery of this tradition as a means of societal transformation as discussed in
chapter four. The story that follows aims to provide clear images of the transition to 2062 that are readily communicable to diverse stakeholders and are consistent with the U.N.P.O. values and principles. In Ricoeur’s words quoted earlier ‘a model for the redescription of the world’ (in Bruner 1986:7).

5.5 The U.N.P.O. Global Governance Story for 2062: ‘One World.’

In this future world the rise of Brazil, Russia, India and China with a more collectivist cultural orientation shifted societal values generating pressure from global civil society on States and the United Nations to create a more caring and inclusive international community. In 2013 the U.N. General Assembly achieved a majority vote to work towards the development of ‘One World’, the planetary organisation that replaced the U.N. in 2062 and now co-ordinates worldwide programs aimed at managing the human family’s common affairs. The U.N. reforms introduced between 2015 and 2060 included the extension of U.N. Security Council membership, the adoption of the Right to Protect policy and practices, inclusion of global civil society into decision-making forums, the formation of a U.N. Parliamentary Assembly, and eventually a U.N. Business Assembly. This enabled the ‘people of the world’ as envisioned by the Commission on Global Governance in 1995, to exercise their power as planetary citizens. This in turn led to a shift in globalisation from its neoliberal form, which dominated much of the twentieth century, to a planetist orientation as more people became aware of the significance of some of the global challenges facing them. Planetary Progress Indicators (PPIs; a fictitious measure I have created for this story), developed from earlier work on Genuine Progress Indicators and indices measuring democracy and freedom, were developed over time and eventually led to universal progress indicator research.

The transition to the U.N.P.O. preferred future is written in narrative form from the perspective of a university history lecturer in 2065. The lecture on the history of One World is being delivered into students’ homes through their portals, a future communications medium in every home that enables two-way communications, Internet access, and provides bio-security, all in ambient technology form. Students have the
choice of receiving their instruction in holographic or flat screen format. In futures research terms, this narrative is a history of the future created from the elements of the U.N.P.O. preferred global governance future model. Our story starts in 1945 with the founding of the U.N.

“Welcome learners and knowledge sharers. Today’s lecture is on the history of One World from 1945 to the present day. Please make sure the date, May 14, 2065, is clearly entered into your logs alongside your name, portal ID number, home country and the lecture title ‘The History of One World from the Second World War to the First Planetary Alliance’. Without this information your testimony to this lecture cannot be assessed for learning progress.

When the United Nations was founded more than a century ago in 1945 the world was a very different place to the one we live in today. In those days, decisions were made by men and whilst the Second World War led to more women working in factories and on farms to support the war effort, this was seen as a temporary measure and it was expected that women would step aside when the men returned from battle. It was almost three decades later when women were widely accepted in working roles and another 50 years before equal pay and conditions laws were enforced. It was to be many decades later that women were given equal access to decision-making forums. There was no WorldNet in 1945, no comms portals, no palm comms or ambient technologies of the type we take for granted today. People did almost everything manually, face to face or with mechanical devices. The environment was not considered in international decision-making, nor were the wishes of the people. Men believed they had the right and responsibility to make choices for all. Earth was divided by artificial borders into geographic regions known as ‘States’. The heads of these States came together at the United Nations General Assembly and made the important decisions of the day which concerned rebuilding the States affected by World War II and creating a peaceful and prosperous world. Noble

12 At this stage I have been unable to obtain feedback on the preferred future or story from U.N.P.O. My assumption is that a combination of communication blockades, lack of access to communications technologies, limitations in written English, and new staff at the Secretariat who are unfamiliar with the research is affecting U.N.P.O. ability to respond. I have, however, been encouraged by one contact at the Secretariat to present my findings to the 2012 General Assembly.
aims and like the League of Nations before it, as we discussed in lecture four, this system achieved some positive results in the areas of humanitarian aid, peacekeeping and international conflict resolution. It was, however, created in the style of the 1940s: a rigid hierarchical structure that was unable to adapt to a changing world.

By the 1970s a group of scholars had formed, intent on researching alternatives to the United Nations global governance system. The World Order Models Project released a number of publications, available through your portals, and for several years developed proposals for a new world order. However the work was not widely accepted and subsequently failed.

In the 1980s a further development shaped world politics and economics. An alliance between the U.S. and the U.K. produced significant changes in political and economic ideology and practice. These two nations adopted and promoted Neoliberalism internationally. Some nations followed suit and the world’s affairs seemed, to many, to be focused on the political and economic interests of the already powerful nations.

At the turn of the twentieth century there was widespread panic at the perceived threat of a worldwide electronic systems collapse. Terrorist attacks in several countries threatened the national security of the powerful nations and those seen to be supporting them. Climate change impacts became observable. World population had grown from 2 billion in the early twentieth century to over seven billion and was continuing to rise. Concerns about energy, water and food shortages were growing along with the population growth. In some countries genocide took place and entire cultural groups were wiped out; United Nations intervention and humanitarian aid came too late to save millions of lives. The States in their General Assembly structure couldn’t agree on what to do about these planetary issues. Despite many efforts at United Nations reform from within by successive Secretary Generals, Kofi Annan and Ban Ki Moon, over two decades the organisation had resisted change and failed to remain relevant.
in a rapidly changing world. It was increasingly seen as ineffective in the face of worsening global issues.

Global Civil Society, the peoples’ movement that was to become our Civil Society Assembly at One World, became increasingly active in this period, forming many associations and movements and involving itself in international affairs. For many decades the heads of States refused to admit non-state actors into global decision-making forums, threatened by the power for change of the millions of people these groups represented. An elite group of the Heads of States, responsible for security matters, resisted all attempts to expand their membership and share power with other States. Civil Society protests, physical, on the Internet – an earlier version of WorldNet - and in virtual reality, increased pressure on the Heads of States to enact the United Nations reforms promulgated by Kofi Annan and Ban Ki Moon. Finally, in January 2017, at the completion of Moon’s second term as Secretary General, the Security Council recommended the General Assembly appoint Jan Egeland of Norway to the post. He reappointed Under Secretary-General Alicia Barcena Ibarra and tasked her with the responsibility of administration and management reform. These two appointments heralded a period of transformation from the States-based U.N. to the planetary-oriented ‘One World’ we know today. Their first achievement was securing the formal adoption of long-range planning, signalling the start of our present-day adaptation of the historical seven generations test.

U.N. reforms proceeded with astonishing speed. This wasn’t solely due to the U.N. wish for reform from within; on the contrary, the U.N. had been unable to adapt to change throughout its history. But a number of converging influences, including pressures from citizens in the politically and economically powerful States for their State to take leadership role in tackling the major global challenges, gave the new Secretary General the votes he needed to work towards an Assembly for Civil Society. For these citizens, the U.N. should have been instrumental in tackling the global problems yet internal politics and processes, plus the reluctance of a small number of States to share power, was holding the U.N. back. Reports on reform agendas, including extending membership of the Security Council, the Right to Protect versus Non-intervention Policies, and
inclusion of civil society in decision-making forums, were unable to gain majority support in the General Assembly.

The first major reform in 2020 became known as ‘the democratisation of the Security Council’, which was achieved by appointing members for a five-year term and rotating membership of the 11-States council. The first significant act of the new Security Council was to open voting on security matters to the General Assembly, which subsequently abolished the power of veto. The second reform saw the Right to Protect policy and protocols introduced in 2022 and Egeland was re-elected for a second term as Secretary General. The new Security Council was empowered to intervene swiftly in humanitarian crises where human lives were at risk and they dealt effectively with the attempted genocide in Africa in 2023, saving many thousands of lives.

The 20s saw greater levels of civil society activism as, despite welcome signs of U.N. reform, concerned citizens believed their governments were not doing enough to deal with climate change, wars, inequalities, the pervasive Neo-liberal globalisation, and the escalating threat of inter-nation conflicts arising from the incomplete decolonisation process in Africa. The third U.N. reform, to include civil society in global decision-making, was achieved in 2030 half-way into the first term of Secretary General Marleya Kerrata, the first woman to be appointed to the post. Kerrata opened the first meeting of the Civil Society Assembly; a breakthrough move by the U.N. that showed it was genuinely engaged in reform and that Heads of States were willing to cede some power to the people. Non-government organisations, democratically elected representatives of 1800 previously unrepresented nations, and concerned individuals had forums in which they could debate global issues and influence decisions. The increased workload at the U.N. prompted Egeland and Ibarra to call for a male and a female representative from each nation in forums on global issues. The U.N.P.O. provided some of the earlier training in international protocols for these heads of nations. Internet technologies initially provided the means for the thousands of representatives to vote on issues. The first projects managed by the C.S.A. were
climate change adaptations using local environmental knowledge to address global issues at the local level.

Societal values and norms continued to shift through the 30s and 40s as Brazil, Russia, India and China brought their collectivist orientation to bear on world affairs. China championed the issues of poor and developing nations at the U.N. and power in the General Assembly shifted from coercive and economic power to moral authority and creating a more egalitarian world. China still had internal problems with breaches of human rights but made a commitment to U.N.P.O., a leading international organisation in the Civil Society Assembly, to sign a treaty in 2037 acknowledging the rights of Tibet, Taiwan and Inner Mongolia to self-determination.

The States, whose power had already been eroded from above by international organisations and from below by civil society and the renewed aspirations of nations to shape their own futures, were faced with the options of transformation or irrelevancy. If you’ve read the preparatory notes for this lecture you will know that most chose transformation and today their administrations are enablers of progress and coordinators of global programs at the Nations and local communities level. Heads of Nations run these administrations collectively in regional groupings of Nations with similar natural environs. The United Nations created its Parliamentary Assembly in 2045, replacing the General Assembly and replacing Heads of State with democratically elected Heads of Nations by 2049. This was considered a positive move, evidence of further democratisation of the U.N. and greater accountability to the people. I remember images of that time and slogans ‘we the people’ being chanted in portal song rooms and interpreted artistically in the paint rooms.

The business sector overcame its earlier reluctance to involve itself openly in global affairs and formed, through the auspice of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, a lobby group that sought to influence the Parliamentary Assembly agendas. Business remained concerned at the state of the global economy that had been fluctuating wildly since the turn of the twenty-first century with disastrous business, social and ecological effects. A mock
business assembly was trialled from 2050 to 2055 with leading signatories of the U.N. global compact and W.B.C.S.D. members. Their inputs to decisions by the Parliamentary and Civil Assemblies proved invaluable and the U.N. Business Assembly became a permanent fixture in 2057, after several rounds of negotiations.

The U.N.P.O., as representatives of previously unrepresented nations and peoples, attracted many more members over the years as heads of nations sought assistance and support in international relations skills from a trusted adviser. At one point U.N.P.O. membership grew to over 400 nations and peoples. Innovative use of WorldNet communications technologies enabled members to connect with each other and influential C.S.A. representatives, bypassing corporate controlled media channels, censorship and communications embargoes. The U.N.P.O. was influential in promoting the transition from G.D.P. as a sole measure of State progress to the more holistic Planetary Progress Indicators (P.P.Is) that we use today to measure..... what Simti?..... correct! Social, ecological, political, economic, spiritual and technological progress of the human family and the planetary health and wellbeing of Earth. These early efforts to understand the complexity of our universe eventually led to ..... yes, Lundvik?..... correct! Our current research into measures of progress for our universe. Again, how times have changed. In the mid 1900s, there was widespread fear and superstition of alien spacecraft and little green men from Mars! By 2000 we had begun to explore our universe and look beyond it into the multiverse in hope of finding other life. Today we have the space elevators and interplanetary transport to explore other worlds and look for potential future homes for Earth’s people. But I digress....

Ongoing challenges posed by climate change saw a gradual shift in thinking from globalisation as money and politics, the twentieth-century view, to globalisation as a social equaliser; unity of the human family to meet the challenges that affected them all. In 2059 the Nations, civil society, businesses and reformed U.N. were ready to make the final transition to ‘One World.’
Meetings of the Assemblies were convened, negotiations progressed and in 2061 the announcement was made: there was an agreed planetary alliance of all nations. ‘One World’ commenced operations in 2062.

That ends today’s lecture and I leave you with one point to ponder and discuss in your oral essay: as a planet whose human family are beginning to take responsibility for their role in the future of our universe, what might be the equivalent of ‘One World’ in the universal sense, and how have humans historically seen their role and relationship with the universe?”

The following table summarises the timeline for transition to the U.N.P.O. preferred future:

**Table 11: U.N.P.O. Story Timeline.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Decade</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>U.N. established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>W.O.M.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Thatcher/Reagan alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Y2K panic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010s</td>
<td>Egeland/Ibarra introduce long-range planning to the U.N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030s</td>
<td>Global civil society admitted to the U.N. General Assembly. Brazil, Russia, India, China bring collectivist influence to bear on international affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2037</td>
<td>China signs treaty, acknowledging rights of Tibet, Taiwan and Inner Mongolia to self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2045</td>
<td>U.N. Parliamentary Assembly formed replacing General Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2049</td>
<td>Heads of State replaced by elected U.N.P.A. heads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2057</td>
<td>U.N. Business Assembly formed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2062</td>
<td>‘One World’ replaces the U.N.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As U.N.P.O. delegations favour a reformed U.N. I will summarise the analysis of findings with two C.L.A. matrices that represent a synthesis of elements from the literature, from the U.N.P.O. materials, and my interpretation of these. The first, Table
12, maps the distinctions between the current U.N. model of global governance, based on outdated Western notions of linear strategy, and the U.N.P.O. preferred future that is founded on more contemporary, collaborative, and non-linear strategy concepts. This provides a sharp contrast between the cultural orientations of individualism and collectivism that I have interpreted using the metaphors ‘I think therefore I am’ and ‘I am because we are’.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Litany as measures of success</td>
<td>Number of States as members of U.N.</td>
<td>Number of people with access to planetary decision-making forums.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ideological</td>
<td>Time as commodity; linear time. Domination.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cultural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Scientific</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Temporal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Societal organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors and Myths</td>
<td>West and the rest. I think therefore I am. The Queen Mary exclusive cruise ship: limited places at the Captain’s table.</td>
<td>The world is a village. I am because we are. ‘One World’ inclusive spaceship: rotation of invites to the bridge.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An alternative system from the U.N.P.O. perspective would see global decisions taken at the nations and communities level, articulated through regional groupings such as the African Union and then into a reformed U.N. A Civil Society Assembly would provide access to ‘the people of the world’, including heads of nations, other non-State actors, and individuals, as envisaged by the Commission on Global Governance. In the second matrix, Table 13 below, I have further interpreted the summaries, deconstructed the current U.N. centred global governance system from both the U.N. and U.N.P.O. perspectives, and provided a synthesis that, borrowing from Giri (2006) is intended to work ‘out an emancipatory space that inhabits both and transform the space to one of creative reconciliation.’ The final word of the synthesis is the metaphor “Symbiosis” which is a direct extract from the U.N.P.O. texts.13

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13 At this point I was concerned that my interpretive voice might overpower that of the U.N.P.O. and searched for their words to describe my interpretation. “Symbiosis” is the perfect metaphor for nations living in harmony with each other and the Earth.
Table 13: Deconstruction, Reconstruction and Synthesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.N. Perspectives</th>
<th>Deconstructed from the non-State Actors’ View</th>
<th>Reconstructed as Synthesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global governance is the</td>
<td>Participation in planetary decision-making is the right</td>
<td>Non-State actors are key partners in global decisions, policy making and local implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responsibility of the powerful.</td>
<td>and responsibility of all.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of States are the</td>
<td>Heads of States do not represent the people of the</td>
<td>The inclusion of non-State actors will improve planetary decision-making and democratise global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>world.</td>
<td>governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. global governance is</td>
<td>U.N. global governance is at risk of becoming irrelevant</td>
<td>Reform is necessary for the U.N. to remain relevant and for stewardship of the interconnected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>necessary for peace and</td>
<td>with the decline of States.</td>
<td>systems that nurture the human family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prosperity.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Might is right.</td>
<td>The sacred cow.</td>
<td>Symbiosis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.6 Chapter Summary.

In chapter five I used C.L.A. to analyse the current U.N. global governance model and power bases and the neoliberal form of globalisation that is shaping its functions and form. I then constructed six alternative models from the ideological worldviews and discourses of interest groups with strong positions on globalisation and discovered or created the myths and metaphors underlying these worldviews. The use of C.L.A. as analytical method provided insights as to how a particular model might measure its success, the nature of the dominant system—social, technological, economic, ecological or political; or a sub-system thereof— that is producing the measures, the worldviews and discourses that privilege and support that system, and the metaphors and myths that might be operating at a subliminal level of consciousness providing evolutionary direction and creating alternative realities. For each of the proposed future models of global governance I presented a short visionary story using elements from the analytical framework as a basis for what Mittelman refers to as ‘grounded utopias’ (Mittelman 2005:21). These short plausible stories serve as the means to communicate the possibilities and generate various images of the future in the mind of the reader. I then created a more fully developed U.N.P.O. preferred future, privileging U.N.P.O. data and principles. This was written in narrative form as a history of the future.
Niiniluoto (2001:375) recognises that futures discourse is a form of directed cultural evolution: ‘an artefact that is created by human actions’. C.L.A. applied as method in this thesis provided the means of accessing and framing deeper social truths at the symbolic level. As language is a symbolic system, as well as a constitutive one, resymbolisation in the form of grouping phrases to create new metaphors became an important function of this research. Metaphors were thus used in this thesis as catalytic language to create new futures as well as for sense making of existing deep structures of knowledge (Flick 2009; Judge 1993) including myths. Acknowledging the pivotal role of language, I introduced some new terminology, new metaphors and new stories as possibilities of global governance futures. The stories are social artefacts that emerged from the interactions between participants, myself included, their data and the literature.
Chapter Six

Joining the Quilting Circle: Conclusions and Implications
6.1 Introduction.

At the outset of this project my aim was to assist the U.N.P.O. to amplify its voice in the emerging global governance futures conversation. I argued that there is a need for research on global governance futures that focuses on the views of those unrepresented in the current system, both on moral grounds and from the perspective of eliciting unconventional inputs to the growing international conversation on this topic. A review of the literature on global governance futures revealed that this conversation was not well developed, however a small number of non-State actor groups are beginning to position themselves in the discussion of possible future global governance architectures. The field of global governance studies is relatively new and the literature concerning global governance futures studies even less developed. Writers on the subject of global governance view it as a necessity for one of three interconnected reasons: to manage the common affairs of the human family, such as climate change and future potable water needs for a growing global population; as a product of societal evolution and social organisation for a planetary civilisation; or as an inevitability of globalisation. Whilst globalisation discourses are many and varied, few researchers to date have taken these contesting discourses further to develop global governance futures.

The literature review also exposed a gap in the deeper, ideological levels of exploration of globalisation and global governance. To address these gaps, assist the U.N.P.O., and contribute to the body of knowledge, I elected to develop a small number of global governance futures as potential emergences from alternative globalisation ideologies. I chose C.L.A. as the primary analytical method for its ability to accommodate many ways of knowing and its layered approach that facilitates deeper levels of enquiry into ideological worldviews and the metaphors and myths that shape evolutionary direction. Exploration of these deeper layers of the central issue has been vital to this study that sought to understand the emerging conversation concerning global governance futures and to position U.N.P.O. as one participant in the conversation.

Using C.L.A. in my account and analysis of the research findings, I developed an analytical framework that synthesised elements of the competing globalisation
discourses, themes from the macrohistorical writings of Galtung and Inayatullah (1997), the alternative globalisations work of Ramos (2010), Khagram’s (2006) scholarship in alternative global governance architectures, and U.N.P.O. materials. I then stitched together future global governance models based on the ideologies of prominent actor groups competing for attention in the emerging global governance discourses, considering their history and worldviews, and the forms of structure, agency, and episteme that are congruent with their ideologies. Given the slow rate of change associated with shifts in ideology and worldviews, it is reasonable to assume that these commitments will shape the preferred futures of the different actor groups. In this final chapter of the thesis I discuss the implications of the research findings for theory, policy and practice.

6.2 Conclusions About the Research Question.

As presented in chapter one, a research question was posed to guide this project:

By what means might international non-State actors transform global governance in alternative futures and what is the preferred global governance future of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation?

Four research objectives were developed to support this question:

1. To explore the views of U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly delegates as to the major issues facing the human family;
2. To discover how delegates view the prospect of social organisation at the planetary level;
3. To understand the positions of other non-State actors that are engaging in the international conversation on global governance futures;
4. To develop a preferred global governance future for U.N.P.O. to enable them to join the international conversation.

These objectives have been achieved and the research undertaken for this thesis has generated original material as a contribution to an ecology of knowledge concerning global governance futures.
Objective one: To explore the views of U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly delegates as to the major issues facing the human family.

As discussed in chapter five, the major issues identified by U.N.P.O. are security, the environment, social justice, inequalities, identity, exclusion, and neoliberal globalisation. There are clearly some areas of agreement with the global issues identified by several authors and discussed in chapter two as neoliberal globalisation, terrorism, wars, climate change, anticipated energy, food and water shortages, growing world population, poverty, the standards of living in third world countries, the status of women, science and technology, transnational organised crime, health issues (in particular pandemics), and rogue States (Mason, 2006, Cocks, 2003, Wallerstein, 2004, The Millennium Project 1996-2011). The environment and climate change, involvement of women in key decision-making roles, the potential for science and technology to be both progressive and regressive, rogue States and neoliberal globalisation are common concerns. U.N.P.O.’s issue of security can be considered to incorporate terrorism, wars, rogue states and transnational organised crime, whilst their concern regarding persistent inequalities is similar to the concerns for poverty, standards of living in third world countries, and the status of women identified in the literature.

Where U.N.P.O. delegates add a very different perspective to the international conversation of global issues is in the areas of identity and exclusion. As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the majority of writers commenting on global affairs are English-speaking white men from wealthier States who are fortunate enough to live in countries where freedom of speech is an accepted norm. I commend their work. However being de-identified as people and being excluded from international decision-making forums where their future is decided upon is outside of the first-hand experience of these writers. From the emic U.N.P.O. perspectives, de-identification and exclusion are significant barriers to world harmony. These perspectives could be viewed as an expected response from nations that are unrepresented and peoples in situations of oppression. Galtung, however, understands this ongoing situation as a threat to world peace when he writes of ‘2000 nations in 200’ States (2007:153), States being comprised of many nations and usually dominated by one nation. 2000 nations as groups of people with common cultures, languages, histories and an attachment to a
homeland (Galtung 2000) in an era when the State system is declining and nationalism and civil society involvement in international affairs is rising; for Galtung there is clearly the potential for increasing inter-nation and inter-State conflict. Whilst U.N.P.O. members are committed to non-violent solutions to their considerable challenges, they are only a small number of the many nations that are not directly represented at the U.N. There are potentially another 1800 nations that are unrepresented or underrepresented in international decision-making forums who might choose the path of violence to achieve the recognition and freedoms that the politically and economically powerful States have created, and continue to maintain, for themselves. De Sousa Santos (2003) presents similar situations in his sociology of absences as deliberate productions of non-existence, as discussed in chapter two. In relation to the subject matter of this thesis, the current system of global governance actively produces the non-existence of 1800 nations; it de-identifies them. As well, the perspectives of unrepresented nations and peoples lose their credibility, as the U.N. system perceives them through a bureaucratic lens. The ramifications of continuing this exclusion and de-identification, and of allowing atrocities to be committed unchecked in several countries, might well be more incidents of international and intra-national conflict and terrorism as Galtung (2000) suggests. In his view, a form of world federation might serve as a peaceful world system.

**Objective two: To discover how delegates view the prospect of social organisation at the planetary level.**

Prior to this research the views of nations previously subsumed into States-based social organisation concerning a posited emerging planetary civilisation were little known. There are mixed views within the U.N.P.O. membership as to whether a planetary civilisation is an opportunity or a threat. Some U.N.P.O. delegates view social organisation at a planetary level as a positive move to a world of common values, for others it is potentially an additional threat to their fragile existence. Those seeing organisation at a planetary civilisation as a positive development envisage opportunities for the emergence of a more egalitarian society, greater solidarity between nations and peoples in addressing humanity’s common affairs, improved access to human rights, and a life in dignity for all. Their view of globalisation as unity of the world’s people and a means to reduce conflicts is in stark contrast to the prevailing view discussed in chapter two which continues to promote globalisation as economic growth driven by
neoliberal politics in which clashes of civilisations are perceived as inevitable. The collectivism inherent in the U.N.P.O. spirit of Ubuntuism, the indigenous epistemology and recognition of many ways of knowing, the valuing of nature above economy are all consistent with emerging schools of thought concerning the form that societal evolution and progress needs to assume in the twenty-first century: that of societies living in harmony with nature, reducing consumption of natural resources, advancing technologies that assist with environmental improvements, and collaborating to manage the global commons; as U.N.P.O. say ‘symbiosis’.

Conversely other U.N.P.O. delegates, describing their present situations with the meme ‘cultural genocide,’ are threatened by the possibility of another level of social organisation from which they could be excluded or which might provide additional barriers to the recognition of their identity. Here I see similarities to the theories advanced by Eisler (1991, 1995, 1998) and Campbell (1991; Campbell and Moyers 1988) when they discuss how peaceful and advanced societies in the past were destroyed culturally and then physically. With few exceptions, U.N.P.O. nations and peoples are being eradicated either physically, or culturally by the abolition of their cultural beliefs and practices. Artefacts are being destroyed; histories ‘wiped clean’; dissenters, peaceful or otherwise, executed or made to disappear; communications blocked; outsiders, including the U.N. and other independent organisations, denied access.

**Objective three: To find out what other non-State actors are engaging in the international conversation on global governance futures; their positions on the issue and their underlying ideological worldviews.**

In order for U.N.P.O. to join the international conversation on global governance futures the Presidency, Secretariat and members need to understand the nature of the conversation, whose voices are currently dominating the space, the issues of concern for them, and the deeper ideological commitments, discourses, worldviews, metaphors and myths that are driving their engagement. Global governance futures being an undeveloped area of research, meeting this objective relied upon the literature review for discovery and analysis of information concerning other actors in this space.
Subsequent analysis of U.N.P.O. materials and the literature reveals several areas where U.N.P.O.’s preferred future has common interests with other actor groups, suggesting common ground could be found to create a unifying voice. These common interest areas are discussed later in this chapter under the heading of implications for policy and practice.

Objective four: To develop a preferred future model of global governance for U.N.P.O. to enable them to join the growing international conversation.

Whilst U.N.P.O. delegates were willing to share interesting stories as to how decisions were made by their communities in the past, their strong commitment to democracy reveals a preference for egalitarian decision-making in the future. U.N.P.O. delegates are promoting a greater inclusion of women in international decision-making forums and much wider consultative mechanisms that allow for local leaders to brief and consult with men’s groups, women’s groups and youth on the issues and potential resolutions. This contrasts strongly with decision-making at the U.N. General Assembly where heads of State make the decisions and a large majority of these are men, as discussed in chapter three. For U.N.P.O. decisions on global matters need to be considered in the context of local conditions and taken by the heads of nations in consultation with local committees.

6.3 Research Contributions.

This project is original in that it captures a range of perspectives on the common affairs of the human family and governance for a future planetary civilisation from unrepresented nations and peoples. It is significant in focusing on planetary inequality and innovative in its engagement with the U.N.P.O. as nations and peoples of the world that are currently unrepresented at the U.N. Specifically, the research contributions are discussed in the context of the fifteen criteria for original contributions to knowledge identified by Phillips and Pugh (2005) and based on earlier work by Francis (1976) and Phillips (1993). This study of global governance futures met five of these. First, it links action research and storytelling, combining the pragmatism of action research with the presentational way of knowing associated with the arts, storytelling and theatre (McArdle and Reason 2008). The resulting method overcame the participants’
reluctance to being interviewed and supported previous research findings that storytelling is a medium known to, and used by, all cultures. The use of C.L.A. to frame the analysis at multiple levels of consciousness addresses Fiss and Hirsch’s (2005) proposition that more work is needed at the deeper levels in order to more fully understand globalisation. C.L.A. also accommodates an extended epistemology, recognising experiential, presentational, propositional and practical, as well as other ways of knowing, and is therefore consistent with the Participatory Action Research strategy. Thus the thesis is original in its use of methodology and methods in a way they have not been used before in global governance futures research.

Second, whilst the topics of globalisation, planetary civilisation, global challenges and global governance are not new to Futures Studies, this study explores an area that futures researchers have not considered before by focusing on the images of futures held by marginalised people, thereby enriching the international debate on global governance futures by including perspectives previously ignored or constructed as nonexistent.

Third, taken together the literature and analyses show that global governance futures have not previously been developed at the Worldview or Metaphor and Myth levels nor have other researchers synthesised the elements of agency and power, structure, history, future, and ideology to produce more holistic views of global governance on a normative futures basis. Thus this thesis contributes to propositional knowledge by developing a synthesis that has not been made before. Fourth, it builds on the alternative globalisations scholarship and concepts of Ramos (2010) and Khagram’s (2006) exploration of alternative global governance structures making an original contribution to knowledge by reinterpreting existing material. Fifth, it adds ‘to knowledge in a way that has not been done before’ by increasing our understanding of the power of presentational ways of knowing, such as storytelling, in action research (Phillips and Pugh 2005:61-62).

In relation to the four forms of knowledge associated with Participatory Action Research as discussed in chapter four this study makes specific contributions: the experiential knowledge of international issues acquired by co-researchers during direct and meaningful encounters over the eight day U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly;
presentational knowledge that emerged from the experiential to present the meaning and significance of images of futures through the creative medium of story; propositional knowledge, building on existing scholarly works to generate ideas and theories of alternative global governance futures; and practical knowledge, enhancing the ability of co-researchers in the workshop to share knowledge in an empowering and organisationally useful way. The U.N.P.O. are ready to participate in the global governance futures conversation, and could develop policy and activities towards achieving the preferred future. In this context, this research has implications for theory, and for U.N.P.O. policy and practice.

6.4 Implications for Theory.

*Implications of the use of C.L.A. in normative world order models.*

As discussed in chapter three, in Beer’s (1979) critique of the W.O.M.P. he concluded that future work in the domain of normative world order models needed to include a wider variety of ideological perspectives. Some 30 years later, Marchetti (2009:136) discovered ‘the academic discourse on ideal models of global politics is very underdeveloped. Few attempts have been made to map ideological background visions of global politics’. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by using C.L.A. to map ideological background visions of global governance futures, connecting deeply held ideological worldviews with their underlying metaphors and myths, and with their products, the systems and litany level of global governance issues. The synthesis of layers of C.L.A., a futures research method, with analytical elements from macrohistory produced a new interpretation of C.L.A., enabling me to travel down the layers of what is, propose new stories, and then travel up newly constructed layers of what could be.

The experience of using this approach to explore the topic at the deeper levels of consciousness in this particular study suggests there are implications for futures studies seeking to achieve transformational, or triple-loop, learning for the individual participant and for the organisational collective. Whereas single loop learning is primarily adaptive and incremental learning concerned with providing new skills to the individual and the organisation; and double loop learning is fundamentally generative, challenging assumptions and deeply held beliefs in an effort to reframe the underlying
patterns of thought and behaviour; triple loop learning involves enquiry into traditional mind-sets values or paradigms to identify and transcend outmoded limitations and can produce a significant shift in our worldviews and our views of ourselves (Raelin 2006).

An exploration of metaphors, and in particular the allegiance at the U.N. to ‘survival of the fittest’, an anachronism from its Westphalian past, shows that new language is needed for transformational change. For the most part futures researchers have a tendency to use the language of the past and present to communicate the work; many still discuss the ‘tools’ of the futures researcher whilst encouraging a shift away from the machine metaphor of the twentieth century that memetically introduced the word ‘tools’ to mean methods or techniques to ‘fix’ the future. As language is constitutive of futures it is vital to transformative aims for researchers to introduce new words, phrases and metaphors, as has been achieved in this thesis. The use of words is further explored in differentiating ‘agency’, understood as the individual’s ability to effect change, with ‘communion’, understood herein as the collective’s ability to effect change or a collaborative, partnerships approach. This again reaffirms the stark contrast between the individualistic metaphor ‘I think therefore I am’ with the collectivist metaphor and philosophy of Ubuntuism ‘I am because we are’.

Implications for Futures Studies.
This thesis enhances understanding of the perspectives of unrepresented nations and peoples concerning global governance futures by listening to the voices of the victims, the marginalised and the excluded; those on the very edge of the periphery of international affairs. In doing so, it has brought them from the periphery into the core of a growing international conversation framed through Futures Studies. Their inclusion in the conversation introduces the new dimensions of identity and exclusion as potential causes of conflict and as challenges to a peaceful transition to a new world order. Whereas Huntington might consider a ‘clash of civilisations’ to be a foregone conclusion, the participants in this research have demonstrated that Ghandian non-violence is an effective means of protest, awareness raising and issue resolution and that solidarity in facing common challenges can traverse perceived cultural fault lines.
Using Multiple Normative Futures from Different Actor Groups.

There are many forms of scenario creation and three were considered at the outset of this research as possibly suitable for the thesis: the double driver method, the archetype method, and my own emergent futures method. Each is used to produce multiple scenarios from the one organisation or community’s perspectives using various forms of uncertainty or systems mapping to frame a narrow range of alternative futures. In this thesis a different approach was used as the U.N.P.O. materials, and their aim to participate in international debate and decision-making alongside other groups, were not congruent with these scenario methods. No two over-riding critical uncertainties emerged as are required to frame scenarios in the double-driver method. The archetype method lacked sufficient structure to provide the depth of analysis suggested by Fiss and Hirsch (2005) in chapter two. For my own emergent futures method there was insufficient information to produce a complex adaptive systems map that generated credible and suitably different scenario platforms.

I therefore elected to adapt the Visionary Scenarios method that produces one preferred story for an organisation or community. It is a method that futures researchers might overlook as being too narrowly focused and not reflective of the uncertainty inherent in the future. However, in this thesis I consider global governance to be an emergent property of alternative forms of globalisation ideology so the uncertainty of the future is addressed by using the visioning method across multiple competing ideologies. As a result, rather than producing multiple scenarios for one organisation or community’s future as would have been the case had a different method been employed, this thesis develops multiple normative futures for the topic of global governance based on the perspectives of seven different non-State actor groups. This approach generates very different images of global governance futures and enables us to visualise a particular future should any one group or globalisation ideology prevail. Concerns regarding rigour, discussed in chapter four, are addressed by using a framework comprising themes from global governance futures discourses and structural elements from macrohistory. The resultant models can be systematically analysed, compared and contrasted at multiple levels of consciousness. This original approach has implications for transformative futures projects where a deeper understanding of multiple actors’ contested positions is needed and a synthesis of perspectives is required to produce an accommodating position. Collectively these preferred futures represent the
international conversation on global governance futures that U.N.P.O. seeks to join. In that regard, it may prove useful in other international and inter-cultural conversations as Gordon (2011) suggests.

*Implications for Participatory Action Research in Futures Studies.*

In this study a participatory action research approach is used as the strategy of enquiry for developing normative futures for groups of actors engaging in an emerging conversation on global governance futures and to provide U.N.P.O. participants with a transformational learning experience. In its customary application to individual and localised projects, P.A.R. incorporates multiple engagements with co-researchers in the study, critical reflection at key intervals in the research, and regular feedback from participants. It is often undertaken over an extended time period. The situations of the geographically dispersed U.N.P.O. participants, many of whom have limited freedom of communication, are such that this has not been possible in this study. For the main, the study materials were obtained during meetings and multiple meaningful interactions during the intensive eight-day U.N.P.O. General Assembly. Whilst this concentration reduced opportunities for reflection, it provided a much deeper immersive experience that enabled participants to engage more closely with each other and focus more intently on the matters under discussion. In spite of the limited period of interaction, delegates at the General Assembly empowered themselves through the Anecdote Circles Futures Workshop learning from and with each other about global affairs, discussing their own nation’s challenges, and exploring possibilities for ongoing futures work within U.N.P.O.

This research therefore validates the application of action research theories in areas of broader societal debate, as distinct from previous applications which, as Bradbury and Reason (2006) note, have been largely limited to particular individual and local needs. Congruent with the philosophy of P.A.R., researchers using this strategy in futures studies and international studies might need to adapt the P.A.R. practices that have been developed through use in local projects to suit the needs of a broader application.
6.5 Implications for Policy and Practice.

In addition to this thesis’ contribution to theory, the findings also have implications for U.N.P.O. policy and practice. As Heron and Reason (2001:1) write, the primary focus in action research is action, ‘transformative practice that changes our way of being and doing and relating’ and therefore the key contribution of this thesis is to practical knowledge that can be used by U.N.P.O. towards achieving its aims. The findings also have implications for policy and practice at the U.N. and, to a lesser extent, for other non-State actor groups with limited or no access to U.N. decision-making forums.

**Implications for U.N.P.O. Policy and Practice.**

Despite some criticisms of the U.N., and preferences for more democratic decision-making processes, General Assembly delegates contributing to this research favour a reformed U.N. rather than a complete break with the past and the creation of a new global governance system. A reformed U.N. is the key to U.N.P.O. achieving some of its primary aims: a voice in international affairs, greater access to human and cultural rights, protection from the worst forms of violence, and engagement with indigenous and local knowledge for ecological stewardship. It is also the means by which the U.N. might ensure ongoing support from the U.N.P.O., one non-State actor group within an increasingly activist global civil society that is calling for U.N. reforms to be implemented.

Weaknesses of the U.N. system were discussed during the U.N.P.O. 2010 General Assembly. To address these weaknesses a reformed U.N. would need to extend membership of the Security Council, rescind the power of veto, and provide the means for the people of the world to participate in global governance, effectively democratising the U.N. The inclusion of heads of nations in major decision-making forums would overcome U.N.P.O.’s concern regarding the maintenance of artificially created borders. A reformed U.N. would also need to implement the Responsibility to Protect initiatives that aim to ensure swift peacekeeping intervention in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war, cultural genocide and the like, making sure that the initiatives are used to uphold human rights and not to increase the power of the already dominant States to interfere in domestic affairs, as discussed extensively by Falk (1975,
These reforms are consistent with those called for by scholars, activists, and at the highest levels of the U.N. They are consistent with China’s U.N. reform agenda, as reported by Wang and Rosenau (2009). The role China sees for itself in U.N. reform, as that of champion of developing nations and reformer from within, could make China a potential ally of U.N.P.O. However some U.N.P.O. members, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Taiwan, do not live under China’s rule voluntarily and it would be difficult for U.N.P.O. to continue to represent their interests whilst partnering with China. Feminist writers, as discussed earlier, also support a reformed U.N. model of global governance and have a common interest with U.N.P.O. in promoting the role of women in decision-making; transnational feminist movements would make a strong ally for U.N.P.O. in promoting U.N. reform. U.N.P.O.’s preferred global governance future, which includes representation of non-State actors in major U.N. decision-making forums, is also consistent with structural reforms proposed in Galtung’s (1995) three Assembly model that includes a People’s Assembly, and in Khagram’s (2006) architectures for global governance; both would rely on civil society feedback to ensure transparency, participation and accountability. Finally, the reforms that would best align with U.N.P.O. objectives are congruent with the aspirations of the former U.N. Secretary General Annan, current Secretary General Moon and the Commission on Global Governance.

Moon is particularly keen to implement the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) initiatives and reduce the risk of a repeat of the massacres in Bosnia, Kosovo or Rwanda, as discussed in chapter three. R2P could be utilised to alleviate considerable suffering in many nations yet there are concerns within the U.N. membership that this strategy is simply a means of extending the powers of the Security Council, which privileges a small group of economically and politically powerful States. For U.N.P.O. R2P cannot come soon enough to stop the killings, torture and forced disappearances. In relation to this, and other human rights issues, the historical Westphalian principle of non-intervention within State borders is proving to be a considerable barrier to U.N.P.O. members accessing their human and cultural rights, and their right to self-determination. In that regard, the U.N. reforms would also need to include the development of new foundational principles to replace the outdated, and now dysfunctional, Westphalian
model and the transition from Neoliberalism to Neohumanism. As Falk (2008) cautions, however, the U.N. has previously been unable to adapt to a changing world and seems incapable of reforming itself. It remains driven by Westphalian and neoliberal principles, privileges elite States, and decisions are taken, in the main, by men. Little headway has been made since the announcement of former Secretary General Annan more than a decade ago that the U.N. would need to reform to remain relevant in a changing world. Organisations such as U.N.P.O. and other international non-government organisations and movements could play a vital role in organising pressure groups, from political lobbying to flash-mobs catalysed through the Internet, insisting on reforms being implemented.

There are several areas where U.N.P.O.’s preferred future has common interests with the hypothetical preferred futures of actor groups discussed earlier. These interests, summarised in Table 14 below, create connections between the groups and have the potential to amplify the U.N.P.O. voice. In the Assertive Multilateralism model, the common interest is U.N. reform. In Planetary Partnerships it is increasing the role of women in decision-making forums. In Bioregionalism/Localisation the U.N.P.O. will find allies concerned about the natural environment and the need for global decisions to be adapted to local contexts. In Global Digital Democracies, the common interest is in using information and communication technologies to enable all the people of the world to participate in debates and decisions concerning our futures. In Grassroots Globalism, the U.N.P.O. can make connections with others suffering the impacts of colonialism, neoliberal globalisation, and social and ecological harm. In Cosmopolitan Democracy, the rule of law and focus on rights might assist the U.N.P.O. with accessing the human rights to which members are entitled.

Table 14: Common Interests of U.N.P.O. and Others’ Global Governance Futures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Future Global Governance Model</th>
<th>Areas of Common Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assertive Multilateralism.</td>
<td>U.N. reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planetary Partnerships.</td>
<td>More women in decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bioregionalism/Localisation.</td>
<td>Natural environment and local decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Globalism.</td>
<td>Colonialism and neoliberal globalisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitan Democracy.</td>
<td>Legal rights.</td>
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Transforming Global Governance: Contesting Images of the Future from People on the Edge of the Periphery
The first step towards the preferred U.N.P.O. global governance future is the development of a U.N.P.O. policy or position statement on global governance. The policy or statement could reflect the issues discussed above, supporting a reformed U.N. whilst maintaining pressure on the U.N., alongside other non-State actors, to end the protracted discussions and enact the reforms. Whether or not the power of veto could be used to block reforms is unclear although the veto was not originally intended for such purposes.

**Implications for U.N. Policy and Practice.**
As discussed previously, U.N. reform is imperative if the organisation is to remain relevant in a changing world. Increasing activism and pressure from global civil society coupled with the declining power of States in world affairs, and the need for a coordinated approach to issues such as climate change, point to the need for reform to be actioned urgently. A proposed metaphor and myth for planetary participation in global decision-making, ‘the world is a village’ and ‘One World’, speak to the need for greater involvement of the local in the global as de Sousa Santos (2003) discusses in his sociology of absences. It also answers Secretary General Annan’s metaphorical challenge of the U.N. approaching a fork in the road (Falk 2008). A more positive, and perhaps more palatable, discussion within the U.N. might be framed as organisational transformation within the context of societal evolution to the planetary phase. The U.N.P.O. story of the future suggests hypothetical steps that could be taken to transform the U.N. over time but it is clear that the first step must be taken soon if the U.N. is to continue to attract support rather than diminish in standing along with the decline of the States.

The continuous efforts of Annan and Moon to encourage reforms have largely been unsuccessful due to resistance to change and reluctance to cede power within the General Assembly and the Security Council. In this regard the U.N. General Assembly could learn from the U.N.P.O. At the U.N.P.O. General Assembly 2010 the solidarity of members in addressing issues of significance to the attending delegations overcame all other potentially divisive matters such as race, religion, political affiliation, gender, class and the like: they were completely united in their common cause. The potential
scale of the current challenges facing the human family is such that solidarity of this nature within the U.N. is required to effectively coordinate global responses.

Whilst some scholars maintain that the first step must be rescinding the power of veto and extending Security Council membership, the inclusion of non-State actors in global decision-making forums might be an easier way of introducing the reform agenda. Past experiences of civil society involvement in U.N. forums on environmental issues, for example, have been successful and have added considerable value to the proceedings (Falk 2008). U.N. policy could be drafted to accommodate such involvement in accordance with the recommendations from the Commission on Global Governance and other eminent scholars and advisers. A five-year trial program could be actioned during which strategies and processes can be reviewed, monitored and used to improve the program.

**Implications for Other Non-State Actors.**

The future planetary participation models proposed are hypothetical and intended to catalyse debate and social activism by non-State actors as well as within the U.N. and the U.N.P.O. Actors such as the transnational feminist movement, World Social Forum, environmental N.G.O.’s, cyber-activists and online peer-to-peer protagonists, global citizenship movements, and other unrepresented nations and peoples could use this research as a starting point for the formulation of their own policy and engagement in shaping the means by which the common affairs of the human family are decided upon in the future. However a key obstacle in the involvement of non-State actors and civil society generally in global affairs is the fragmentation of the social sector (Deacon 2003). Scholars engaging with the World Social Forum have discovered a widely diverse array of interests and activist groups that are reluctant to coordinate themselves formally in an organisational structure, preferring instead to remain an open movement and resisting the notion of representing the social sector in world affairs (de Sousa Santos 2004; Ramos 2010; World Social Forum 2009). Here again the solidarity of U.N.P.O. is instructional and perhaps the World Social Forum could emulate the U.N.P.O. General Assembly approach to debating issues and developing resolutions and action plans. The U.N.P.O., in turn, should consider participation in the major forums of these non-State actors, thereby further amplifying U.N.P.O. members’ voices in international affairs.
6.6 Limitations and Areas for Further Research.

In chapter four I outlined my rationale for various decisions made about the scope and design of this research. Here I summarise the limitations and issues encountered that were beyond the scope of the study and those suggesting areas for further research.

In the Critical Social Constructionist paradigm the importance of context is emphasised. The context of this study has been that of the 2010 General Assembly of the U.N.P.O., an international non-governmental organisation comprising a culturally and linguistically diverse membership with the common attribute of being unrepresented at the U.N. and other international forums. A limitation of this research is that the findings are restricted to this context. Further research could apply the theoretical framework used for U.N.P.O. to develop the alternative planetary participation models in other contexts such as the international feminist or neohumanist movements.

The lack of freedom of communication and participation in this study has limited interactions with U.N.P.O. members almost entirely to the meetings and other meaningful encounters during the General Assembly. This has resulted in the production of models and stories yet to receive final input from participating delegations. In that context I consider these models and stories to be the start of conversations within the U.N.P.O. concerning their position on global governance and their future relationship with the U.N. I aim to present a short report and discuss the research findings at the next General Assembly and seek input for further development and use of the materials by U.N.P.O. during that forum, thereby encouraging ownership congruent with their right to self-determination. This also provides the reciprocal loop that is characteristic of P.A.R. and which I have been unable, as yet, to complete.

Three changes in Secretariat staff throughout the research period have each produced a new relationship between the organisation and me that has limited the extent of my engagement with the participants. I have moved from a position of participant/observer to research partner to observer/researcher according to the level of engagement facilitated by the different Secretariat contacts.
Whilst I remain convinced that other cultures will add richness to the debate on global governance futures, and sought to include these perspectives by emphasising U.N.P.O. data, the literature available in English that presents other cultural perspectives is very limited when compared with the volume of scholarly works produced by the U.S., Europe and Australia. A limitation of this research has been my own narrow range of languages. Further research undertaken by an international multi-cultural research team that has English as a common language would ensure cultural diversity in perspectives whilst enabling researchers to produce articles and reports for a wider audience.

The increasing use of storytelling in research and development projects suggests a possible transition from visual metaphors to aural that warrants further investigation if, as I contend in this thesis, metaphors and myths shape societal evolutionary direction.

The bricoleur approach to Futures Studies represents a more eclectic approach to the work than is usual in the futures and foresight domain and a possible approach suitable for the exploration of non-linear futures, as distinct from the linear approach characterised by single point forecasting and strategic planning, and the multi-linear futures generated by most scenario methods. The synthesis of concepts and insights from Participatory Action Research, storytelling, and Futures Studies creates a new form of futures research that makes this research original.

6.7 Conclusion.

This participatory action research project explored images of global governance futures from the perspectives of nations and peoples unrepresented in the current global governance system. The theoretical framework proposed that such images were linked to the worldviews held by actor groups, that these were underpinned by metaphors and myths, and that collectively worldviews, metaphors and myths influenced choices of preferred global governance structure, power and agency, and priority global issues for that actor group. Whilst participants in this study had distinctly different cultural worldviews, the underlying conclusion of the materials generated by interviews, a storytelling workshop, observations, and delegate presentations is that the worldview of
the unrepresented, the marginalised, and the excluded overcame cultural differences that might otherwise have created a barrier to solidarity.

The literature suggested that a system of global governance is needed for the human family to address global issues that are beyond the capacity of individual nations, to manage the effects of globalisation, and to handle the common affairs of a planetary civilisation that some writers believe is emerging as a natural course of societal evolution. Historically societies evolved in relative isolation from one another. Language and symbolic representation developed with culture and social organisation as the most efficient means to ensure common understanding between members of the same family or society (Rose 2005). The shared norms, values and knowledge needed to survive were handed down ‘with Mother’s milk’, a Finnish axiom, from generation to generation, in symbolic cave paintings, then orally by means of myths in the stories told to children and shared between adults, and then in written form as history (Armstrong 2005; Campbell 1991; Cocks 2003; Snowden 2005b; Wallerstein 2004). As our means of social organising grew in complexity from nomadic clans, to village settlements, cities, states, nations and civilisations, we assumed additional layers of identity and new allegiances. Body, brain, mind, consciousness, language, culture, social organising, technology and story co-evolved to make us who and what we are today: Homo Narrans, the storytelling ape (Snowden 2008).

Human societal evolution has not been the smooth linear or expansionist path implied by some of the literature. Our present is the product of many societal descents and emergences, regress and progress, environmental catastrophes, wars, and legends of courage and exploration, millennia of peace and astounding works of art (Berry 1999; Campbell 2003; Diamond 2006; Eisler 1991, 1995; Friedman 1998; Galtung and Inayatullah 1997; Gimbutas 2007; Maisels 1999; Raviliois 2010; Sarkar 2005; Swkwirk 2008). Nonetheless the literature suggests that next stage of social organisation will involve human societies converging to be reunited in a new form of globalisation, informed by a planetary consciousness with an inherent planetary identity.
Governance of human society throughout history is fundamentally a social phenomenon. Society gives itself identity, decides how it will manage itself and make its decisions, establishes rules and, in recent times, institutions to enact its will. Over the millennia societies have risen and fallen. Conflicts between and within societies, environmental collapses, and natural disasters have changed the physical and geopolitical landscapes over time. Yet it seems almost inexorably that societies reform into larger groupings. Planetary civilisation is therefore considered a process of becoming: a complex emergent entity in a long history of rearranged interdependence, conflict, network creation and development. Society is a complex adaptive system and can rapidly adapt to changing conditions if it chooses (Laszlo 2006, 2008) taking a path of planetary participation rather than global governance; power with rather than power over the people of the world. Images of futures, metaphors and myths, such as those developed for this thesis, provide visual and aural catalysts for transformational change at deeper levels of human consciousness. Laszlo believes that cultural transformation is the next step to a ‘new plateau of human existence’ (1978:741) whilst Spencer (cited in Korten 1996) speculates that world corporations will bring on the next stage of human evolution. For Ellyard (1998) we are already half-way to Utopia whilst Clemens posits that the ‘interdependence of States, globalisation, and the pyramid of power: military, economic, political, cultural’ (Clemens 2000:106) will determine how the common affairs of the human family will be governed in the future. Though the final form of planetary civilisation remains uncertain, a new worldview is emerging that integrates ideas from new sciences and from different cultures and religions into a new story about what it means to be human in the twenty-first century. There is a growing awareness of the interconnectedness of the dynamic systems of macro-reality that collide and spark new forms of creativity and new ways of living, being and thinking; an appreciation of systems thinking that aims to understand this interconnectedness and the larger context in which challenges and possibilities emerge for a myriad of futures.

The voices of unrepresented nations and peoples have yet to be included in the emerging global governance futures scholarship. This study starts to address that gap by developing a preferred U.N.P.O. future for planetary participation in global decision-making. Using an analytical framework that explores the issues at multiple layers of consciousness to frame the U.N.P.O. model and write the transition to their preferred future in story form, their image of the desired future is created and their perspectives
contribute to the growing body of knowledge. As the overall purpose of this research is to assist the U.N.P.O. to join the growing international conversation on global governance futures by formulating an U.N.P.O. preferred future, the thesis achieves its main objective. The principle of empowerment that is central to the aims of this study ensures that those who are the focus of the research gain from it. U.N.P.O. members are active subjects in the creation of their preferred global governance future. They empower themselves through learning with and from each other as occurred during meaningful interactions at the 2010 General Assembly and by using the knowledge generated to amplify their voices. Further, the policy initiatives identified through this research aim at achieving better futures for marginalised groups such as the U.N.P.O.

There are signs of an emerging global consciousness and the beginnings of a global civil society. These signs hold the promise of a strong social platform to counterbalance the historical dominance of political and economic systems of governance and to effect the societal transformation required by Laszlo and others to a more sustainable society (Baker and Chandler 2005; Bennis 2006; Eisler 1991; Kaldoor 2003; Laszlo 2008; Risse et al. 1999; Sandel 1996). Non-State actors are powerful on the international stage as global civil society. Unrepresented nations and peoples, if recognised, would represent the majority of the world’s people. Combined they are powerful beyond measure if only they will unite on the issues that affect us all. Then perhaps we might see what the Commission on Global Governance envisaged in 1995: the ‘people of the world’ using their power at this critical juncture in human history to collaboratively manage the common affairs of the human family.

In the meantime, U.N.P.O. members continue their struggles for survival, for freedom, for self-determination, and to access their human rights. Some nations and indigenous peoples are making headway, engaging with the U.N. Permanent Forum for Indigenous Peoples and the U.N. Human Rights Council, and making their issues more widely known through this level of participation and in non-violent demonstrations. In March 2012, for example, Abkhazia held democratic parliamentary elections without international support for their nation, but with extensive support from the people of Abkhazia. However, as reported in the U.N.P.O. March 2012 newsletter, conditions in
many regions continue to worsen. In Tibet, protests against China’s oppressive rule were marked by a significant rise in the number of self-immolations, while in East Turkestan, Uyghurs were threatened by State officials to convince relatives who had sought asylum to return home. On the African continent the Ogaden experienced a rise in the number of attacks against civilians by the Ethiopian military and private militia forces (U.N.P.O. 2012). The work of the U.N.P.O. to address these issues continues.
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Appendix 1: Interview Prompts and Questions April 2010

Below are a series of questions designed to prompt the sharing of stories and experiences. Please see them as prompts only and feel welcome to answer as many as you wish in any way you wish. Similarly if I have not asked a question that you feel is relevant, I would be delighted if you would provide any information you think important.

Before sending your responses back to me I ask that you review your answers and stories and highlight or emphasise the points that are the most important to you and your people so that I can better understand how you see and experience things:

Past:
Thinking about the past, talk about a few of the best moments in your nation/ peoples’ history

Thinking about the past, talk about a few of the worst moments in your nation/ peoples’ history

Why is your nation/people excluded from many international forums and how did that situation come about?

What does this mean to you/your people today?

How has your nation/people traditionally made decisions on issues that affect everyone? Is there a story you can share as an example to illustrate this?

Are there different roles for law-making, governance, decisions and if so who has taken on these responsibilities?

Present:
Thinking about the present, what do you see as the major issues facing humanity?
If your nation/people were given the opportunity to do something about these issues, how would they go about it?

What do you see as the key factors influencing the direction of global governance and international decision-making?

Looking at the way the world is governed now, what would you change and why?

Future:
According to many authors the human family is in the early stages of transition to a planetary phase of human civilisation. How do you/you nation or people view this prospect for the future? What do you see as positive about this possibility and what would concern you?

How would your people feel about taking on a planetary identity?

How would you like to see a future planetary civilisation address matters that affect everyone?

What are the different ways you envisage decisions concerning planetary issues could be made in the future?

If we were creating the ideal planetary decision-making entity for 2060, what would that look like to you?

Do you/your nation or people have a story for the future of the world and humans place in this?

What images come to mind when you think about a planetary civilisation of the future?
Appendix 2: Anecdote Circles Method.
(modified due to venue and equipment constraints during the 2010 U.N.P.O. General Assembly).

The following notes are direct quotes extracted from ‘The Anecdote Circle’, Snowden (2008), published by Cognitive Edge online as cited in the bibliography. They were used to inform the original design and subsequent modification of the workshop process. I undertook the Cognitive Edge accreditation program in 2009 and the Anecdote ‘Storytelling for Leaders’ program in 2011 in order to better apply storytelling methods to this research.

‘An anecdote circle is a gathering (physical or virtual) whose purpose is to generate and collect anecdotes about some issue or topic. Usually the anecdotes gathered will be used later in some sort of sense-making, and they may be placed in a narrative database for sense-making and as knowledge repository. An anecdote is a naturally occurring story, as found in the "wild" of conversational discourse.

What you are after in the anecdote circle is not purposeful stories, which are indicative of what people believe is expected of them, but anecdotes, which are more unguarded and truthful. For sense-making and knowledge sharing anecdotes are invaluable. They can answer many questions that direct questioning cannot. Telling stories allows people to disclose sensitive information without attribution or blame, because the inherent distance between reality and narration provides safety for truth-telling.

The general operating principle of the anecdote circle is this. Because "you only know what you know when you need to know it", it is difficult to get at aspects of knowledge, values and beliefs that are held in common but rarely talked about. When people tell each other stories about their experiences, the social negotiations that take place create conditions which recreate to some extent the feeling of being "in the field under fire", or, in the state of "needing to know". Thus hidden knowledge surfaces and becomes available in ways it could not otherwise do so. The end result is a diverse body of anecdotes that together
represent the true situation better than a few stories one might gather in simple interviews without such complex social exchanges. All of the narrative techniques we use in anecdote circles increase the complexity of the narrative patterns generated in natural conversation.

These are some elements of a well-functioning anecdote circle. If you see these things happening, leave things alone; if you don't, intervene. Each of these things also represents an obstacle to a well-functioning anecdote circle, because these are all things people need some help to talk about.

**Extremes.** People should be talking about best and worst moments, not about everyday things. What you are looking for is the boundaries of experience, not the midpoint. You are not interested in what a "typical day at the office" is like; you are interested in the best and worst days in a lifetime. And importantly, these extremes must include the negative as well as the positive. It is much easier to get "success stories" out of people than it is to get stories of failure and disappointment; but it is the latter that is usually more fruitful.

**Events.** People should be *recounting things that happened*. You are looking for stories, which are a qualitatively different type of data than any other kind of statement. All stories describe events; if nothing happens, it is not a story. Whether you get stories or not depends on how you frame the things you ask people to do. It can be as simple as making sure to ask "was there a time you felt proud" rather than "what were your accomplishments". Always frame your introductions to natural storytelling in terms of events - times, moments, experiences, instances, things that happened, and so on.

**Emotions.** In every situation there will be some issues that people are going to be at least a little passionate about. If that isn't happening you haven't found the issues yet. Sometimes it takes a while for people to open up and start talking about what really matters to them. You need to find a balance between using techniques that help move this along and just having patience and letting things take time. You can help people *too* much. Sometimes you will get all of your useful anecdotes in the last quarter of the anecdote circle's time. That's fine, as long as it happens.

**Experiences.** You want to hear about people's real experiences, because that is
where the real potential of narrative disclosure is realised. There are several techniques for fictional exploration but outside of any technique, you also need to convince people that you really do want to know what *their* experiences have been and that their perspectives are valuable to you. You can do that in how you talk about what the anecdote circle is about and why you need the perspectives the people in it have to offer. Your reasons for this will of course differ based on why you are holding the anecdote circle; but in nearly every case you will be truthfully able to say that you are after something deeper and more meaningful and significant than what can be found out by reading official stories or news stories or instruction manuals, something that only the people in the room know about. Knowing that what they will be talking about will be valuable will help people to volunteer what they know.

**Exchanges.** Naturally occurring storytelling lives in a habitat of conversation. It is not a "thing" you ask for but an emergent property of discourse. Whether you get emergence or "things" will depend entirely on how you present the anecdote circle. Watch your language. Never "ask" for a story. Never tell people "we want your stories" or in any way refer to a story as a thing. If you do that, you will tap into a lot of misperceptions about what a "story" or an "anecdote" is, including a novel, a movie, a comedy routine, a lie. What you want people to understand is that you want them to talk together about the past, about times and events in the past, about things that happened to them, about their experiences. If that happens, there will be much better anecdotes produced than if people believe they are "producing" anything.

**People and Timing.**
An anecdote circle should be populated by people who have some kind of shared experience and who can reflect together on some issue or topic or history. There should also be some diversity within the group, perhaps in age or background; normally this comes naturally and doesn't need to be planned. The number of people in an anecdote circle should be small - say ten to fifteen people. The process could take anywhere from two hours to a whole day, depending on how much material is desired and for what reason, and how many people you have access to and for how long. In general you want to gather as much rich and
diverse anecdotal material as possible in as short a time as possible. It is helpful to time the anecdote circle so that it comes when people are naturally more relaxed - say at the end of the day or the end of the week.

Capturing Anecdotes.
There are many ways to collect anecdotes in an anecdote circle. At one extreme, you need not capture any anecdotes if the purpose of the circle is to lead in to another sense-making exercise and not to populate a narrative database. At the other extreme, say if the people in the anecdote circle are hard to get together or will be impossible to get access to again, you may want to record every anecdote that is told. The most common technique is to record each small-group conversation in audio and have the tapes transcribed for use in a narrative database. You can also have scribes sit with each group and write down anecdotes as they are told; this method is quick because it doesn't require transcription, but it doesn't result in verbatim stories. There are circumstances in which scribes can be very useful, say if you will use the anecdotes the next day in sense-making exercises but won't need them in detail for a narrative database.

General Plan.
There are several techniques you can use to get people to tell anecdotes. You should be familiar with them, but you should not plan to use them in any kind of fixed agenda. The anecdote circle is perhaps the Cynefin method in which you need to think on your feet and adapt your plans to new circumstances more than any other. You will get all kinds of groups of people in an anecdote circle. People are famously diverse in (a) how much they tell stories, (b) how much they think they tell stories, and (c) whether they think it is worthwhile to tell stories. Some people live in a narrative world; some don't. It is easy to get people who are natural storytellers to tell stories - too easy, in fact, because if those are the only people telling stories you will get an insufficiently diverse set of anecdotes. Probably the most important thing about the anecdote circle is that people shouldn't be aware of a lot of structure or "objectives" in what they are doing.
They should mostly think they are having an interesting time reminiscing together. What you are trying to do above all is facilitate the emergence of natural storytelling in engaged energetic conversation, which will lead to the collection of a diverse body of meaningful anecdotes.

**Best and Worst Moments.**

A good way to get people to talk about experiences rather than opinions is to ask them to talk about best and worst moments. The word "moments" here is a stand-in for "events", which is what you are after - things happening, things unfolding *in time*. Ask people to think over the past and have them come up with a few of the best moments they can remember. This can be done from individual perspectives ("what were your best moments") or looking at the experience of the nation as a whole ("what have been the nation's best moments"). Encourage people to follow stories they hear with their own stories. One way to do that is to mention how stories usually *remind* people of other stories, and how the natural thread of storytelling in conversation is also a useful way for people to compare experiences and think together about something.

Using ditting as a technique takes advantage of the propensity of people to always want to "better" what someone else has done. This comes out often in spontaneous storytelling events. Ditting gets people to talk about things they might not have talked about otherwise because it brings things out to the extremes of experience, to areas that are less "safe", which is where some of the more important issues will surface. It's also a motivating factor to get people to tell more stories than they would otherwise have told, and to get more people to talk when they might have held back'.